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In his poetic exploration of the idea of Joy, Robert 
Browning makes an important contribution to the development 
of one of the most vital concepts in nineteenth-century 
English literature, a contribution which also elucidates 
the nature of his strategic place midway in the evolving 
Romantic tradition between Wordsworth and Yeats.
In the traditional Christian ethos, the concept of 
Joy was associated with supernatural virtue which man 
struggled to attain. With the disintegration of a viable 
Christian tradition, however, the idea of Joy came to be 
seen, partly through the impetus of the French Revolution, 
both as an egalitarian human right and as the unique pos­
session of the poetic consciousness. Chapter I examines 
Browning's idea of Joy against the background of some of 
the most important touchstones of the concept from Schiller's 
"Ode to Joy" to W. B. Yeats's "tragic joy," with special 
emphasis given Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Arnold. Since 
The Prelude is the most important embodiment of the idea of 
Joy in nineteenth-century English literature. Chapter II is 
devoted to an exploration of the complex and manifold
iv
implications which Wordsworth gives the concept of Joy. 
Wordsworth carefully identifies Joy as a power which partakes 
of "happiness" and "pleasure" but ultimately transcends both 
of these qualities and is associated with the essential 
dignity of human nature, with unity, with power and energy, 
and with the universality of the poetic imagination.
Browning's earliest attempts at the formulation of his 
idea of Joy are discussed in Chapter III from the standpoint 
of these aspects of the Wordsworthian concept of Joy. In 
Pauline, Paracelsus, and Sordello, Browning both extends 
and modifies the Romantic idea of Joy, while in Easter-Pay 
and in "Saul," he incorporates the concept firmly within 
the framework of his religious faith, recalling the tradi­
tional relation of the idea of Joy to Christian virtue. 
Browning dramatizes his concept of man's capability for Joy 
in some of his finest poems, and twenty-two of the poems 
of Men and Women and Dramatis Personae are examined in 
Chapter IV as they demonstrate his developing poetic concern 
with the idea of Joy.
In Chapter V, the relationship between Joy, energy, 
and the grotesque which John Ruskin emphasizes in the chapter 
on "The Nature of Gothic" in The Stones of Venice is dis­
cussed as it is manifested in Book One of The Ring and the
Book. Ruskin, following Coleridge and Wordsworth, identifies 
the concept of Joy with purity, energy, and universality. 
Browning extends this identification further through the 
dramatization of these qualities in his characterization of 
Pompilia, Caponsacchi, and the Pope. In the final chapter, 
Browning's struggle to maintain his idea of Joy is seen in 
a few of the poems of the 1870's and 1880's, especially in 
"Numpholeptos," La Saisiaz, and several of the poems of 
Ferishtah1s Fancies.
The idea of Joy is an attempt of the nineteenth- 
century literary consciousness to embody the most powerful 
experience discernible by the poetic vision and to draw upon- 
the concept of Joy as a unifying cultural experience which 
could rejuvenate a society that was being rapidly trans­
formed by technological progress. When it is identified and 
traced through some of his most important poems, Robert 
Browning's idea of Joy emerges as the most dynamic Victorian 
attempt to transmit and transmute the Romantic legacy of 
Joy-consciousness.
CHAPTER I
THE IDEA OP JOY:
ROBERT BROWNING AND THE TRADITION
The concept of Joy includes some of the most dynamic 
and crucial developments in nineteenth-century literature. 
Robert Browning's contribution to the idea of Joy is an 
important aspect of his poetry, important because it 
greatly enriches the poetic texture itself, but important 
also because it indicates one facet of Browning's strategic 
place in the Romantic tradition midway between Wordsworth 
and Yeats. Browning's modifications and extensions of the 
idea of Joy will be more relevant if they are considered 
against the background of a few of the important touchstones 
of the idea in the entire Romantic tradition.
For the idea of Joy is one of the complex literary 
motifs of the nineteenth century; it is a vital, protean 
concept which appears with varying subtlety and complexity 
in the chief Romantics and Victorians, and is modified and 
metamorphosed as it enters the twentieth century in the 
work of Hardy and Yeats. One thinks of Schiller's "Ode to 
Joy," most probably of its musical embodiment in Beethoven's
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Ninth Symphony; of the claim that Wordsworth makes for the 
"never-failing principle of joy"; of the loss of Joy des­
cribed by Coleridge in "Dejection"; of Keats's lament for 
the transitory visitations of "Joy, whose hand is ever at 
his lips / Bidding adieu"; of Browning's Cleon and his 
"joy hunger"; of Arnold's longing for "joy whose grounds 
are true"; of Meredith's exultation in "the joy of earth"; 
of Hardy's description of man's insatiable "appetite for 
joy" as the force which drives Tess D'Urberville in the 
climactic pages of that novel; or of W. B. Yeats's savage 
attempt to reconcile the paradox of "tragic joy." These 
examples suggest both the importance and the scope of 
nineteenth-century explorations of the idea of Joy, an 
idea treated briefly by Frank Kermode in Romantic Image, 
where Joy is termed a "crucial concept" for the understand­
ing not only of earlier nineteenth-century literature, but 
also of Symbolism and the entire modern movement in poetry 
from Baudelaire to Yeats.
This brief catalogue also suggests that the importance 
given Joy in the imaginative thought of poets as diverse 
in their aesthetic aims as Wordsworth, Browning, and 
Yeats, makes it more than a convenient synonym for 
"happiness" or "pleasure," though Joy certainly includes 
these connotations. Thomas Hardy's description of Tess's
"appetite for joy" is quoted, although no source is indi­
cated in the text of the novel, from Browning's poem, 
Paracelsus. Browning's phrase, as Hardy must have 
recognized, is a telling one: the metaphoric equivalence
of "hunger" and "joy" suggests the transformation of Joy 
to the status of a basic human drive as powerful as man's 
biological drives and more important to his total being.
Joy is one of the perennial needs of the human personality. 
It is a value defined, cherished, and sought after by the 
major Romantic poets. This initial chapter should both 
dispel the obvious but rather simplistic associations of 
the concept of Joy and establish evidence of the rich 
poetic and cultural ramifications of the Joy motif in a 
few of the chief figures of the nineteenth century.
In "The Everlasting Yea" of Sartor Resartus, Thomas 
Carlyle voices one of the central ideas of the Romantic 
movement: "Man's Unhappiness, as I construe, comes of
his Greatness? it is because there is an Infinite in him, 
which with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the 
Finite." Carlyle's prescription for this infinite unrest 
is, paradoxically, that man should simply accept infinitude 
as his necessary condition and stop his ceaseless search 
for the means of happiness, "Love not Pleasure; love God. 
This is the EVERLASTING YEA, wherein all contradiction is
solved; wherein whoso walks and works, it is well with him. 
But the idea of the infinite possibilities of human life 
which reached its apotheosis in the French Revolution 
could not be stilled even by the thundering rhetoric of 
Carlyle. The quest for Joy as the means of the highest 
form of happiness is a consistent theme of the first gener­
ation of Romantic poets and extends through the Victorians 
into modern literature.
However, from a historical perspective, Joy is a 
relatively new idea. In the traditional Christian ethos, 
perfect Joy was attained in an Eternity to come, and its 
most satisfactory counterpart attainable in this world was 
found in a life which conformed to the Will of God. Joy 
was considered to be a habit of the soul, a virtue won 
only after long struggle. A well-known example of this 
concept of Joy in literature is Chaucer's Squire. The 
keynoteof Chaucer's description of the Squire is joyous­
ness, because Joy is the virtue most highly prized in 
the young knight; it is a virtue which denotes purity and 
innocence of soul and has to be carefully nurtured. With 
the disintegration of a viable Christian tradition, however 
Joy loses its association with supernatural virtue and 
eventually comes to be seen both as one of man's basic 
rights and as the peculiar possession of the imaginative
consciousness of the poet. When Carlyle admonishes man to 
forget happiness and pleasure, he is attempting to refute 
the contemporary assumption that they are the universal 
rights of all men by reminding man of his infinite spiritual 
nature, a nature which all the pleasures of the world 
cannot satisfy. Most nineteenth-century writers tacitly 
assume man's infinitude; but they also assume, as the 
narrator of Herman Melville's Pierre says, that Joy "is 
my right as man; deprived of joy, I feel that I should 
find cause for deadly feuds with things invisible."
The roots of the new importance accorded Joy can be 
found in the thought of the eighteenth century. The 
epistemology of John Locke helped to inaugurate what has 
been called a "crisis of consciousness" in English thought. 
If sensation is the basis of reality, value has no ob­
jective existence outside of the subjective experience of 
the individual. Ernest Lee Tuveson, in his study of the 
Lockean tradition, notes that Locke's epistemology created 
"the necessity of finding new channels for old and valued 
experience, and of reconstructing on new foundations the 
dignity of the soul."1 Joy is such an old and valued human
1Ernest Lee Tuveson, The Imagination as a Means of 
Grace (Berkeley, 1960), p. 93.
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experience, and it is made one of the chief foundations for 
man's dignity of soul. Professor Tuveson's discussion of 
Joseph Addison's essays on The Pleasures of the Imagination 
provides an insight into the idea of Joy in the nineteenth 
century.
Professor Tuveson explains that when Addison says
that the first discovery of Beauty "strikes the mind with
an inward joy," he is voicing a rather revolutionary idea:
Saint-Just, the utopian and apologist of the 
French Revolution, once remarked that "happi­
ness is an idea new to Europe." As an ideal 
to be attained in this life, joy was a rela­
tively new conception. The word "pleasure," 
used in the title of the series, is a touch­
stone. The tendency has formerly been to
contrast the temporal "pleasure" with the true 
and eternal "joy".. . . In Addison's usage,
"pleasure" has taken on a spiritual value and 
"joy" arises from a purely sensuous delight 
God Himself has prepared for us. Another idea 
has found aesthetic projection.2
A glance at the entry on Joy in the OED bears out Tuveson's 
claim that Joy is a relatively new concept and indicates 
its central place in the Romantic movement. One form of
the word Joy, "joyance," was introduced into the language
by Spenser, considered obsolete by Dr. Johnson, and appeared 
again about 1800 in the works of Coleridge and Southey, be­
coming a favorite word with writers of imaginative literature.3
2Ibid., p. 108.
30ED (Oxford, 1961), V, 612.
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The rise of Evangelical Christianity with its emphasis on 
a joyously enthusiastic and emotional religious conversion, 
in addition to Locke's epistemology and Addison's aesthe­
tic that Professor Tuveson cites, are all interrelated 
causes for the new emphasis on Joy. The concept of Joy 
receives even more important aesthetic and intellectual 
projection in the nineteenth century.
Schiller's "Ode to Joy” is the logical starting place 
for a discussion of the idea of Joy. His aesthetic ideal 
of Joy had an important, demonstrable influence upon 
Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Arnold, and his poem embodies 
many of the facets of the new idea of Joy. Schiller 
credits Joy with the instinct to brotherhood among men. In 
its Victorian translation, the An die Freude begins with an 
apostrophe to Joy as the "spark from the fire that gods 
have fed":
Strong custom rends us from each other—
Thy magic all together brings;
And man in man but hails a brother,
Wherever rest thy gentle wings.^
Joy springs from nature and is also the link which binds the 
disparate elements of nature into one holy bond. Joy is 
personified as an extension of the power of the Absolute:
4J. C. F. Schiller, The Poems and Ballads of Schiller, 
trans. Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton {New York, 1844), pp. 332- 
334.
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Joy moves the dazzling wheels that roll
In the great time piece of creation;
Joy breathes on buds, and flowers they are;
Joy beckons, suns come forth from heaven.
Joy is the reward given seekers after truth, but it is also 
the source of their energy; Joy smiles from "Truth's pure 
and lambent fires." Schiller identifies Joy with virtue, 
faith, truth, and, finally, with the vision of the Absolute 
"Through the shatter'd vaults of death / Lo, mid the 
choral angels, Joy."
The story related about the inspiration of this poem 
is a significant one. Bulwer-Lytton writes that Schiller 
had saved a poor theology student from an attempted suicide 
and had given him enough money to tide him over for a brief 
time. When Schiller repeated the incident to guests at a 
wedding party, a subscription was immediately made for the 
young man, who received funds enough to enable him to com­
plete his studies successfully. Schiller, so the story 
goes, as a result of the fortunate outcome of this incident 
wrote the An die Freude, and consecrated it to the spirit 
of humanity.5 The interesting point of this anecdote is 
its emphasis upon Schiller's identification of Joy with 
humanity and with humanitarian ideals, for it is Joy, not
^Ibid., p. 332.
dharity, as might be expected logically, that is made the 
creative motivation for the universal advancement of man­
kind. One of the favorite ideas of the century is explicit 
in this poem, for the progress of humanity is envisioned 
springing naturally and joyously from the progress of the 
individual. Schiller reconciles what are later to become 
the sometimes antithetical ideas of the progress of the in­
dividual and the progress of society through the power of 
Joy.
Schiller's concept of Joy is a part of the later 
eighteenth-century identification of Joy, pleasure, happi­
ness, even luxury, with the essential dignity and worth of 
the individual human being, an identification which gained 
important impetus from the political ideals of the French 
Revolution, and which Tuveson notes in the study cited 
above. M. H. Abrams provides still another critical insight 
which makes this historical relationship clear. Abrams 
writes that "pervasively in both the verse and prose of the 
period, 'hope,' with its associated term, 'joy,' and its op­
posites, 'dejection,' 'despondency,' and 'despair,' are used 
in a special application, as shorthand for the limitless 
faith in human and social possibility aroused by the 
Revolution, and its reflex, the nadir of feeling caused by
10
its seeming failure. . . .1,6 The "Ode to Joy" is a concrete
instance of Abrams' argument: the leap from Schiller's ob­
scure act of charity to his identification of Joy with the 
progress of humanity makes for a complex relationship, which 
the historical perspective of the French Revolution clarifies. 
Custom, as Schiller says, "rends us from each other," but 
Joy "all together brings." Custom is related to the dead 
hand of eighteenth-century absolutism; the concept of Joy 
is associated with the wave of the democratic future with 
its unbounded confidence in the infinite possibilities of 
ordinary men and women.
Schiller's concept of Joy became a factor in English 
literature chiefly through the aegis of Coleridge. Frederic 
Ewen notes that "in the aesthetics of both Coleridge and 
Schiller, joy (Freude) occupies a significant place. In 
fact, Schiller would make the end of art sheer joy. And 
Coleridge seems to echo him when he affirms that 'the 
proper and immediate object of poetry is the communication 
of immediate pleasure.'"^ Coleridge's poem, "Dejection:
An Ode," is perhaps the most notable of his many attempts
^M. H. Abrams, "English Romanticism: The Spirit of
the Age," in Romanticism Reconsidered, ed. Northrop Frye 
(New York, 1963), p.54.
7Frederic Ewen, The Prestige of Schiller in England 
(New York, 1932), pp. 73-74;
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to embody the relationship of Joy and the creative imagi­
nation of the artist.
In the 1817 version of "Dejection," Coleridge des­
cribes. the emotional state which he also calls "exsiccation," 
the spiritual dryness which is the result of a "stifled, 
drowsy, unimpassioned grief" that finds no natural outlet.
Joy is irrevocably lost; feeling and intellect exist apart; 
natural beauty is seen, intellectually realized, but not 
truly felt. Coleridge says that Joy is both the source of 
man's glory and the "beauty-making power" which enables him 
to reach that intellectually perceived glory. Joy rescues 
the artist from a kind of moral inertia, a dreadful sense 
of the emptiness of life, a paralysis of the will. He 
addresses the Lady, who does not question the existence of 
this Joy, the "strong music in the soul," because she is 
pure of heart:
Joy, virtuous Lady! Joy that ne'er was given 
Save to the pure, and in their purest hour,
Life, and Life's effluence, cloud at once and shower,
Joy, Lady! is the spirit and the power,
Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower 
A new Earth and new Heaven. (11. 64-69)
Purity is a necessary prerequisite of the Joy which redeems
man from his state of spiritual exsiccation, for Coleridge
envisions Joy as being a gift to the worthy. In this respect,
Joy is somewhat analogous to the grace given man in the
12
Christian pattern of redemption. But this purity also 
denotes the essential innocence that embraces the contra­
dictions of life and restrains the reflective powers that 
would destroy the experience of Joy. The failure of Joy, 
Coleridge says, results in the loss of the "shaping spirit 
of imagination," which weds man to the outer world.
Coleridge makes other explanations of the idea of Joy, 
deservedly less well known than "Dejection," but neverthe­
less important. In his Philosophical Lectures, he says 
that "in joy individuality is lost." This aspect of the 
concept of Joy has an affinity with Schiller's idea of Joy 
as the force that "all together brings"; Joy is the power 
which reconciles opposites within the poetic imagination 
as well as individuals within the body politic. Coleridge 
goes on to say that Joy "is therefore liveliest in youth, 
not from any principle of organization but simply from this 
that the hardships of life, that the circumstances that 
have forced a man in upon his little unthinking, contempt­
ible self, have lessened his power of existing universally; 
it is that [Joy] only which brings about those passions."8
QSamuel Taylor Coleridge, The Philosophical Lectures 
of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn (London, 
1949), p. 179.
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Joy is thus said to be that facet of the creative energy 
of the artist which enables him to avoid morbid, fruitless 
introspection, and to exist imaginatively in the universal 
life of the world around him. Coleridge implies in this 
passage that it is next to impossible to retain the power 
of Joy beyond youth, but although this is also the experi­
ence embodied in "Dejection," it is not emphasized in his 
other statements about Joy. Rather, Coleridge stresses the 
developing, maturing aspects of the idea of Joy and its 
power to create a kind of equilibrium within the human 
personality.
For example, Coleridge writes that "happiness" has
four distinct states:
We need only appeal to our own consciences to 
know their distinctions, namely: that of a
bodily [appetite], in other words a perfect 
correspondence of the external stimulants to 
the frame to be stimulated; the second, a 
certain joyousness, [gladness, laetitiae]. .
. . as where Pythagoras discovered the pro­
position that made him cry out "Eureka". .
. . The third is a speculative point which 
arises from the consideration of our extreme 
dependence upon external things. The fourth 
I cannot otherwise express than in the words 
of the liturgy as "the peace of God". . . .9
QIbid., p. 141. W. B. Yeats echoes Coleridge's idea 
and indicates its possible source: "We are happy when for
everything inside us there is an equivalent something out­
side us. I think it was Goethe said this."
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Coleridge here outlines a theory of the stages of the ex­
perience of Joy which is completely embodied by Wordsworth 
in The Prelude. Joy is consistently imaged by both poets 
as moving along a scale, or ladder, from the realm of the 
purely physical to the intellectual to the meditative to the 
spiritual, a development also implied by Schiller in the 
"Ode to Joy."
Coleridge's son provides yet another of his father's 
attempts to define the idea of Joy: "He [Coleridge] called
it j°y, meaning thereby not mirth or high spirits, or even 
happiness, but a consciousness of entire and therefore 
well-being, when the emotional and intellectual faculties 
are in equipoise."10 This is perhaps the clearest statement 
that Coleridge provides of his concept of Joy. I. A. 
Richards, who quotes this passage, goes on to remark that 
"Coleridge's use of this word here is obviously connected 
with the 'deep power of joy' in 'Tintern Abbey.'" Words­
worth does indeed embody the idea of Joy in that poem, but 
The Prelude is the most crucial touchstone of the idea of 
Joy in the early Romantic tradition, and it will be dis­
cussed at length in the next chapter.
10Quoted in I. A. Richards, Coleridge on Imagination 
(Bloomington, 1960), p. 150.
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It is sufficient now to observe that in the early 
nineteenth century Joy is identified as the power which 
destroys individuality, advances the cause of universality 
within the human realm, and even constitutes the basic 
dignity of man. Furthermore, Joy produces a state of mind 
in which emotion and intellect are held in equilibrium, and 
Joy is thus a condition for aesthetic production and a 
source of a kind of aesthetic experience. The concept of 
Joy achieves particular prominence in the literature of 
the nineteenth century, where it is made to symbolize the 
transcendent power peculiar to the poet, but accessible to 
all men through the poet, who is different only in degree, 
as Wordsworth assures us, from other men. A deep and en­
during consciousness of Joy is the poet's hallmark, and the 
poetic embodiment of Joy is his greatest contribution. Joy 
is made a supreme and universal value; but the idea of Joy 
is not, therefore, a uniform concept, because the source 
of value shifts repeatedly throughout the nineteenth century. 
Wordsworth finds the highest Joy in the meditative realm of 
nature; Browning emphasizes the Joy derived from the union 
of the individual soul with another human being and with 
God; while Yeats rejoices in the very suffering inherent 
in the human condition.
Frank Kermode's Romantic Image is largely concerned
16
with the theory of the image in the poetry of W. B. Yeats, 
but he also provides an explicit identification of the Joy 
motif. Kermode traces the origin of the idea of the iso­
lated artist to its beginnings in the Romantics. The usual 
idea of the modern artist is a stereotyped account in which 
the artist is said to be cut off from the life of ordinary 
men, suffering alienation for the sake of his vision.
Kermode identifies Joy as the power which enables the artist 
to attain this vision: "Some difference in the artist gives
him access to this— an enormous privilege, involving joy 
(which acquires an almost technical sense as a necessary 
concomitant of the full exercise of the mind in the act of 
imagination). But the power of joy being possible only to 
a profound 'organic sensibility,' a man who experiences it 
will also suffer exceptionally."^ Kermode points out that 
Wordsworth had hoped to see "joy in widest commonalty spread," 
but Kermode maintains that his belief, expressed in the 
Preface of 1800, that the poet is different in degree from 
other men, necessarily estranges the rest of mankind from 
the power of Joy, leaving the artist in isolation. Kermode 
believes that Keats'svision of Joy-in-melancholy is the 
most significant expression of the idea, more imitable than
^Frank Kermode, Romantic Image (New York, 1964), p. 6.
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Coleridge's "Dejection," and that it is the poet's symbol- 
making power, his ability to "weld joy and pleasure to­
gether in some symbolic blaze," that rescues both his Joy
12and his sanity.
The isolated artist communicates the Joy which he 
experiences to his fellows; this is his truly moral func­
tion. But Kermode points out that it must be a Joy "whose 
grounds are true," and Matthew Arnold's Empedocles, for 
example, rejects the Joy of the earlier Romantics because 
the state of Joy which is based upon the union and inter­
course of the mind with a perceived harmony in the universe 
is only a momentary vision which the poet struggles to 
embody in the poetic image. But this vision is only an 
illusion, it is actually false, and the poet's only re­
course is, not action, but the creation of more poems 
written to overcome his isolation and to recapture his Joy, 
if only momentarily.13 This, for Arnold, is an impossible 
solution, and Arnold's dilemma becomes the archetypal prob­
lem of the modern artist.
Not all writers, however, accept this dilemma as it 




Coleridge, and Browning, posit Joy as the force which 
promotes unity among men and universality within the poetic 
imagination. Joy is made a value both in and of itself, 
and it is also the aesthetic means to the discovery of value. 
Joy is at once an expressive and an instrumental experience. 
Wordsworth says that "we have no sympathy but what is propa­
gated by pleasure." The poet, Wordsworth explains in the 
1800 Preface, considers man as "looking upon this complex 
scene of ideas and sensations, and finding everywhere ob­
jects that immediately excite in him sympathies which, from 
the necessities of his nature, are accompanied by an over­
balance of enjoyment."^4 Alienation and isolation are 
thus completely foreign to the very nature of the poet as 
Wordsworth defines him. Only in the dimension of Joy does 
the poet realize the totality and the unity of human ex­
perience. The Joy created by the artist enables the reader 
to enter imaginatively and sympathetically into the experi­
ence of art just as the power of Joy is the instrument which 
enables the artist, in Coleridge's words, to exist univer­
sally in the creation of art.
^William Wordsworth, "Preface to Lyrical Ballads," 
Wordsworth1s Literary Criticism, ed. Nowell C. Smith (London, 
1905), p. 26.
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Coleridge maintains that Joy results when emotion 
and intellect exist in a state of equipoise. This emo­
tional and psychological equipoise, however, is harder 
and harder to achieve as the nineteenth century advances. 
The spiritual and poetic strategy of Robert Browning is 
the most dynamic of the Victorian attempts to fuse subject 
and object, reason and passion, emotion and intellect, the 
necessary fusion which is both the power of Joy and the 
result of Joy. Browning achieves this dynamic concept of 
Joy by rejecting the idea that equipoise is its necessary 
condition. He embraces the contradictions of life, its 
changefulness, and its ultimate imperfection as the source 
of the highest Joy. Indeed, Browning's rejection of this 
aspect of the traditional idea of Joy is an indication of 
his struggle to maintain the concept. The equipoise which 
his age generally seeks is not the psychological equipoise 
of the Romantics but is rather an attempt to maintain the 
status quo against a rising tide of liberalism. Browning's 
flourishing poetic period, the 1850's through the 1860's, 
has been called the "age of equipoise" by W. L. Burn, who 
notes, however, that man's ability to experience the 
noblest emotions is almost overly stressed and re-stressed 
by the mid-Victorian generation.
20
Professor Burn asks, "Have we here a desire to em­
phasize the uniqueness of Man as a being capable of the 
noblest feelings in contrast to a society which with its 
railways, steamships, telegraphs, and limited liability 
companies was showing dangerous signs of becoming 
mechanized and materialized?"15 Wordsworth, Coleridge, and 
the other poets of the first generation of English Roman­
ticism use the experience of Joy chiefly as a weapon against 
a mechanistic philosophy; in turn, the Victorians employ 
the idea of Joy not only against philosophical mechanists, 
but also against the Utilitarian ethic and the rapidly de­
veloping technology that were beginning to dominate all 
areas of Victorian life. One facet of Browning's emphasis 
upon man's "capability for joy" is that Joy is a power and 
an energy which gives to the soul of man unique dignity.
Browning extends and modifies the more quiescent and 
meditative Wordsworthian Joy by associating Joy with energy 
and work. Here his affinity with the thought of Carlyle, 
Ruskin, and Morris is evident. If a machine can do work, 
it cannot work joyously, for joyous work, as opposed to 
mechanical production, is an attribute peculiar to man.
15W. L. Burn, The Age of Equipoise; A Study of the 
Mid-Victorian Generation (New York, 1965), p. 41.
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Since Joy transcends both pleasure and happiness, it in­
dicates that man possesses a capacity for experience that 
similarly transcends the purely physical. Pleasure has the 
potentiality of enslaving man to his natural appetites, 
while Joy has a transcendent power which is potentially 
liberating but which does not reject man's total humanity.
The opposition to the machine in the social theory of 
Carlyle, Ruskin, and Morris rests upon the idea that 
mechanization affects man's dignity of soul. We can say 
that it robs him of his Joy.
Behind this connection of Joy and work is the still 
more elusive connection which nineteenth-century poets make 
between energy and Joy. This relationship has been seen 
already in Schiller and in Coleridge, who identify Joy as 
a manifest and uniquely human energy because it rests upon 
a spiritual foundation. Joy is thus associated with a 
kind of psychic power that has a potential energy which far 
surpasses the energy of the machine. This power, however, 
is available in its greatest strength to the man who 
possesses an essential purity and innocence of soul. In 
The Victorian Morality of Art, Henry Ladd notes that a theory 
of energy lies behind Goethe's doctrine of work, and that 
Browning's will to act, as well as Carlyle's and Ruskin's 
gospel of work, "hold the combination of moral purity with
physical e n e r g y . I f  it also is remembered that 
Wordsworth and Coleridge stipulate purity of heart as the 
necessary condition for the power of Joy, the developing 
notion of Joy's relationship to power, purity, energy, and 
work is more meaningful, and mid-Victorian modifications 
of the idea of Joy are seen to be clearly indebted to the 
earlier tradition. The nineteenth-century idea of Joy, as 
it is variously described by Coleridge, Wordsworth, Arnold, 
and Browning, does not restrict the experience to a purely 
aesthetic realm: it is bound up within their total vision 
of life.
In a recent essay, Lionel Trilling traces the evolu­
tion of attitudes towards pleasure from the Romantics to 
the present. Just as M. H. Abrams makes clear the impetus 
given the concept of Joy by the optimistic social ideals 
of the French Revolution, Trilling suggests that the origin 
of the emphasis on pleasure in the chief Romantics can be 
found in the newly perceived importance of the common man. 
Before the Revolution, luxury and pleasure were largely 
considered to be the rights of kings and aristocrats alone 
and were, therefore, associated by the deprived common man
16Henry Ladd, The Victorian Morality of Art (New York, 
1932), p. 377.
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with dignity and with honor. Trilling explains that as a 
result of the Revolution, pleasure came to be, associated 
with individual human dignity; the ability to experience 
pleasure was now felt to be the rightful and noble posses­
sion of peasant as well as king:
And Diderot himself, the most uncompromising 
of materialists, as he was the most subtle 
and delicate, could not have wanted a more cate­
gorical statement of his own moral and intel­
lectual theory than Wordsworth's assertion 
that the grand elementary principle of pleasure 
constitutes the native and naked dignity of 
man, and it is by this principle that man 
knows, and lives, and breathes, and moves.
Trilling traces the development of this Wordsworthian plea­
sure principle through Keats to the twentieth-century 
concept of the spiritual life as it is mirrored in 
Dostoevsky's "underground man," who scornfully rejects the 
idea of pleasure because it transforms him into a machine­
like puppet at the mercy of whatever gratifies his appetite. 
Trilling suggests that modern man rejects pleasure in this
sense of the term, but it can be demonstrated that he still
finds room in his concept of the spiritual condition for the 
more transcendent idea of Joy.
The special mark of the modern age is said to be more
17Lionel Trilling, "The Fate of Pleasure," in Romanti­
cism Reconsidered, p. 80.
the pursuit of meaning than the pursuit of happiness. The 
idea of Joy serves this aspect of the modern consciousness 
and is made to do double duty, for Joy is traditionally 
both an instrument in the artist's search for meaning, as 
well as the condition transcending mere happiness that re­
wards that quest. The drama presents what is perhaps the 
most accurate image of the concerns of the contemporary 
consciousness, and the drama of the late nineteenth century, 
as well as that of our own time, contains some of the most 
notable instances of the changing motif of the "appetite 
for joy." A few examples from some selected modern plays 
will suggest the more-or-less contemporaneous concern with 
the idea of Joy.
Gorki's The Lower Depths embodies the equation of Joy
and work. Satin, for example, remarks to the dregs of the
industrial system who share his misery that "when work is
pleasure, life is a joy! When work is a duty, life is 
18slavery!" Gorki sees the experience of Joy as a liber­
ating factor in human life. In Jean Giraudoux's Madwoman 
of Chaillot, a "universal joy" is depicted that is
18References are to Masters of Modern Drama, eds. 
Haskell M. Block and Robert G. Shedd (New York, 1962) , and 
to T. S. Eliot, The Complete Poems and Plays, 1909-1950 
(New York, 1952), p. 208.
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reminiscent of Wordsworth's dream of "joy in widest common­
alty spread." This state of Joy comes when the money lenders 
and money changers are driven by the Madwoman into the 
oblivion that awaits them beyond the trap door, and the 
world is made safe again for the ordinary individual. 
Giraudoux describes the scene as follows: "Little by little,
the scene is suffused with light, faint at first, but in­
creasing as if the very walls were glowing with the quiet 
radiance of universal joy." We can recognize in these 
examples from Gorki and Giraudoux Joy's equation with the 
spirit of humanity and with the revolutionary ideals first 
advanced in the last eighteenth century.
Chekhov, Sean O'Casey, and T. S. Eliot also evidence 
a concern with the idea of Joy. Chekhov's futile, tragi­
comic characters attempt to salvage the experience of Joy 
from the glory of the past. In The Cherry Orchard, for 
example, the orchard itself becomes a symbol of lost Joy.
Anya tells her mother that the mortgaged orchard can be 
replaced: "We will plant a new orchard finer than this one,
you'll see it, you'll understand; and joy, quiet, deep joy 
will sink into your heart, like the sun at evening, and 
you'll smile, Mama!” But Joy is an inward power, as 
Coleridge insists in "Dejection," and Chekhov makes it clear 
that the futility of Lyuboff's life cannot be salvaged from
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beauty seen but not truly felt. Sean O'Casey makes as 
militant a stand as does any writer against those convention 
al forces which would destroy the Joy of life. His Cock-A 
Doodle-Dandy is a celebration of Joy made to counteract 
"the fight made by many to drive the joy of life from the 
hearts of men." O'Casey attempts to dignify the Joy that 
is rooted in man's whole-hearted acceptance of life, while 
T. S. Eliot's concept of Joy in Murder in the Cathedral 
emphasizes a more transcendent aspect of the idea of Joy.
In the great speech which concludes with Thomas's quiet 
assertion that "human kind cannot bear very much reality," 
Joy is an integral part of the reality that man cannot 
bear, for Thomas reminds the chorus:
This is one moment,
But know that another
Shall pierce you with a sudden painful joy
When the figure of God's purpose is made complete.
Eliot's Joy is the emanation of a sudden epiphany, a Joy
that contains at once the sense of completion described in
"Dejection" and Keats's vision of Joy-in-Sorrow.
But it is in Ibsen's Ghosts that the complex threads 
traced thus far are knitted together, for Ibsen equates Joy 
with energy, with salvation, and with work. Osvald says of 
Regine: "I suddenly realized that she could save me; she
was so full of the joy of lifel" His mother is startled
by this statement, "Joy of life— ? Is there salvation in 
that?" And Osvald replies to Mrs. Alving, "That— and the 
joy of work. They're really the same thing you know." Mrs 
Alving then realizes that she has been entirely unfair to 
both her dead husband and her dying son. Ibsen makes her 
see her entire life through the perspective of Joy, and she 
recognizes for the first time the joyous vitality of life 
that has eluded her.
These examples suggest the central place given the 
concept of Joy in the contemporary consciousness and evi­
dence a concern with the possibilities for Joy which 
implicitly denies the assertion of Samuel Johnson's Imlac 
that "human life is everywhere a state in which much is to 
be endured and little to be enjoyed." Writers in the 
Romantic tradition overturn this stoic dictum, despite the 
prophetic warnings of Carlyle, and assert the power of Joy 
in human life, even though the demonstration often amounts 
to the fact that each manifestation of Joy is also a defeat 
for the man, who, after all, "cannot bear very much reality 
But if Joy indicates the man's finitude, it also indicates 
that he possesses a capacity for infinitude, and the defeat 
of the man is the triumph of the spirit.
This paradox, the paradox of Coleridge's "Dejection" 
and Arnold's Empedocles on Etna, is given further
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ramification by Arthur 0. Lovejoy's discussion of Coleridge's 
poem. Lovejoy contends that as an artist "Coleridge finds 
a certain triumph in defeat; for he is able to derive, and 
to impart, aesthetic pleasure from the very emotion aroused 
by his inability to experience aesthetic pleasure— or at 
all events, from the poetic utterance of that emotion. The 
Ode is a paradox among poems in that it not merely— like 
other poems— makes melancholy enjoyable, but achieves 
beauty by the description of the loss of feeling for 
beauty."^-9 This is the same paradox which Frank Kermode 
embodies in his discussion of Matthew Arnold in Romantic 
Image, and both Arnold and Coleridge found the production 
of poetry on the basis of this paradox impossible. Both 
men gradually relinquished the poetic exploration of the 
Joy theme, while neither gave up the attempt to posit for 
Joy in their prose writings another foundation, available 
to all men alike, more akin to the universal power of Joy 
described in Schiller's "Ode to Joy" and in Wordsworth's 
Prelude than to the Joy of the artist in isolation.
Coleridge's attempts at the definition of his concept 
of Joy have been traced from "Dejection" through the lectures
19Arthur 0. Lovejoy, "Coleridge's and Kant's Two 
Worlds," in Essays in the History of Ideas (New York, 1960), 
p 263.
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and the table talk. A similarly brief look at Matthew 
Arnold's contribution to the idea of Joy will be helpful 
at this point, for the loss and recovery of Joy is a con­
sistent concern of Arnold's work and provides both an 
interesting contrast to Browning's and another touchstone 
of the idea of Joy in the nineteenth century.
In Arnold's Preface to Poems (1853), the famous re­
jection of Empedocles on Etna is justified largely on the 
basis of Schiller's principle of Joy: "'All Art,' says
Schiller, 'is dedicated to Joy, and there is no higher and 
no more serious problem, than how to make men happy. The
right Art is that alone, which creates the highest enjoy- 
2 nment.'" Empedocles provides no enjoyment, Arnold contends, 
because it presents a situation "in which the suffering finds 
no vent in action"; this is, of course, a statement similar to 
that embodied by Coleridge in "Dejection," where he depicts 
a mood in which grief finds no natural emotional outlet.
The concept of Joy continues to play an important role in 
Arnold's poems through the 1867 edition, for Arnold examines 
almost all of the conventional sources of Joy, and rejects 
most of them. Childhood, love, nature, religion— none of
20‘''Matthew Arnold, Poetry and Criticism of Matthew 
Arnold, ed. A. Dwight Culler (Boston, 1961), p. 204.
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these offer the Joy which is essential to life.
In "To a Gipsy Child by the Sea-Shore," Arnold presents 
the stoical sorrow of a child, unlike the child of 
Wordsworth's "Intimations Ode," for "superfluity of joy" 
does not remove from this child's heart its instinctive 
knowledge of the inevitable pain and sorrow of life. In 
"Resignation," Arnold determines that the "general life" 
of man has as its secret "not joy, but peace," This idea 
is repeated in "Dover Beach," where the narrator sees in 
the world of reality "neither joy, nor love, nor light." 
Marguerite becomes an embodiment of Joy in "Parting," for 
her smile tells of "the unconquer'd joy in which her spirit 
dwells." But Arnold, in "A Farewell," cannot accept "the 
thousand sweet,still joys of such / As hand in hand face 
earthly life." The love which might bring Joy is impossible 
to the poet imprisoned within his own personality. Indeed, 
in "Human Life," Arnold implies that the joys of life must 
be consciously repudiated by the artist, for he says that 
as "we stream across the sea of life by night / The joys 
which were not for our use designed" are left behind.
Finally, to cite one last example, Arnold predicts in 
"Obermann Once More" that true joy will soon dawn, "one 
common wave of thought and joy / Lifting mankind again."
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This must be a joy, Arnold insists, whose "grounds are 
true."21
Arnold's chief preoccupation with the idea of Joy is 
forecast in a letter to Clough in 1847: "Shakespeare says
that if imagination would apprehend some joy it comprehends 
some bringer of the joy: and this latter operation which
makes palatable the bitterest or most arbitrary original
22apprehensions you seem to me to despise." In a later 
letter to Clough, Arnold criticizes Keats and Browning, who 
begin, he maintains, with "no clear idea of the world," or 
in other words, no "bringer of the joy." Arnold writes 
that "as Browning is a man with a moderate gift passionately 
desiring movement and fulness, and obtaining but a confused 
multitudinousness, so Keats with a very high gift, is yet 
also consumed by this desire: and cannot produce the truly
21Ibid., pp. 30, 37, 161, 75, 77, 84, 191. Warren D. 
Anderson has attempted to define the Joy described in 
"Obermann Once More" by tracing its meaning to Cicero and 
Seneca. Anderson writes that "if we turn to the standard 
Roman authorities for the Stoic definition of joy— gaudium 
as opposed to the agitation that is hilaritas— we find 
Cicero saying that joy is experienced 'when the mind is 
stirred by reason in a calm and steady manner,' while 
Seneca's definition is 'elation of the mind trusting its 
good and true possessions'. . . ." Matthew Arnold and The 
Classical Tradition (Ann Arbor, 1965), p. 153.
22Ibid., p. 515.
living and moving. . . ,"23 Arnold praises Wordsworth be­
cause he, unlike Browning and Keats, does apprehend the 
"bringer of the joy." In the Preface to his edition of 
Wordsworth's poems, Arnold contends that the greatness of 
Wordsworth's poetry lies in the "extraordinary power with 
which Wordsworth feels the joy offered to us in nature, the 
joy offered to us in the simple primary affections and 
duties; and because of the extraordinary power with which, 
in case after case, he shows us this joy and renders it so 
as to make us share it."^ The most important fact of 
Wordsworth's power of Joy, according to Arnold, is that it 
has a universal source, available to all men. But Arnold 
himself cannot accept the unity of man and the natural world 
as the "bringer of the joy."
Arnold continues to explore the idea of Joy as the 
force that can overcome the multitudinousness of the nine­
teenth century. His final strategy is an outgrowth of his
2^Ibid., pp. 518-519.
24Ibid., p. 343. Arnold's emphasis on the Joy-giving 
power of Wordsworth's poetry is shared by many of his con­
temporaries. For example, John Stuart Mill in his Auto­
biography , sees a similar merit in Wordsworth's poetry.
Mill writes that in Wordsworth's poems he "seemed to draw 
from a source of inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative 
pleasure, which could be shared in by all human beings. .
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lifelong concern with the possibilities of Christianity as 
the basis of a unifying cultural and spiritual experience.
In the Preface to Last Essays on Church and Religion of 
1877, Arnold attempts to define his concept of Joy so that 
its power will be truly universal. He stresses the develop­
ment of the whole man, the man who possesses both virtue 
and virtu. Joy is identified in this essay with the 
Christian spirit of charity, purity, and self-renouncement, 
three of the great natural truths which Arnold finds in 
Christianity. Christ, according to Arnold, places bliss not 
in a future life but in self-renouncement, the giving of
self to others. This self-renouncement is the "eternal
life" and the "joy" of Christ; this is the Joy that Christ 
hoped his disciples might share. In self-renouncement, 
Arnold says, there is a "fount of joy," for "self-renounce­
ment is joy. . . ."25 Christianity will survive the multi­
tudinousness of the nineteenth century, Arnold says, and 
it will serve as the "bringer of the joy," because it is
based in these great natural truths.
Arnold's concern with the idea of Joy, although it is 
not always specifically identified as such, is one of the 
most frequently commented upon themes in modern criticism.
25Ibid., p. 509.
It is the focal point of Lionel Trilling's critical bio­
graphy of Arnold, and it receives much emphasis in A.
Dwight Culler's Imaginative Reason, where Arnold's poetic 
world is charted into three distinct regions, in each of 
which Joy occupies a prominent position. Culler's summary 
of these regions clarifies the brief survey of Arnold's use 
of the Joy motif in his poetry discussed above. The first 
stage is characterized by Culler as being "a period of 
joyous energy when one lives in harmony with nature"; the 
second and third regions of Arnold's poetic world begin, 
Culler says, in "a period of peace in which suffering sub­
sides into calm and then grows up into a new joy, a joy of 
active service in the world." Culler explains that Arnold 
made truth and universality the conditions of Joy, that 
"the Joy of the Romantic poets, and of childhood, and of the 
children of the world had some element of illusion about it, 
of a divine illusion, which is unsatisfactory to modern 
man. . . . The faculty through which we are to find this 
[recovered joy], according to Arnold, is the 'imaginative 
reason.' ”26
Now the "imaginative reason," as Culler demonstrates 
is Arnold's term for a synthesis of feeling and intellect
A. Dwight Culler, Imaginative Reason (New Haven, 
1966), pp. 4, 282.
which he felt that modern man must effect if the "confused 
multitudinousness," which he associates particularly with 
Browning, is to be overcome. Arnold's concept of the 
"imaginative reason" demonstrates the continuity of the 
idea of Joy, for Wordsworth places the highest Joy at the 
disposal of the "feeling intellect," while Coleridge main­
tains that the experience of Joy results when emotion and 
intellect are held in equipoise. Furthermore, Arnold's 
emphasis upon the association of purity with the concept of 
Joy is also a development of the idea of Joy as it is 
described by Coleridge in "Dejection" and by Wordsworth in 
The Prelude.
Leon Gottfried has pointed out that there are two 
apparent ironies in Arnold's position toward the idea of 
Joy as it is summarized above. In the first place, 
Gottfried writes that though his loss of religious faith 
separated Arnold from the more traditional sources of Joy, 
he bases hope for recovered Joy upon the "great critical 
effort of European thought," the very effort which had 
occasioned his original loss. Gottfried also notes, in 
the second place, that Arnold was unable "to see beyond the 
power of joy to the power of Vision which Wordsworth some­
times attained." Gottfried defends Arnold's position on 
this second point, noting that "Arnold seemed to feel that
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Wordsworth's visionary powers were less, not more signifi­
cant than his power of joy, for the former was unique and
idiosyncratic, while the latter was based on universal
27emotion and was universally accessible." The Romantic 
idea of Joy, however, cannot be sundered in this way, for 
Joy is more than "universal emotion." The visionary power 
cannot be separated from the power of Joy, as the references 
to Coleridge and to Wordsworth's Preface of 1800 make clear. 
Indeed, Wordsworth says that the visionary power arises in 
the sympathetic Joy of the poet and that the experience of 
Joy is, therefore, a kind of power. Arnold recognizes this 
aspect of the idea of Joy, but he attempts to place the 
source of its power in the permanent and enduring spiritual 
truths of Christianity. The power of partial Joy is avail­
able to the cultured and fully developed man, the man who 
sees life "steadily" and "whole."
Like Matthew Arnold, W. B. Yeats also evidences a 
concern with unity of being as an aspect of the idea of 
Joy, but his concept of Joy resembles Browning's more than 
it does that of Arnold. Ezra Pound shared his "rediscovery" 
of Browning with Yeats. Yeats writes in his Autobiography
27Leon Gottfried, Matthew Arnold and the Romantics 
(London, 1963), pp. 17, 60.
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that he came to view Browning as a "dangerous influence"; 
however, despite this disavowal, he is the modern poet who 
most clearly embodies the idea of Joy which Browning trans­
mitted and transmuted from the earlier Romantic tradition. 
Yeats, as has been noted briefly earlier in this chapter, 
echoes Coleridge in his belief that Joy manifests itself 
in a kind of equilibrium, but he characteristically adds to 
the condition of equilibrium its converse. He writes that 
"we are happy when for everything inside us there is an 
equivalent something outside us. I think it was Goethe 
said this. One should add the converse. It is terrible to
desire and not possess, and terrible to possess and not 
28desire." Yeats maintains, therefore, that Joy is a dyna­
mic value. He writes that "Joy is of the will which labours, 
which overcomes obstacles, which knows triumph."29 Further­
more, Yeats considers Joy to be the central emotional ex­
perience of tragedy and of life itself. In an essay on the 
plays of John M. Synge, he writes:
There is in the creative joy an acceptance of 
what life brings because we have understood the 
beauty of what it brings, or a hatred of death
28The Letters of W. B. Yeats, ed. Allen Wade (London, 
1954), p. 810.
29W. B. Yeats, The Autobiography of William Butler 
Yeats (New York, 1963), p. 319.
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for what it takes away, which arouses within 
us, through some sympathy perhaps with other 
men, an energy so noble, so powerful, that 
we laugh aloud and mock in the terror or 
sweetness of our exaltation, at death and 
oblivion.
Yeat's brief definition of creative joy encompasses in Joy 
equilibrium, universality, brotherhood, energy, and power, 
most of the associations of the concept which have been 
traced thus far through the nineteenth century.
Yeats calls the joyous acceptance of the contradictions 
and imperfections of the human condition "tragic joy." B.
L. Reid, in his study of the Yeatsian concept of tragedy, 
notes that only in man's acceptance of life as tragedy did 
Yeats feel that "tragic joy" could be achieved. Reid be­
lieves that Yeats best expresses the conditions of his 
concept of Joy in the last stanza of a late poem, "A 
Dialogue of Self and Soul":
I am content to follow to its source 
Every event in action or in thought;
Measure the lot; forgive myself the lot!
When such as I cast out remorse
So great a sweetness flows into the breast
We must laugh and we must sing,
We are blest by everything
Everything we look upon is blest. (11. 65-72)
30Quoted in B. L. Reid, William Butler Yeats: The Lyric 
of Tragedy (Norman, 1961), p. 90.
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Reid points out the "rather precise echo" of Browning's
poem, "Andrea del Sarto," in the opening lines of this 
31passage, but the equally precise echo of Wordsworth's 
"Ode: Intimations of Immortality" in the closing lines of 
Yeats's poem indicates in capsule form the major line of 
the development of the idea of Joy from Wordsworth to 
Browning to Yeats.
Browning's poetry shows a concern with the concept of 
Joy as intense as that of Wordsworth or Arnold or Yeats, 
but though his poetic themes have been well delineated by 
critics and scholars, polemicists and apologists, their 
relation to the tradition of Joy has not been explored. 
Browning, like the earlier Romantics, sees Joy as both an 
instrumental and expressive value. Joy is at once the 
source and the result of the "infinite moment," for in
this crucial instant of time when two disparate realms are
fused, all barriers between the self and the other are 
lowered, and a brief equipoise of intellect and feeling is
attained. The experience of Joy is the impetus to the
constant struggle of human life which Browning envisions 
extending into eternity, and the resulting Joy is an im­
portant proof human love is truly a source of
31Ibid., p. 206.
redemption from isolation within the individual personality. 
Browning maintains that one of the chief values of poetry 
is its demonstration of the worth of the tangible world, 
the "wild joys of living," as David says in "Saul." One of 
Browning's chief poetic preoccupations is the characteri­
zation of men and women who have failed or succeeded in 
maintaining an idea of Joy, and one of the important motifs 
of his poetry is the importance of the concept of Joy as an 
aspect of the artist's creative energy.
The following chapters will demonstrate that his con­
cept of Joy as a dynamic value places Robert Browning firmly 
within the Wordsworthian tradition. Like Wordsworth, 
Browning sees the idea of Joy as a developing value, both 
a means and an end, part and parcel of becoming, and subject 
to the larger claims of reason and of love. Browning's 
characteristic uae of the grotesque and his concern with all 
varieties and types of human personality are intricately 
related to the traditional Romantic equation of Joy with 
energy and with universality, an equation that is pervasive 
in modern poetry and drama.
CHAPTER II
WORDSWORTHIAN JOY:
THE CONCEPT OP JOY IN THE PRELUDE
Continuity is difficult to trace in an era so near 
our own, especially the continuity of an idea that no 
longer seems particularly revolutionary. The Joy motif 
defined here has its most important expression in The 
Prelude, and it is to this poem that we must turn if 
Browning's contribution to the Romantic tradition of Joy 
is to be fully explored.
Joy is a consistent concept in Wordsworth's poetry, 
occurring almost fifty times at the most crucial points 
in The Prelude alone.^ The poet's reiteration of the 
word, and his insistence that Joy is "a never-failing 
principle," indicate its importance for the complete
Lane Cooper et al., A Concordance to the Poems of 
Wordsworth (London, 1911), p. 632. Word~counts alone“are 
an unsatisfactory index of a poet's use of a concept. With 
this in mind and for what it is worth, the word Joy, ac­
cording to my count, occurs forty-five times in The Prelude. 
This count does not include the forms enjoyment, enjoy, 




comprehension of the philosophy of man and nature which 
is unfolded as the reader follows the growth of the poet's 
mind through the fourteen books of the poem. The Prelude 
is the locus classicus of the idea of Joy, and Wordsworth's 
concept of Joy contains almost all of the associations which 
the idea assimilated as the century advanced.
Matthew Arnold's recognition of Joy's central impor­
tance in Wordsworth's poetry has been discussed in the last 
chapter, and Wordsworth's use of the idea of Joy has been 
often noted by critics since Arnold, without, however, any 
real demonstration of its meaning and importance. James 
Benziger, for example, writes that "one can, in fact, read 
a dozen individual poems and find Wordsworth everywhere 
summoning man to joy: at times joy seems his favorite
word and himself joy's greatest celebrant. But one may
read as many other poems and find Wordsworth's mind gripped
2by those facts which make joy most difficult." And 
Frederick A. Pottle has pointed out the power of Wordsworth's 
iteration of the concept of Joy. Pottle writes that "of 
course it is the figures that convey the emotion. No one 
can make us joyful merely by using the word 'joy' or any of
2James Benziger, Images of Eternity (Carbondale, 1962) ,
p. 61.
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its synonyms. But there is impressive agreement among 
readers of all periods that by giving a simple figure, re­
inforcing it by certain devices of varied iteration, and
explicitly interpreting it, Wordsworth does evoke the
3emotion of joy."
George Wilbur Meyer, more than any other Wordsworthian 
since Matthew Arnold, has emphasized what he terms the 
poet's "Philosophy of Joy." In "The Rainbow," for example, 
Meyer finds the most succinct expression of this Philosophy 
of Joy. He writes that the "subject here is the indestruc­
tible continuity of human life. All the stages of our 
growth and history are joined to the other by the unifying 
joy we feel in our reaction to external nature, in this 
poem represented by the rainbow."4 Investigations of 
Wordsworth's vocabulary, however, have not been concerned 
with the meaning of his concept of Joy. Ellen Leyburn's 
study of recurrent words in The Prelude includes earth, 
substantial, being, object, sense (also discussed by William 
Empson in The Structure of Complex Words), form, image, 
presence, intercourse, and power. Miss Leyburn recognizes
^Frederick A. Pottle# "The Eye and The Object," in 
Wordsworth: Centenary Studies Presented at Cornell and
Princeton Universities, ed. Gilbert T. Dunklin (Princeton, 
1951) , p. 31.
4George Wilbur Meyer, "'Resolution and Independence': 
Wordsworth's Answer to Coleridge's 'Dejection,'" TSE, II 
(1950), 54.
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the importance of Wordsworth's deceptively simple diction.
She argues that "the symbol and the essence symbolized are
both present in the word. . . . The double intent of the
diction again reveals Wordsworth's view of God and nature:
nature as actuality and in her sensuous forms the means of
5communication between God and man." Joy, however, is not 
included in her discussion, nor does it receive attention 
in Josephine Miles'sWordsworth and the Vocabulary of Emotion. 
An examination of Wordsworth's concept of Joy in The Prelude 
is thus in order.
Wordsworth proposed to draw his poetic vocabulary from 
a selection of the real language of men; this theory of 
poetic diction presents a problem to the reader, however, 
precisely because words such as Joy are quite commonplace. 
Hugh Sykes Davies has noted the careful attention which must 
be paid Wordsworth's diction. Davies writes that "few of his 
words draw any attention to themselves, but many of them 
deserve and require close attention nevertheless, indeed 
much the more because their superficial easiness fails to 
give warning of their full f o r c e . P e r c e p t i v e  readers of
5Ellen D. Leyburn, "Recurrent Words in The Prelude,"
ELH, XIV (1949), 295.
gHugh Sykes Davies, "Wordsworth and the Empirical Philo­
sophers ," in The English Mind: Studies in the English
45
Wordsworth have long realized this fact. Robert Southey, 
for example, wrote to Coleridge in 1802, asking him of 
Wordsworth, "Does he not associate more feeling with parti­
cular phrases, and you also with him, than those phrases 
can convey to any one else? This, I suspect." Coleridge 
replied that "Wordsworth's words always mean the whole of
7their possible meaning."
In The Prelude, Joy's possible meanings are complex 
and manifold, for Wordsworth formulates a scale of defini­
tion which ranges from an ingenuous Joy to a subtler, 
recondite Joy which links the human soul to nature and to 
the Divine in a kind of mystic exultation; "lively jdY," 
of course, is a common synonym for exultation. Wordsworth 
associates the concept of Joy with energy, with power, with 
unity, and with purity. Joy is a universal and permanent 
power of the human soul; Joy, indeed, constitutes the es­
sential dignity of the human being, since it is the noblest 
expression of the creative spirit of the imaginative power 
of man. In the "Prospectus" to The Recluse, Wordsworth says
Moralists Presented to Basil Willey, eds. Hugh Sykes Davies 
and George Watson (Cambridge, 1964), p. 153.
7Quoted in Josephine Miles, Wordsworth and the Vocabu­
lary of Emotion (Berkeley, 1944), p. 70.
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that intent thoughts which elevate the mind take their ori­
gin in emotion, but emotions such as Joy come from either 
"outward circumstance," or perhaps from the autonomous move­
ment of the human soul within itself, through "an impulse 
to herself." Despite the ambiguous nature of their origin, 
these emotions will be the chief themes of his poetry:
Of Truth, of Grandeur, Beauty, Love, and Hope,
And melancholy Fear subdued by Faith;
Of blessed consolations in distress;
Of moral strength, and intellectual Power;
Of joy in widest commonalty spread. (11. 14-18)
Wordsworth's emphasis on "widest commonalty" as the realm
of Joy indicates the egalitarian nature of his idea of Joy,
and it also indicates the temper of the revolutionary milieu
in which he moved.
Wordsworth identifies one facet of his idea of Joy with
the intense pleasures of boyhood and early manhood. In Book
One of The Prelude, he writes of the "vulgar joy" of the
child's activities:
Thus oft amid those fits of vulgar joy 
Which, through all seasons, on a child's pursuits 
Are prompt attendants, 'mid that giddy bliss 
Which, like a tempest, works along the blood.®
8William Wordsworth, The Prelude, ed. Ernest de Selin- 
sourt. Second edition revised by Helen Darbishire (Oxford, 
1959), Book I, 11. 581-584. All subsequent references to 
this edition will be included in the text and will be to 
the 1850 version of The Prelude, unless the 1805 version 
is specified for purposes of comparison.
These "fits of vulgar joy" attend the ordinary pursuits 
of a boyhood spent in a rural environment— the hunting 
of birds, ice-skating, running through piles of autumn 
leaves, picnicking in the midst of sunlit trees, or 
imitating the call of birds. They are the result of the 
twofold function of nature which inspires in the child 
both a sense of awesome beauty and a sense of mysterious 
fear. This early Joy is most often unreflective and 
thoughtless; the mere sight of the sun or the moon, for 
example, gives rise to the ingenuous Joy described in 
Book Two:
In many a thoughtless hour, when, from excess
Of happiness, my blood appeared to flow
For its own pleasure, and I breathed with joy. (II, 186-
188)
Wordsworth's careful differentiation of "pleasure," "happi­
ness," and "joy" in this short passage indicates that the 
concept of Joy partakes of both, yet finally transcends both. 
The first experience of Joy is usually the result of physi­
cal activity. It is described, for instance, as resulting 
in "a wantonness of heart" when Wordsworth and his friends 
travel home from school on horseback, "a joyous band . . .
We beat with thundering hoofs the level sand" (X, 600-604) .
It is also the sentimental emotion felt by the boy as he 
visits the old woman with whom he had lived while attending
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day school.
Furthermore, the thoughtless Joy of youth is lodged
deep within the memory:
— And if the vulgar joy by its own weight 
Wearied itself out of the memory,
The scenes which were a witness of that joy 
Remained in their substantial lineaments. (I, 597-600)
The supposedly forgotten Joys become indissolubly linked
to the scenes which inspire them, and Joy thus provides the
human being with a permanent source of imaginative sympathy.
Joy is, therefore, an integral part of the "spots of time"
theory which Wordsworth advances in Book Twelve of the poem.
The experience of Joy makes poetic creation possible, for
it is these "spots of time," or, as Wordsworth says in The
Excursion, the "spiritual power of absent things," which
are the sources of poetic creation. Wordsworth asserts in
the "Ode: Intimations of Immortality" that not "all that is
at enmity with joy" can abolish these first affections of
the soul.
But Wordsworth also associates the early experience of 
Joy with intellectual activity, especially with the reading 
of imaginative literature such as The Canterbury Tales, The 
Arabian Nights, or Don Quixote, three works which are singled 
out for special praise because they enable the reader to 
forget self and to exist imaginatively in more universal
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experience. These three are among the "golden store of
books" described in Book Five:
And when thereafter to my father's house 
The holidays returned me, there to find 
That golden store of books which I had left,
What joy was mine! (V, 477-480) ̂
Wordsworth contends that physical Joy cooperates with
intellectual Joy. The boy reared in a strenuous natural
environment for example, is more amenable to the Joy of
poetry:
Is stirred to ecstasy, as others are,
By glittering verse; but further, doth receive,
In measure only dealt out to himself,
Knowledge and increase of enduring joy 
From the great Nature that exists in works 
Of mighty Poets. (V, 590-595)
This particular coupling of knowledge and Joy is a late 
addition, for in the 1805 version of the poem, Wordsworth 
says that such an environment enables the youth to receive 
"enduring touches of great joy" (V, 617); this becomes, in 
the passage cited above, "Knowledge and increase of enduring 
joy." That Wordsworth regards intellect and Joy as co­
operative powers is seen, however, not only in this particular
qIn the 1805 version of the poem, Wordsworth describes 
the books "open to my enjoyment," concluding, "What heart 
was mine." The use of "joy" for "heart" in the final manu­
script is a result of the general poetic tightening-up which 
he effects in his revisions, but it also demonstrates the 
sense of heart-felt sympathy which the power of Joy provides 
the developing mind.
revision but also in an earlier passage in the same book, 
a passage which remains the same in both versions of the 
poem: "Be these the daily strengtheners of their minds /
May books and Nature be their early joyi" (V, 422-423).
Wordsworth thus stresses the enduring qualities of the
early Joy found through nature and through the pursuit of
imaginative literature, but he also describes, in the
nationalistic tones reminiscent of Schiller's "Ode to Joy,"
the intense Joy which arises from his love of England. He
depicts the political and sociological fabric of the years
of his early manhood in terms of Joy:
But Europe at that time was thrilled with joy,
France standing on the top of golden hours,
And human nature seeming born again. (VI, 339-341)
Patriotic Joy is rooted in his love of liberty and in his
recognition of the equality and brotherhood of men. The
French people, for example, throw open their hearts to
receive the young Wordsworth and his companion, Robert Jones
Like bees they swarmed, gaudy and gay as bees;
Some vapoured in the unruliness of joy,
And with their swords flourished as if to fight 
The saucy air. (VI, 391-394)
Wordsworth describes the universal quality of the Joy which
^®In the 1805 version, "But twas a time when Europe 
was rejoiced." The revision to "thrilled with joy" is, 
again, a more emphatic statement of the idea of Joy.
he saw reflected in the faces around him at Calais: "How 
bright a face is worn when joy of one / Is joy for tens 
of millions" (VI, 348-349). To have been alive and young 
in the midst of these early and hopeful days of the French 
Revolution was "bliss" and "very Heaven," and Wordsworth 
admonishes the present statesmen whose foreign policy tends 
to the denial of the intense power of Joy in national pride 
and in liberty, those politicians who tear "From the best 
youth in England their dear pride / Their joy, in 
England. . ." (X, 302-303).
This nationalistic aspect of Wordsworth's idea of Joy 
stems partly from his disappointment in the course of the 
French Revolution. Coleridge had written to him in 1799 
as follows: "I wish you would write a poem, in blank verse,
addressed to those, who, in consequence of the complete 
failure of the French Revolution have thrown up all hopes 
of the amelioration of mankind, and are sinking into an 
almost epicurean selfishness, disguising the same under the 
soft titles of domestic attachments. . . .1,11 The trans­
cendent power of Joy, not the power of political ideals, is 
thus utilized by Wordsworth in The Prelude, as it had been
11Quoted in de Selincourt, p. 526.
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used by the Revolutionary philosophers in its connotation 
of "pleasure," to indicate the true dignity, worth, and 
hope for the amelioration of the common man.
The early Joys, whose sources are childhood play, 
nature, books, or patriotic pride, are necessary components 
in the growth of a sensitive mind, but they are only contri­
butory to a higher, more spiritual Joy which comes with 
increasing experience. In Book Eleven, Wordsworth breaks 
once more into his narrative to address Coleridge directly, 
wishing for his friend such communion with natural objects 
as will be "sanative," providing for Coleridge "a ladder 
for [his] spirit to reascend / To health and joy and pure 
contentedness." This ladder is the same psychological scale 
as that described indirectly in "Tintern Abbey." It is an 
analogue of the scala amoris of Platonic thought in that 
both the ladder of Joy and the scale of love posit as their 
ultimate objective a mystic and intimate union with Divine 
Love, union transcending the artificial limits of time and 
space.
In the first book of the poem, Wordsworth describes 
the joy of youth, but points out that he will also reveal 
"How other pleasures have been mine, and joys/ Of subtler 
origin. . ." (I, 557-558). Youthful exultation in nature's 
beauty is thought to be excessive by those persons who do
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not understand its ministering quality:
Some called it madness— so indeed it was;
If child-like fruitfulness in passing joy,
If steady moods of thoughtfulness matured 
To inspiration, sort with such a name. (Ill, 149-152)
"Passing joy" is fruitful because it leads to "thoughtful­
ness matured" and finally to "inspiration," the steps up 
the ladder of Joy which Wordsworth hopes that Coleridge 
can also reascend. Even simple walks through the lakeland 
hills are "richly laden with good" and are remembered 
"with thanks / And gratitude, and perfect joy of heart..." 
(IV, 133-135). In Book Three, Wordsworth notes the "just 
gradation" which leads to "higher things," a "permanent 
possession, better fruits" (III, 531-532).
Another Joy of "subtler origin" is that resulting from 
the spirit of brotherhood, from the love of man as man.
For example, Wordsworth describes Michel Beaupuy as exist­
ing in a veritable atmosphere of Joy:
A kind of radiant joy 
Diffused around him, while he was intent 
On works of love or freedom, or revolved 
Complacently the progress of a cause. (IX, 315-318)
Even when disillusioned by the bloody course which the
French Revolution took in the hands of the Terrorists,
Wordsworth is inspired by the individual excellence of men
like Beaupuy:
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So that disastrous period did not want 
Bright sprinklings of all human excellence,
To which the silver wands of saints in Heaven,
Might point with rapturous joy. (X, 483-486)
Joy in individual achievement indicates that universal
progress is still a possibility, and Wordsworth advances
the power of Joy as its means.
The power of Joy receives its more universal impetus
from nature. Other Joys pass with youth, enduring in the
scenes to which they are linked in memory, but the love of
nature for itself is the step which leads to love of man
and then to the permanent union of the individual soul with
the spirit that permeates nature. At this point in his
development, Wordsworth describes his attitude as follows:
Nature herself was, at this unripe time,
But secondary to my own pursuits 
And animal activities, and all
Their trivial pleasures; and when these had drooped
And gradually expired, and Nature, prized
For her own sake, became my joy. (VIII, 342-347)
Nature, until the poet's twenty-second year, is a "passion,"
a "rapture," and an "immediate love" (in the 1805 manuscript,
an "immediate joy").
Joy in nature leads the poet to Joy in individual man. 
Wordsworth credits his sister, Dorothy, with this aspect of 
his development; his walks with her are described in terms 
of joyousness:
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Between these sundry wanderings with a joy
Above all joys, that seemed another morn
Risen on mid noon; blest with the presence, Friend,
Of that sole Sister. . . . (VI, 196-199)
As a result of his wanderings with Dorothy, the poet begins 
to see the dignity inherent in all men, even the humblest.
He is intrigued with the integrity of the men of the Lake­
land farms, of shepherds, and of day laborers, all of whom 
are in unconscious union with nature: "Theirs is the
language of the heavens, the power / The thought, the image, 
and the silent joys" (XIII, 271-272). Exultation of spirit, 
joyousness, gladness, delight— these emotions come to man 
through the cultivation of his response to nature,, emotions 
refined and purified by experience.
In The Prelude, furthermore, the concept of Joy has
an association that is firmly rooted within the tradition
of Christian meditation. Louis L. Martz, in his study of
the meditative style in seventeenth-century English poetry,
uses the words of Gerard Manley Hopkins to define the
meditative style:
Meditative style, then, is "current language 
heightened," (G. M. Hopkins, Letters to Bridges, 
p. 89] molded, to express the unique being of 
an individual who has learned, by intense 
mental discipline, to live his life in the 
presence of divinity. It is not only the 
style of Donne, Herbert, Vaughan, Crashaw, 
or Marvell: it may also be found in Robert
Southwell, Edward Taylor, Blake, Wordsworth,
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Hopkins, Emily Dickinson, the later Yeats, 
and the later Eliot.
Martz's definition contains several important ideas especi­
ally pertinent to the idea of Joy in The Prelude. In the 
first place, Hopkins' definition of meditative style as 
"current language heightened" is analogous to the then 
revolutionary concept of the "real language of men" advo­
cated by Wordsworth in his Preface of 1800. Furthermore, 
Wordsworth's purpose in The Prelude is to describe the 
"growth of a poet's mind"— the manner in which the poet 
has disciplined himself to the recognition of the essential 
unity of man and the cosmos, or, as he says in Book Fourteen 
of the poem, a history of "the discipline / And consummation 
of a Poet's mind" (XIV, 303-304). The "presence of divinity," 
which Martz contends is the realm of the meditative poem, 
is, for Wordsworth, the realm of nature.
Wordsworth shows that a joyous, sensory appreciation
■»of nature leads man to the apprehension of the divine. Now 
techniques of Christian meditation have traditionally stressed 
the importance of the five sense for fruitful religious 
contemplation, contemplation that results in a new and 
joyful apprehension of a revealed truth. St. Ignatius
*2Louis L. Martz, The Poetry of Meditation (New Haven, 
1954), p. 342.
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Loyola's Spiritual Exercises is perhaps the best known work, 
largely because of its effect on the poetry of Hopkins, but 
Martz describes still another book more analogous to the 
kind of meditation found in The Prelude. This is Richard 
Baxter's The Saints Everlasting Rest (1650). Baxter at­
tempts to present in this book a style of meditation 
acceptable to Protestants, but based in the meditative 
practices of traditional Christianity. The Saints Everlast­
ing Rest was immensely popular and became a standard work 
which greatly influenced preachers and writers, especially 
those of Puritan persuasion, such as the American poet, 
Edward Taylor. Baxter's system of meditation results in 
the virtue of Joy, and The Prelude encompasses a similar 
kind of meditation leading to a similar result.
Consider, for example, the following exhortation to 
the practice of meditation by Baxter in The Saints 
Everlasting Rest; "Sirs, if you have never tried this art, 
nor lived this life of heavenly contemplation, I never 
wonder that you walk uncomfortably, that you are complaining,
and live in sorrows, and know not what the Joy of the Saints
13means." Compare to this statement Wordsworth's many
13Ibid., p. 153.
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expressed desires that Coleridge will be able to mount the 
scale of Joy; in Book Six, for example, he comments on 
Coleridge's delight in natural beauty:
Speed thee well! divide 
With us thy pleasure; thy returning strength
Receive it daily as a joy of ours. (VI, 247-249)
Again, in Book Eleven, cited earlier in this chapter, 
Wordsworth expresses hopes for Coleridge's complete restor­
ation through nature:
Thine be such converse strong and sanative,
A ladder for thy spirit to reascend
To health and joy and pure contentedness. (XI, 396-398) 
After hearing Wordsworth read The Prelude in 1807, Coleridge 
expressed his reaction in "To William Wordsworth," and he 
concluded the poem with this line, "And when I rose, I 
found myself in prayer" (1. 112) , an indication of his 
recognition of the meditative nature of The Prelude, whose
"poetic thought" he describes as being, "industrious in its
joy" (1. 22).
In the traditional method of Christian meditation, 
sense experience was believed to be a necessary avenue for 
faith. Baxter, for example, writes that "Faith is imperfect, 
for we are renewed but in part; but sense hath its strength 
according to the strength of the flesh."!4 Wordsworth, too,
*4Ibid., p. 171.
59
shows that strength comes to man through sensuous appre­
hension; he describes the source of a sublime Joy in Book 
Two as follows;
From manifold distinctions, difference 
Perceived in things, where, to the unwatchful eye,
No difference is, and hence, from the same source, 
Sublimer joy. . . . (II, 299-302)
In the last book of the poem, the poet commends the power
of the fields "in balmy spring-time full of rising flowers /
And joyous creatures." The man who has been reared in such
an environment of sensuous beauty possesses the fundamental
wellspring of Joy:
But joy to him,
Oh, joy to him who here hath sown, hath laid
Here, the foundation of his future years I (XIV, 218-220)
Wordsworth, however, alters a very important aspect 
of the traditional Christian concept of Joy. Baxter, for 
example, writes that "the object of Faith is far off; we 
must go as far as Heaven for our Joyes: But the object of
sense is close at Hand."^ Baxter opposes an eternal Joy 
against the transitory present in order to emphasize the 
power of everyday things as a means of religious meditation. 
Wordsworth, however, insists that Joy can be had by all men, 
here and now, through the agency of the imagination which
15Ibid., p. 171.
re-creates the transitory Joy of sensory perception. The
experience of Joy is not deferred entirely to the hereafter.
Wordsworth refers to himself as a "Pilgrim resolute"
in Book One of the poem:
To the open fields I told 
A prophecy: poetic numbers came
Spontaneously to clothe in priestly robe 
A renovated spirit singled out. (I, 50-53)
Again, in the final book of the poem, he prays that he and
Coleridge might be "Prophets of Nature." Pilgrim, Priest,
and Prophet— Wordsworth's emphasis on these sacramental
functions of the poet places The Prelude firmly within that
class of Christian spiritual quests for a kind of moral
adequacy which John Holloway had described as a "Protestant
kind of character building: nature makes man serious,
steadfast, thoughtful, plain-living, high-minded. Another
continuity with the antecedent Christian tradition shows in
Wordsworth's firm insistence on the primacy, over and above
the poet's feeling for nature, of man himself. Wordsworth,
1 6as is now recognized, is no nature poet." But it is also 
recognized that although Wordsworth is "no nature poet," he 
is nevertheless the poet of man and nature, for the
16John Holloway, "English and Some Christian Traditions, 
in The English Mind, p. 290.
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consciousness of the unity with nature is the initial step 
which leads to the perception of the unity of men.
God is specifically invoked in the sixth book of the
poem as "the giver of all joy"; but God's perfect Joy comes
to man primarily through nature. Wordsworth begins Book
Thirteen with the following explanation:
From Nature doth emotion come, and moods 
Of calmness equally are Nature's gift;
This is her glory; these two attributes
Are sister horns that constitute her strength.
(XIII, 1-4)
The "emotion" of line one of this passage is probably Joy,
for throughout the poem, calm is counterpoised against
Joy as the second of nature's two chief gifts, as "emotion"
is poised against "calmness" here. The "joyous murmur"
of the Derwent River described in Book One, for example,
is "a foretaste, a dim earnest, of the calm / That Nature
breathes among the hills and groves" (I, 280-281). Nature,
through the twofold ministry of the emotion of joy and the
emotion of fear, mysteriously contributes to the "calm
existence" of the mature poet. Thus nature brings the "joys
of subtler origin" which lead to the perception of unity:
An intellectual charm; that calm delight
Which, if I err not, surely must belong
To those first-born affinities that fit 
Our new existence to existing things.
And, in our dawn of being, constitute
The bond of union between life and joy. (I, 553-558)
62
Joy partakes of calm, as awe partakes of fear, and this
combination leads to the culmination of growth described
in Book Fourteen of the poem, the culmination which is
also the goal of Christian meditation, for the power of
Joy deepens as experience and knowledge increase:
And so the deep enthusiastic joy,
The rapture of the hallelujah sent
From all that breathes and is, was chastened, stemmed 
And balanced by pathetic truth, by trust 
In hopeful reason, leaning on the stay
Of Providence; and in reverence for duty. (XIV, 293-298) 
The idea of Joy is balanced by man's reason and by his trust 
in higher law.
The Prelude is a quest for permanence as well as a 
quest for moral adequacy. In Book Three, Wordsworth says 
that even as a student at Cambridge he had looked for 
"universal things." Wordsworth discloses the discovery of 
a permanent source of Joy, a source both highly individual 
and universal. The poet records the scale of contemplation 
which leads to a permanent union between life and Joy, a 
union for the "uneasy heart" of men, a "never-failing 
principle":
Ye mountains1 thine, 0 Nature! Thou hast fed 
My lofty speculations; and in thee.
For this uneasy heart of ours, I find 
A never-failing principle of joy 
And purest passion. (II, 447-451)
At the opening of the poem, a breeze fans the poet's cheek,
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a breeze which is "half-conscious of the joy it brings."
In the last book of the poem, an opposite situation is
described, a mountain climb on a "breezeless summer night."
As the moon flashes out from behind some murky clouds,
the poet is made aware of yet another rung of the scale
of Joy, a step open, however, only to those endowed with
special gifts. This vision of Mount Snowden becomes
"the emblem of a mind / That feeds upon infinity':
A mind sustained 
By recognitions of transcendent power.
In sense conducting to ideal form,
In soul of more than mortal privilege. (XIV, 74-77)
This "soul of more than mortal privilege" is marked by the
power of imagination, by the "feeling intellect":
And he whose soul hath risen 
Up to the height of feeling intellect 
Shall want no humbler tenderness. (XIV, 225-227)
This power of "feeling intellect" is the highest rung of 
the ladder of Joy, available only to the man whose imagin­
ative consciousness envelops all the lesser stages of human 
Joy. This faculty is the special attribute of the poet.
The theme of Joy in The Prelude moves along a scale 
from the vivid emotions of unthinking pleasure in early 
youth, to the Joy rising from the intellectual apprehension 
of the unity of man and nature, to a final joyful sense of 
thanksgiving. The poet finds in nature a source of value
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which leads to a transcendent Joy, a source thus universal 
and permanent, but available in its ultimate power only to 
the "feeling intellect," the possession of the man of 
creative imagination. To the man who possesses this 
faculty, all creation seems to be suffused in an ambient 
Joy. The imaginative power, fed by Joy and calm, joins 
life and Joy into a final mystic state of beatitude:
Wonder not
If High the transport, great the joy I felt,
Communing in this sort through earth and heaven 
With every form of creature, as it looked 
Towards the Uncreated with a countenance 
Of adoration, with an eye of love.
One song they sang, and it was audible.
Most audible, then, when the fleshly ear,
O'ercome by humblest prelude of that strain,
Forgot her functions, and slept undisturbed. (II, 409- 
418)
This experience of the unity of life and Joy is consistent 
in Wordsworth's poetry. In the "Ode: Intimations of Im­
mortality," the shepherd boy who exists in perfect harmony 
with the May morning is called a "Child of Joy," and the 
poet insists that the years that bring the calmness of the 
"philosophic mind" do not destroy the essential beatitude, 
the "perpetual benediction," of the early experience of Joy. 
The continuity of his thought is also demonstrated by the 
following lines from "Tintern Abbey," where Joy and calm 
are said to yield the power of the perception of unity:
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We are laid asleep 
In body and become a living soul:
While with an eye made quiet by the power 
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy 
We see into the life of things. {11. 46-50)
In The Excursion, the poet is struck by the sight of the
rising sun and describes a feeling in which his "spirit
was entranced / With joy exalted to beatitude" (IV, 118-19).
Thus The Prelude is, in large part, Wordsworth's fullest
exploration of his lifelong concern with the ascent of the
ladder of Joy, the scale described by Coleridge in The
Philosophical Lectures as culminating in the perfect peace
of God.
Besides constituting a psychological and spiritual 
ladder for the individual soul, Joy is identified as the 
power which,unifies man with nature and man with man. 
Schiller and Coleridge also stress this unifying function 
of the idea of Joy. Wordsworth attributes the greatest Joy 
expressed in the 1805 manuscript of The Prelude to his 
seventeenth year, when, from the experience of the sympa­
thetic social principle of life, or from a kind of 
revelation (again, as in The Recluse, the ultimate source 
of Joy is relegated to this twofold alternative), he feels 
a "bliss ineffable": "I saw one life, and felt that it was
joy." The highest Joy is a result of union with other men
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and communion with God. This experience of the unity of 
life, described in Book Eight, has its most powerful mani­
festation when Wordsworth lingers among the crowds on 
London streets, and feels "union and communion" with all 
humanity. In the 1805 version of the poem, Wordsworth says 
that the experience of unity leads to the Joy of self- 
knowledge :
When strongly breath'd upon 
By this sensation, whencesoe'er it comes 
Of union or communion doth the soul 
Rejoice as in her highest joy: for there,
There chiefly, hath she feeling whence she is
And passing through all Nature rests with God. (VIII,
831-836)
The concept of the soul rejoicing "as in her highest joy" 
is given even more emphatic expression in the final version 
of this passage:
The soul when smitten thus 
By a sublime idea, whencesoe'er 
Vouchsafed for union or communion, feeds 
Oh the pure bliss, and takes her rest with God. (VII, 
672-675)
The union and communion which is manifested in Joy is thus 
a "sublime idea."
The experience of Joy leads not only to the perception 
of unity within the cosmos, but also to a sense of integrity 
within the human soul itself and a sense of identity with 
the divinity which pervades all things. This twofold sense 
of the probity of the individual human soul and of generic
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human nature receives its chief expression in Book Eight,
as is seen above, but earlier, in the 1805 version of this
book, Wordsworth explains that he was endowed with a capa-
ious and ample mind which enabled the experiences of nature
and of intellect to exert upon his total consciousness the
following perception:
The Human nature unto which I felt 
That I belong'd, and which I lov'd and revernc'd 
Was not a punctual Presence, but a Spirit 
Living in time and space, and far diffus'd.
In this my joy, in this my dignity 
Consisted. . . . (VIII, 761-766)
The Joy of God's presence creates a consciousness of human
dignity which transcends all human compacts, a sense of
integrity and worth at once highly individual and universal.
Like Coleridge in "Dejection," Wordsworth also main­
tains that purity of soul is a necessary concomitant for 
Joy. In Book One, for example, the "joys of subtler origin" 
are connected with "hallowed and pure motions of the sense," 
and in Book Two, "sublimer joy" results from moments of 
vision which are not only "kindred to [the] purer mind," 
but also indicative of the sublime dignity of the soul. This 
purity is the innocence that accepts the complexities of 
human experience, content to bear these complexities as 
"the burthen of the mystery," but it is also indicative of 
the traditional Christian concept of Joy as a virtue related
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to moral purity and innocence.
Joy is also associated in The Prelude, as it is to
be throughout the nineteenth century, with energy and with
power. In the opening lines of the poem, energy is the
"gift" that consecrates the Joy of leisure time, the
coming liberty, that the poet anticipates. In Book Five,
after setting up his theory of excellence in education,
Wordsworth makes an even more explicit connection of Joy
with power:
May books and Nature be their early joyI 
And knowledge, rightly honoured with that name—  
Knowledge not purchased by the loss of powerl (V, 423- 
425)
The "deep power of joy" must not be enervated by the identi­
fication of knowledge with the analytical reason alone. 
Furthermore, in Book Two of the poem, Wordsworth carefully 
examines the reciprocal nature of the give-and-take between 
nature and mind. The child perceives an active universe 
through the impetus of Joy:
For feeling has to him imparted power 
That through the growing faculties of sense 
Doth like an agent of the one great Mind 
Create, creator and receiver both. (II, 255-258)
In the 1805 manuscript, the growing faculties of sense which
impart this spiritual power are specifically enumerated:
grief, exultation, fear, and joy (II, 271).
In the concluding book of the poem, when Wordsworth
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formulates the effect that Mount Snowden had upon him and
begins his description of the imagination and the "higher
mind," he once again elucidates the contribution Of "the
principle of joy," for the power of love itself largely
results from the power of Joy in beauty:
To fear and love,
To love as prime and chief, for there fear ends,
Be this ascribed; to early intercourse 
In presence of sublime or beautiful forms,
With the adverse principles of pain and joy— . (XIV, 162- 
166)
R. D. Havens has discussed Wordsworth's own designation of
The Prelude as a poem which chiefly describes the growth of
power, and in his explanation of "the ministry of fear,"
Havens writes that "fear is an emotion called forth by the
presence or the thought of power. Even the joy which is
often derived from the contemplation of power partakes (as
most of the keener pleasures have in them ar element of
17pain) to some extent of fear." Havens uses the passage 
quoted above to reinforce the chief argument of this chapter 
of his book, the explanation of Wordsworth's idea of the 
contribution of the emotion of fear to the imagination and 
the soul of man. Havens omits in his quotation, however,
Line 163 of this passage, "To love as prime and chief, for
17R. D. Havens, The Mind of a Poet (Baltimore, 1941),
p. 47.
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there fear ends." This line would seem to be the real core
of the passage, for Wordsworth specifically says that fear
is obliterated by the power of love. Furthermore, Joy is
not only "derived from the contemplation of power," as
Havens says, but Joy i£ power, a power identified in this
same passage as partaking of beauty itself. Like Coleridge,
Wordsworth maintains that Joy has intrinsic expressive
value, but also that Joy is an instrumental value which
leads to the perception of beauty and of love.
Wordsworth's equation of Joy with power can best be
demonstrated through a comparison of the two versions of a
passage in Book Three of the poem. The 1805 manuscript
reads as follows:
Youth should be aw'd, possess'd, as with a sense 
Religious, of what holy joy there is 
In knowledge. (Ill, 395-397)
In the revised manuscript, the idea of Joy is stated more
obliquely:
Youth should be awed, religiously possessed 
With a conviction of the power that waits 
On knowledge. (Ill, 390-392)
"Holy joy" is thus revised to "a conviction of power" in
the final version of the poem, indicating Wordsworth's
concept of the symbiotic relationship between Joy and power.
Still another example of this equation is found in Book Two,
where the assertion of the "sublimer joy" found in the
"manifold distinctions" of nature is made possible through
71
the "most watchful power of love," through "the visionary 
power." Matthew Arnold's attempt to unite the "sublimer 
joy" with "the visionary power" found in the natural truth 
of Christianity is a development of this aspect of Words­
worth's idea of Joy.
The idea of Joy is identified with the imagination
in Book Six of The Prelude. In the manuscript of 1805,
Wordsworth says that the imagination reveals to the soul
that its destiny "is with infinitude, and only there."
Possessing this knowledge, the soul can rest content with
no other outward sign of its fate:
That may attest its prowess, blest in thoughts
That are their own perfection and reward
Strong in itself, and the access of joy
Which hides it like the overflowing Nile. (VI, 545-
548)
This magnificent image of "the access of joy" flowing 
round the soul as the Nile overflows its banks is revised 
to "beatitude" in the 1805 manuscript. In many of his 
revisions, Wordsworth gives his poem a more Christian 
spirit, and this is an example of that tendency. The re­
vision of "access of joy" to "beatitude," however, is also 
another example of the presence of the traditional implica­
tions of the idea of Joy, for the Christian concept of Joy 
includes a final state of beatitude, as the passages 
previously examined in Baxter's The Saints Everlasting Rest
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demonstrate. Wordsworth's idea of Joy draws upon a cul­
tural source that strengthens its power and appeal.
Wordsworth refuses to define the ultimate source of 
Joy in The Prelude, other than to maintain that it arises 
from union and communion with all things. In a sonnet 
written between 1812 and 1815, "Surprised by Joy," the 
poet seems to imply that Joy is a gift or revelation, the 
result of what James Joyce calls an epiphany? this is much 
the same idea which Coleridge expresses in "Dejection." 
Wordsworth's poetry is true to the complexities of the 
human condition, and the experience of Joy recorded in The 
Prelude cannot be reduced to formula, aesthetic or spiri­
tual. This is the ultimate power of the idea of Joy. If 
all aspects of human experience could be summarized in 
convenient equations or in the language of Blue Books, as 
many nineteenth-century Positivists thought, the nature of 
man itself becomes little more than another problem await­
ing final solution. Wordsworth refuses to accept such a 
reading of human life. Joy's source thus remains deep 
within the consciousness, but Wordsworth's uniquely person­
al exploration of his own consciousness demonstrates that 
dignity of soul, unity, power, energy, and purity accrue 
to man through and with the power of Joy.
CHAPTER III
WORDSWORTH, BROWNING, AND "KINDRED JOY":
THE JOY MOTIF IN BROWNING'S POETRY, 1833-1850
Wordsworth says in Book Four of The Excursion that
man who communes with natural forms will be led to find
"kindred joy" in his fellow men:
— Needs must feel 
The joy of that pure principle of love 
So deeply, that, unsatisfied with aught 
Less pure and exquisite, he cannot choose 
But seek for objects of a kindred love 
In fellow-natures and a kindred joy. (IV, 1212-1217)
Wordsworth uses a phrase in this passage that appeals to
other Romantic poets as well. Shelley says in The Defence
of Poetry that poetry must "bear news of kindred joy." The
"kindred joy" of Wordsworth and Shelley is embodied by
Browning in his poetic characters. The source of Joy moves
from Wordsworth's meditative realm of nature to Browning's
world of men and women, but Browning continues to employ
the essentials of the Romantic idea of Joy.
Browning, together with Tennyson and Arnold, attempted 
to avoid the introspection which marked, and, they felt 
marred, the poetry of the earlier Romantics. The search for
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a more objective poetic form stems at least partly from the 
fact that The Prelude was not a part of their inheritance 
from the earlier tradition, for The Prelude was not pub­
lished in its entirety until after Wordsworth's death in 
1850, a fact which Morse Peckham has called a tragedy for 
the subsequent course of English literature. Browning, 
for example, was thirty-eight years old in 1850 and had 
been publishing his poetry since 1833: the poetry he com­
posed from 1833 to 1850 reworks many of the same psycho­
logical and emotional problems which Wordsworth explores 
in The Prelude without the consummate artistry of Words­
worth's poetic introspection. Tennyson's major poem, In 
Memoriam, was published the same year as The Prelude, and 
Arnold, who later claims that Wordsworth's true genius lay 
in his shorter poems, was, judging from the entries in his 
Note-Books, chiefly impressed by the more didactic passages 
of The Prelude. Herbert Lindenberger's analysis of the 
Victorian reaction to the poem makes the following summation
The poor reception of The Prelude in 1850 is 
rooted in causes more fundamental than its 
generic strangeness. In the half century be­
tween its composition and publication England 
had passed through political, technological, 
and social changes far vaster in scale than 
during any comparable period in her history.
. . .  To an age preparing to demonstrate its 
progress and cosmopolitanism at the Great 
Exhibition Wordsworth's world must have seemed
quaint and provincial. Yet no review, not even 
the Examiner, was willing to recommend it as a 
period-piece— it was obviously too introspec­
tive to stand next to such vivid reconstructions 
as A Tale of Two Cities and The French Revolution.!
Too introspective— this is the heart of the matter, 
for it is introspection which plagues Browning in Pauline, 
Tennyson in poems like "The Palace of Art," and Arnold in 
Empedocles on Etna. Browning's Pauline is the poem which 
elicited John Stuart Mill's now famous comment that the
author of Pauline is "possessed with a more intense and
morbid self-consciousness than I ever knew before in any 
sane human being." As William Clyde DeVane points out, 
Pauline is Browning's autobiography to his twentieth year, 
his Prelude and Sartor Resartus, as the late Parleyings 
are a more objective autobiography of his own mind. Al­
though Browning certainly changed the form of his intro­
spection, the Wordsworthian impulse to explore the mind of
man remains dominant in his concept of poetry. J. Hillis
Miller utilizes a striking phrase in describing Browning's 
characteristic poetic method as being "the introspection
^■Herbert Lindenberger, "The Reception of The Prelude, 
BNYPL, LXIV (April, 1960), 206.
2Quoted in William Clyde DeVane, A Browning Handbook 
(New York, 1955), p. 46.
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3of others."
Browning's idea of Joy is clarified if it is ex­
plored as it developed within the Wordsworthian-Romantic 
tradition, although Browning was probably as much influ­
enced by the emphasis on Joy which pervaded the Zeitgeist 
as he was by a detailed knowledge of Wordsworth's poetry. 
Browning became personally acquainted with Wordsworth when 
the latter had assumed the rather aloof stance of the 
Laureateship; he attacked Wordsworth's political conser­
vatism in "The Lost Leader," an attack which he later 
regretted, and he assumed an important position in the 
London Wordsworth society in his later years, an uncharac­
teristic public act. For his part, Wordsworth (and his 
position is not unique) found Browning's early poetry 
obscure; in a rather rare flash of humor, he writes at the 
time of the marriage of the Brownings that it is probably 
a very good match since both are unintelligible to anyone 
else.
Elizabeth Barrett's letters show far more veneration 
for the elderly Wordsworth than do Browning's, at least 
partly because Wordsworth was a personal friend of her
J. Hillis Miller, The Disappearance of God (Cambridge, 
1963), p. 103.
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cousin, John Kenyon. Indeed, Elizabeth Barrett singles 
out a statement by an obscure Victorian critic named Mr.
Gurney which has been used again and again to contrast 
the two poets. She writes, "I have just been looking at a 
preface of some poems by some Mr. Gurney where he speaks of 
'the reflective wisdom of Wordsworth and the profound 
psychological utterances of a Browning'. . . . The 
"reflective wisdom" of the Wordsworthian-Romantic tradition 
has often been played off against Browning's "psychological 
utterances" by critics since Mr. Gurney, but to do so dis­
torts not only the genius of both Wordsworth and Browning, 
but also the character of English Romanticism as well.
Like Arnold, Ruskin, Mill, George Eliot, and other Victorians, 
Browning had to come to terms with the Wordsworthian tradi­
tion which dominated his era. He evolved a poetic theory 
that is strikingly similar to that of Wordsworth. In their 
approach to the basic principles of poetic creation, to the 
dramatic possibilities of lyric form, to the importance 
of isolated moments of time, to the nature of poetic truth, 
and to the dramatic characterization that "makes a case," 
Browning and Wordsworth have analogous positions.
One of Browning's few extended prose comments about
4The Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett 
Barrett (New York, 1899), I, 73.
his concept of poetry occurs in 1855 as a result of John 
Ruskin's charge of obscurity. Browning replies to Ruskini 
"I know that I don't make out my conception in my language, 
all poetry being a putting the infinite within the
5finite." This statement is comparable to Wordsworth's 
much expressed concern with the inadequacy of the poet's 
language when dealing with the "fallings from us, vanishings" 
that characterize the Romantic sense of infinity. Browning 
even employs the metaphor of a mountain climb, the usual 
Romantic symbol of infinity, in his explanation to Ruskin 
of the manner in which his poetry should be read: he ad­
vises Ruskin to make the mental leaps that his diction 
sometimes requires without poking his alpenstock into every 
nook and gorge. Wordsworth, to single out one example, 
explained to Walter Savage Landor, Browning's close friend, 
that "even in poetry [it] is the imaginative only, viz., that 
which . . . turns upon infinity, that powerfully affects 
me . . . passages where things are lost in each other, and 
limits vanish, and aspirations are raised."6 Furthermore,
5E. T. Cook, The Life of John Ruskin (London, 1912) , I,
461.
6Quoted in Havens, p. 240.
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Browning's idea of the basic principle of aesthetic pro­
duction is similar to that expressed by Wordsworth in the 
Preface to Lyrical Ballads. In a letter written to Elizabeth 
Barrett in 1845, Browning saysj "'Reflection' is exactly 
what it [the creative process] names itself— a re-presenta­
tion, in scattered rays from every angle of incidence, of
what first of all became present in a great light, a whole 
7one." Browning's idea of poetic re-presentation of an 
experience which first flashes upon the poetic imagination 
as a whole is essentially the Wordsworthian concept of 
emotion that is recollected in tranquillity until a re­
action causes the tranquillity to disappear, and a kindred 
emotion comes into existence. Browning's use of "re­
presentation" and "reflection" as names for the creative 
process is analogous to Wordsworth's use of "recollection" 
and "reaction," both pairs of words implying the active mind 
of the poet engaged in the re-creation of experience.
Browning's use of the dramatic monologue and the 
dramatic lyric are anticipated by Wordsworth. Both poets 
wrote plays and were interested in the dramatic possibilities 
of lyric form, possibilities called forth by the poetic
7The Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett 
Barrett, I, 98.
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exploration of the human mind. Wordsworth gives one ex­
pression of his idea of the dramatic principle of poetry 
in a letter to Coleridge in 1808: "If the Poet is to be 
predominant over the Dramatist, — then let him see if there 
are no victories in the world of spirit, no changes, no 
commotions, no revolutions there, no fluxes and refluxes
Oof the thoughts." Browning's Paracelsus, a forecast of 
his poetic career, is jest such a drama of "the world of 
spirit" as Wordsworth describes in this letter. In his 
Preface to the poem, Browning explains that it is an at­
tempt "to display somewhat minutely the mood itself in its 
rise and progress" without the usual machinery of the drama. 
From this early base, Browning slowly evolved the dramatic 
monologue as his most successful poetic medium.
Browning is also in the Wordsworthian tradition in 
his utilization of a moment of historical or personal 
crisis as the occasion of his dramatic monologues. Hugh 
Sykes Davies, in his discussion of Wordsworth's kinship 
with some of the theories of Freud, contrasts their stress 
on decisive moments with writers in the empiricist tradition 
who employ the stream-of-consciousness technique as the 
most satisfactory method for depicting the flux of the
g
Quoted in Miles, Wordsworth and the Vocabulary of 
Emotion, p. 148.
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moments that constitutes reality, each moment receiving as
much emphasis as the next. In contrast to this latter
technique, Davies writes that the Wordsworthian tradition
is marked by the following traits:
A writer inclined to agree with Wordsworth and 
and Freud will need to find the means of des­
cribing the more crucially formative moments 
and impulses of his own mind, and the minds he 
wishes to represent. The unselectiveness, the 
evenness of the "stream of consciousness" may 
serve him occasionally for preparatory and ex­
planatory passages of experience, for those in 
which the climactic events are prepared and 
presaged; but for the climactic events them­
selves, for the crucial "spots of time," his 
technique will need to be more traditional, for 
it cannot but select, shape and pose almost in 
isolation those moments which were so highly 
selected, so specially shaped and isolated in 
experience.®
The concept of time which underlies Browning's choice of 
climactic moments for his dramatic monologues is analogous 
to Wordsworth's. Browning shapes the material of his poems 
into carefully detailed, artistic patterns through the use 
of traditional poetic techniques so that the crucial nature 
of the moment itself becomes the main aesthetic goal. 
Browning, like Wordsworth, believes that certain moments of 
time are stamped with the special mark of infinitude which 
yields a sudden revelation of Joy. His concept of the 
climactic "infinite moment" thus occupies as central a
9Davies, p. 171.
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position in his poetic theory as do the "spots of time" in 
the Wordsworthian aesthetic.
Wordsworth and Browning, furthermore, have comparable 
concepts of the nature of poetic truth. Aubrey de Vere, 
for example, recollects that Wordsworth often spoke of the 
meaning of "truth" as follows: "Truth in its largest sense,
as a thing at once real and ideal, a truth including exact 
and accurate detail, and yet everywhere subordinating mere 
detail to the spirit of the whole— this, he affirmed, was 
the soul and essence not only of descriptive poetry, but of 
all poetry."^® This Wordsworthian concept of truth is 
similar to Browning's; for example, he insists that he has 
presented truth in The Ring and the Book, although he has 
subordinated some details of his sources "to the spirit of 
the whole." Like Wordsworth, however, he maintains that 
this is not a falsification of essential truth.
Browning is also firmly within the Wordsworthian 
tradition in his emphasis upon man's imaginative apprehen­
sion of truth, an analogue of the previous point. As W. C. 
DeVane points out, "Man is distinguished from the rest of 
creation by the mind— which to Browning means not the 
intellect, but the emotions or the imagination— and it is
10Quoted in Havens, p. 248.
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through this faculty that he attains contact with God. . . . 
He does not want intellectual comprehension; he wants to 
experience through his emotions that he has a kinship with 
God."^ Wordsworth demonstrates in The Prelude that Joy is 
the wellspring of this power of the emotional and moral 
consciousness of the presence of divinity, and Browning 
continues this Romantic tradition.
Like Wordsworth, Browning is attracted to the dramatic 
characterization of the somewhat disreputable character: 
his Victorian admirers were shocked by his apparent endorse­
ment of the lovers in "The Statue and the Bust," of Bishop 
Blougram, or of Don Juan in Fifine at the Fair. Wordsworth's 
contemporaries displayed a similar attitude, as the following 
remarks by R. D. Havens demonstrates:
His tolerance of sexual irregularities shocked Miss 
Fenwick, and his apparent indifference to lying in 
"Beggars" and its sequel "Where Are They Now?"r to 
stealing in "The Two Thieves" and "The Farmer of 
Tylsbury Vale," and to drunkenness in "The Waggoner" 
may have shocked others. In these poems, he in­
tended to point out that, reprehensible as such 
sins are, that is not the whole story— as Godwin 
might have supposed. Where the reason saw only 
lying, thieving, and riot, the heart and the 
aesthetic sense saw beauty, joy, youthful exuber­
ance, kindness, or the sheer delight of living 
and these are so precious that we must prize them 
wherever they appear and must make the best of 
their possessors. ^




This explanation of Wordsworth's aims is much the same as 
that employed by modern Browning apologists, and if Miss 
Fenwick sounds like many of Browning's Victorian admirers, 
we forget that Wordsworth lived his last twenty or so years 
in the Victorian era.
Thus the critical impulse, dominant from the time of 
Elizabeth Barrett's Mr. Gurney, which relegates "reflective 
wisdom" to Wordsworth and "psychological utterances" to 
Browning is misleading and simplistic. Wordsworth is 
deeply interested in psychological processes in The Prelude 
and The Excursion; indeed, The Prelude is poetic "depth 
psychology" at its finest. He analyzes states of mind in 
the Lyrical Ballads, and he creates a cast of characters 
as grotesque as that of Browning; Betty Foy, Martha Ray, 
the Cumberland Begger, and Peter Bell. Certainly Browning's 
departures from the earlier tradition must be recognized 
and the relationship not overstated. Browning's early 
poetic career, however, can be seen as an attempt to come 
to grips, as it were, with the best of the Wordsworthian 
tradition, as an effort to unite the psychological utter­
ances of the "objective poet" with the reflective wisdom 
of the "subjective poet" into the "whole poet," whom he
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describes in the Essay on Shelley.̂  Browning's concept
of kindred Joy contains three of the major elements which 
dominate the Wordsworthian-Romantic idea of Joy. Joy re­
sults from the harmony of soul and body, from the kinship 
of man with man, and from the unity of God and man.
Pauline. Paracelsus, and Sordello are Browning's 
earliest attempts at the formulation of the possibilities 
of the power of Joy in human life and are comparable in 
his poetic career to The Prelude in Wordsworth's. Like 
Wordsworth, Browning explores his own mind in order to 
establish the nature of his moral and aesthetic beliefs, 
and he examines the necessary conditions for the idea of 
Joy as thoroughly as does Wordsworth in The Prelude. The 
speaker of Pauline voices one of the central themes of the 
three poems when the realization of his own mortality 
flashes upon him: "I cannot be immortal, taste all joy."14
Thomas J. Collins has recently summarized the criti­
cal confusion surrounding this essay. His own position is 
that Browning converts Shelley into a "'whole poet' who 
possesses both objective and subjective powers." However, 
Collins maintains that Browning "is not really talking about 
Shelley at all, but projecting into the name and purpose of 
Shelley the ideals and aspirations which he himself had as­
similated by 1851," in Robert Browning's Moral-Aesthetic 
Theory, 1833-1850 (Lincoln, 1967), p. 114 .
14Robert Browning, Pauline, in The Works of Robert 
Browning, ed. F. G. Kenyon(London, 1912), I, l.~81CK All 
subsequent references to this edition will be included in 
the text.
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This statement is more than the adolescent awakening of 
Robert Browning. It is the chief moral and aesthetic prob­
lem of the artist as Browning sees him, for Browning 
maintains throughout his career that the artist must 
develop a deep and humble consciousness of the limits of 
his own consciousness. The artist has unique powers which 
impose unique responsibilities; he, more than other men, 
must have, as Paul Tillich has phrased it for twentieth- 
century man, the "courage to accept his finiteness."
Browning struggles with this problem from the time of the 
publication of Pauline in 1833, to the completion of 
Sordello in 1840.
The moral-aesthetic resolution of these three poems 
centers, as Thomas J. Collins observes, upon the regenera­
tive experience of the central figure in each poem. Collins 
points out that through this regenerative experience, the 
poet discovers the following:
Infinites are unattainable to man in his 
present state of imperfection; imperfection 
qualified by the necessity and inevitability 
of progress, is the law of life; progress, 
through imperfection, depends on the recog­
nition that the flesh is not a "carnal 
mesh,” but a temporal element which can 
contribute to man's ultimate perfections, 
and finally, God rejoices and resides in 
all aspects of his creation even to the
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extent of allowing man, in his weakness, 
to reflect his grandeur. ^
A central perception in Browning's early poetry, in other
words, is that the poet must both nurture and discipline
his consciousness to the perception of the Joy immanent
in the world around him.
In Pauline, however, Browning does not effect this 
resolution in his poet-hero. The speaker of the poem 
attempts to define the character of his past and present 
life for the ever-patient Pauline, and Joy occupies a 
central place in each stage of the narrative. Browning's 
speaker dreams of a Shelleyan Utopia in which "Men were 
to be as gods and earth as heaven." This dream, which 
will encompass all Joy, is to be realized through the 
study of "real life":
Mankind, its cares, hopes, fears, its woes and joys;
And, as I pondered on their ways, I sought 
How best life's end might be attained— an end 
Comprising every joy. I deeply mused. (11. 444-447)
His Utopian dream is soon shattered, however, by the
exigencies of life in the world.
The next phase of his quest takes the speaker of the 
poem to the world of nature. Here, in a setting reminiscent 
of Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey," he finds a clump of trees
15Collins, p. 43.
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set atop a hill, overlooking cottages and hedgerows. This
closed-in natural setting affords security, but unlike
Wordsworth in "Tintern Abbey," Browning's speaker has no
experience of "the deep power of joy":
The bushes close and clasp above and keep 
Thought in— I am concentrated— I feel;
But my soul saddens when it looks beyond:
I cannot be immortal, taste all joy. (11. 807-810)
The consciousness of the existence of Joy only reminds him
of his own finitude, a fact which he is unable to accept
at this point in his development. The speaker of the poem
tells Pauline that he will "look within no more" (1. 937),
a determination that indicates that Browning, like Coleridge,
sees the power of Joy as the primary condition for the
avoidance of morbid introspection.
The speaker of Pauline, despairing because the power
of Joy seems to be inextricably tied to youth, says that
he walks a kind of spiritual tightrope:
1 knew while youth and health so lifted me 
That spite of all life's nothingness, no grief 
Came nigh me, I must ever be light-hearted;
And that this knowledge was the only veil 
Betwixt joy and despair: so if age
Came, I should be left— a wreck linked to a soul. (11. 
492-497)
The force which is to be the redeeming factor in his life 
is his escape with Pauline to a primitive world, where they 
will experience "perfect joy." The speaker of the poem
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concludes, "No less I make an end in perfect joy" (1. 994), 
and this phrase is used as a refrain in the last section of 
the poem. If his dream of love fades, he will, nonetheless, 
"end in perfect joy"; if a higher goal arises only to elude 
his grasp, he will, again, "end in perfect joy."
Browning, however, does not concretely embody this
perfect Joy within the speaker's experience. The assertion
of Joy in Pauline is thus weak and unconvincing, although
the poem does demonstrate that Browning recognizes the
experience of Joy to be a central value in the development
of the poetic mind. The speaker of the poem identifies
his "first free joy" (1. 103) with the realization of his
poetic powers. He is unable, however, to bridle this
imaginative energy into an achievement of Joy:
I envy— how I envy him whose soul 
Turns its whole energies to some one end,
To elevate an aim, pursue success 
However mean! So, my still baffled hope 
Seeks out abstractions. I would have one joy,
But one in life, so it were wholly mine,
One rapture all my soul could fill. (11. 604-610)
These "struggling aims” end in the assertion of "perfect
joy," but this Joy is actually only another abstraction of
an obscure and frightening reality that the speaker of the
poem, and Browning himself, cannot now face with mature
composure and ready acceptance.
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In Paracelsus, published in 1835, two years after 
Pauline, Browning again attempts to define the place of 
Joy in the aesthetic and moral realms, this time more 
successfully. As the poem opens, Paracelsus refuses to 
admit the central importance of Joy to the human soul.
When rebuked by Festus, his oldest friend, for his intel­
lectual pride, Paracelsus replies that he is indeed aware
of the "simple joy," of "all the joys" that he must re­
nounce in order to carry out his plan to pursue perfect 
knowledge. He argues that Festus does not understand his 
dedication to intellectual pursuits:
When Festus learns 
That every common pleasure of the world
Affects me as himself; that I have just
As varied appetite for joy derived 
From common things? a stake in life, in short,
Like his; a stake which rash pursuit of aims
That life affords not, would as soon destroy. (I, 89-95)
Paracelsus, despite the warnings of Festus, does not believe 
that his arduous course necessitates the quenching of his 
"appetite for joy." He proudly longs for some "real sacri­
fice to make" for his goal; he declares that Festus's "friends
the sages threw their joys away, / While I must be content
with keeping mine" (I, 658-659). He will undertake the 
quest for perfect knowledge alone, confident that he will 
attain perfect Joy from perfect knowledge.
In the second canto of the poem, Paracelsus has failed
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in the search for perfect knowledge that he began fourteen
years before. He realizes that his quest has been futile,
partly because he has neglected his own need of Joy:
It has been monstrous: yet, till late, my course
So ardently engrossed me, that delight,
A pausing and relecting joy, 't is plain.
Could find no place in it. (II, 269-272)
He hopes that the God "who clothes summer" can also renew
him. Aprile, the Shelleyan poet, enters the poem at this
point and identifies himself as one who aspired to infinite
love, as Paracelsus has sought to achieve infinite knowledge.
Aprile declares to Paracelsus that his own failure lay in
the rejection of Joy*
— Because I could not curb 
My yearnings to possess at once the full 
Enjoyment, but neglected all the means 
Of realizing even the frailest joy. (II, 388-391)
Paracelsus, however, distorts this counsel into a determin­
ation to seek, as Aprile has futilely sought, perfect love. 
Again his quest is unsuccessful. He explains to Festus, 
in Canto Three of the poem, that his search for infinite 
love has been in vain because he has made Joy only an 
auxiliary and peripheral part of his life:
That 't was ray purpose to find joy or grief 
Solely in the fulfillment of my plan 
Or plot or whatsoe'er it was; rejoicing 
Alone as it proceeded prosperously,
Sorrowing then only when mischance retarded 
Its progress. (II, 264-269)
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Paracelsus, however, refuses to act upon the basis of this 
insight. He has not yet advanced beyond his initial posi­
tion because he still ignores the power of Joy in human 
life.
In Canto Four, Paracelsus desperately resorts to
wine drinking in an effort to deaden his sensibilities,
and to cynicism in an attempt to justify the causes of his
failure. Festus stresses the necessity of the experience
of Joy, but Paracelsus drunkenly replies to him:
Aprile was a poet, I make songs—
'T is the very augury of success I wantl
Why should I not be joyous now as then? (IV, 225-227)
Festus angrily tells Paracelsus that he has destroyed his
capacity for Joy:
Joyous! and how? and what remains for joy?
You have declared the ends (which I am sick 
Of naming) are impracticable. (IV, 228-230)
But Paracelsus tenaciously holds to the belief that he can
successfully yoke together his double aim: "I seek to
know and to enjoy at once" (IV, 240). He slowly regains
his power of reason as this canto advances, but he declares
again to Festus that he will maintain his original goal:
I told you once, I cannot now enjoy.
Unless I deem my knowledge gains through joy;
Nor can I know, but straight warm tears reveal 
My need of linking joy to knowledge:
So, on I drive, enjoying all I can.
And knowing all I can. (IV, 360-365)
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Festus offers Arnoldian advice:
Forswear the future; look for joy no more.
But wait death's summons aimd holy sights,
And trust me for the event— peace, if not joy. (IV, 
530-532)
Paracelsus, however, refuses to forego the Joy that is the
highest fruit of love and knowledge.
In the fifth and final canto of the poem, which
Browning entitles "Paracelsus Attains,” the true nature
of the Joy that has eluded him is recognized and defined
by Paracelsus. Man must struggle, he says, with the forces
of nature that determine the conditions of his humanity
if he is to obtain the Joy that dignifies his soul:
And grappling Nature, so prevail on her 
To fill the creature full she dared thus frame 
Hungry for joy; and, bravely tyrannous,
Grow in demand, still craving more and more,
And make each joy conceded prove a pledge 
Of other joy to follow— . (V, 607-612)
In this speech, Paracelsus recalls his original metaphor: 
the "appetite for joy" is the distinguishing mark of the 
human soul. Joy is the missing link between God and man, 
and man's hunger for Joy propels his soul to an over­
whelming consciousness of his immortal destiny. This know­
ledge marks the end of his lifelong search: now Paracelsus
perceives the relationship between life and Joy, a perception 
that partakes of perfect knowledge:
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What life is— how God tastes an infinite joy 
In infinite ways— one everlasting bliss,
From whom all being emanates, all power 
Proceeds; in whom is life forevermore,
Yet whom existence in its lowest form
Includes; where dwells enjoyment there is he. (V, 643-
648)
Browning's Paracelsus, like Schiller, Wordsworth, and 
Coleridge, identifies infinite Joy with God Himself, and 
extends this identification to include all aspects of 
creation. Paracelsus dies, but he has attained the know­
ledge that the present, with its "distinct and trembling 
beauty," is mankind's proper realm:
But thou shalt painfully attain to joy
While hope and fear and love shall keep thee manl (V,
836-837)
This knowledge is the highest wisdom in Browning's poetic 
universe, and it becomes the leading principle of his idea 
of Joy throughout his career.
Sordello has acquired the dubious distinction of being 
the most obscure poem of the nineteenth century. It is, 
in many respects, an inchoate work, but Browning, nonethe­
less, effects in this poem some of his most meaningful, 
early statements of the idea of Joy. In Book One, Sordello, 
now living in retirement, ponders the proper sphere of the 
poet in society, the nature of his creative powers, and 
the source of his "peculiar joy":
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They are fain invest 
The lifeless thing with life from their own soul,
Availing it to purpose, to control,
To dwell distinct and have peculiar joy
And separate interests that may employ
That beauty fitly, for its proper sake. (I, 490-495)
The poet derives "peculiar joy" from the contemplation of 
beauty for beauty's sake, but other men desire a share in 
his Joy. The poet is described as a man who is diverted 
by his artistic powers from the natural course pursued by 
ordinary men, and is both blessed and cursed by his experi­
ence of Joy:
Of joys— contrive some yet amid the dearth.
Vary and render them, it may be, worth
Most we forego. Suppose Sordello hence
Selfish enough, without a moral sense
However feeble; what informed the boy
Others desired a portion in his joy? (I, 681-686)
The narrator of Sordello here reiterates the conflict which
Browning has also explored in Pauline and Paracelsus: can
the poet really bridle his creative power of Joy into a Joy
in which all men can share? Like Wordsworth in The Prelude,
Browning answers this central question by envisioning Joy
as a ladder. All men must attempt the climb, but the highest
rung on this metaphoric ladder of Joy is available, however,
only to the man endowed with the power of imagination. The
mastery of the poet's craft, for example, is one rung on
the ladder of Joy:
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Sordello could explore 
By means of it, however, one step more 
In joy; and, mastering the round at length 
Learn how to live in weakness as in strength. (II, 277- 
280)
At this point in his development, however, Sordello is 
convinced that his imaginative powers only doom him to a 
life of isolation, a life of "tasting joys by proxy" (I,
728) .
Sordello thinks that the artist must remain aloof from
the Joy of ordinary men, and that he must renounce the idea
of Joy completely:
He caught himself shamefully hankering
After the obvious petty joys that spring
From true life, fain relinquish pedestal
And condescend with pleasures— one and all
To be renounced, no doubt; for, thus to chain
Himself to single joys and so refrain
From tasting their quintessence, frustrates, sure,
His prime design; each joy must he abjure 
Even for love of it. (II, 547-555)
In this passage, Browning embodies Sordello's inner conflict
between Man and Poet in terms of Joy. The man-portion of
Sordello demands Joy; the poet-portion, however, feels that
Joy must be held in abeyance in order to intensify its
power, in order to taste its "quintessence":
His constant faith (the Poet-halffe to wit—
That waiving any compromise between 
No joy and all joy kept the hunger keen 
Beyond most methods)— . (II, 664-667)
Sordello, like Paracelsus, wonders if he must "leap o'er
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paltry joys," or if he can "enjoy like men." This conflict 
is resolved in the sixth book of the poem.
Sordello has failed to perceive, the narrator of the 
poem says, that the artist's Joy results from struggle the 
dies with attainment:
For what is Joy?— to heave 
Up one obstruction more, and common leave 
What was peculiar, by such act destroy 
Itself; a partial death is every joy. (VI, 261-264)
Joy must be wrenched from sorrow. Mankind desires and 
deserves a "portion" of the poet's "peculiar joy," and the 
poet must leave the realm of "peculiar joy" for the realm 
of universal Joy. Legitimate sympathy for mankind and 
humanitarian ideals, however, must not be allowed to en­
croach upon his creative Joy:
Why should sympathy command you quit
The course that makes your joy, nor will remit
Their woe? Would all arrive at joy? (VI, 307-309)
Like Matthew Arnold, Browning sees that man has "such need 
of joy," and he maintains that the Joy-giving potentiality 
of poetry is as powerful as is direct and immediate action, 
that poetry is, indeed, an expressive embodiment of Joy's 
intrinsic value and instrumentally effective as a weapon 
against isolation and alienation. But he does not arrive 
at this resolution without further exploration of the prob­
lem of the poet's Joy versus mankind's Joy.
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In a phrase that recalls Wordsworth's "deep power of
joy," the narrator of Sordello elaborates this conflict.
The poet's imaginative, creative energy is potentially
"gigantic with its power of joy":
His time of action for, against, or with 
Our world (I labor to extract the pith 
Of this his problem) grew, that even-tide,
Gigantic with its power of joy, beside 
The world's eternity of impotence
To profit through at his whole joy's expense. (VI, 321- 
326)
Can "all arrive at joy," and can the artist function for, 
with, or against "the world's eternity of impotence" with­
out forfeiting his idea of Joy? Browning's own faltering 
attempt to comprehend the nature of the poet's power of Joy 
is evident in the syntax of this passage, Robert Preyer 
has commented that poems such as Sordello reveal much of 
interest about the early Victorian milieu. Preyer says 
that "it is as though the authors have been stunned by the 
inhumanity of both Tory repression and middle class indus­
trialism. They can conceive of no joy or dignity or meaning 
in the toil such a society offered its victims. Hence they 
stand aloof, become revolutionary, or fill the void with 
some magical dream of poetry."16
16Robert Preyer, "A Reading of the Early Narratives," 
in The Browning Critics, eds. Boyd Litzinger and K. L. 
Knickerbocker (Lexington, 1965), p. 363.
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Aloofness, revolutionary action, or pure poetry—  
Browning utilizes none of the three alternatives which 
Preyer mentions in the final resolution of the conflict 
which centers in the concept of Joy. Sordello does not 
realize, the narrator of the poem says, that the poet must, 
as a first step up the ladder of Joy, "fit to the finite his 
infinity." Before he can be effective in the world of men, 
the poet must define his goals and accept the necessity of 
his own limitations. Such acceptance sharpens the Joy. 
Browning's most succinct definition of the idea of Joy in 
these early poems occurs at this point in Sordello:
Soul on Matter being thrust,
Joy comes when so much Soul is wreaked in Time
On Matter, — let the Soul’s attempt sublime
Matter beyond the scheme and so prevent
By more or less that deed's accomplishment
And Sorrow follows: Sorrow how avoid? (VI, 492-497)
Joy is not a static entity which the poet contemplates, nor
is it a perfect, changeless goal towards which he climbs.
Joy results from a conflict between the temporal and the
eternal. The poet, no less than any other man, cannot abjure
the struggle; he cannot live in isolation in an attempt to
save his power of Joy from its inevitable defeat by Time and
Matter, for Time and Matter, paradoxically, are the dynamic
forces which produce Joy.
Although the soul of man is immortal and "permanent,"
while his body is finite and "temporal," the narrator of
Sordello reconciles this apparent dualism through the idea
of Joy:
Hence, the soul permanent, the body not,—
Scarcely its minute for enjoying here,—
The soul must needs instruct her weak compeer,
Run o'er its capabilities and wring 
A joy thence, she held worth experiencing:
Which, far from half discovered even, — lo,
The minute gone, the body's power let go
Apportioned to that joy's acquirement! (VI, 514-521)
The soul, therefore, according to its "capabilities,"
determines the nature of Joy from an infinite perspective,
but works through the finite "minute" of the body: it is
in this sense that all men "attain to joy."
Browning both extends and modifies the Romantic idea 
of Joy in his early poetry. He associates Joy, as did the 
earlier tradition, with aesthetic creation, with purity, 
and with psychic energy. He emphasizes, however, the 
struggle for Joy, the Joy resulting when "Soul is wreaked 
in Time on Matter," as he says in Sordello, far more than 
do Wordsworth and Coleridge, who stress its developing and 
revelatory nature. In this emphasis upon the importance of 
the human will in the drive for Joy, Browning looks forward 
to Yeats. Furthermore, Browning views man's infinite 
"appetite for joy" as the central paradox of life, a para­
dox which Wordsworth accepts as "the burthen of the mystery.
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Browning insists, however, in these early poems and through­
out his career, that man's hunger for Joy is a direct 
manifestation of his hunger for God. The artist, therefore, 
must accept Joy in a partial, incomplete, and limited guise, 
mainly through his recognition of its manifestation in other 
human beings and its source in God Himself.
Two aspects of the Christian tradition of Joy are 
evidenced in the Victorian idea of Joy, and, contradictory 
as it may seem, bothwould seem to have their origin in the 
Evangelical Christianity which pervaded the early Victorian 
milieu. G. M. Young describes the impetus given a more 
liberal Christian tradition by the narrower Evangelicalism 
in the following statement: "On one of its sides, Victorian
history is the story of the English mind employing the 
energy imparted by Evangelical conviction to rid itself of 
the restraints which Evangelicalism had laid on the senses 
and intellect; on amusement, enjoyment, art; on curiosity, 
on criticism, on science."17 Matthew Arnold and Thomas 
Carlyle employ what is basically an Evangelical emphasis on 
"restraint" and "self-renouncement" as the condition of the 
idea of Joy; the asceticism of the Christian tradition is
17G. M. Young, Victorian England: Portrait of an Age
(New York, 1964), p. 5.
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implicit in this concept. Browning, on the other hand, 
does not advocate a nineteenth-century version of the Land 
of Cockaigne, but he is attracted to the equally Christian 
idea of Joy as a positive value which man must struggle to 
attain. Like the earlier Romantics, Browning identifies the 
capacity for Joy as the distinguishing characteristic of 
the soul and the source of its essential dignity. By en­
dowing his idea of Joy with a spiritual basis and by insist- 
ing upon the divine origin of man's "appetite for joy," 
Browning cuts the ground from under the restraint imposed 
by Evangelicalism, as Young indicates, and restores to the 
joyous life of man in the world a new rationale, not 
Evangelical, but possessing the energetic fervor of Evangeli­
calism.
Wordsworth says in The Excursion that the power of 
Joy results in "kindred joy," but he does not employ other 
human beings as the primary source of Joy as does Browning.
In Sordello, Browning maintains that what he calls an "out- 
soul," another human being who recognizes and is attuned to 
one's uniquely individual needs i6 a necessary concomitant 
for Joy, and the concept of the out-soul is employed as a 
structural and thematic device in his early poems. Pauline 
is the out-soul of the narrator of that poem; Paracelsus - 
learns before his death that he has misconstrued the
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counsel of his out-soul, Aprile; and Palma, though 
Sordello fails to recognize her, is meant to be his out- 
soul. The function of this kindred soul is explained in 
Sordello:
How dared I let expand the force 
Within me, till some out-soul, whose resource 
It grew for, should direct it? Every law 
Of life, its every fitness, every flaw,
Must One determine whose corporeal shape 
Would be no other than the prime escape 
And revelation to me of a Will
Orb-like o'ershrouded and inscrutable. (Ill, 319- 
326)
The out-soul guarantees that spiritual power will be fruit­
fully directed; it is a manifestation of God's Joy to His 
finite creatures. Browning's belief in the Incarnation is 
yet another aspect of his theory of the out-soul, for Christ 
is the central signification of God's love for, and guidance 
of, man.
Kindred Joy thus moves on two planes: Joy is mani­
fested imperfectly in union with the human out-soul, and 
perfectly in union with Christ, the divine out-soul.
Browning, therefore, incorporates the idea of Joy closely 
within his Christian faith. Pauline, Paracelsus, and 
Sordello contain the seeds of this developing idea of kindred 
Joy, but it comes to fruition in Christmas-Eve and Easter- 
Pay and in "Saul."
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Christmas-Eve is a less crucial exploration of the 
idea of Joy than is Easter-Pay, In the former poem, 
Browning, speaking in his own person, identifies Joy with 
the vision of Christ which enraptures him as he leaves the 
Dissenters’ chapel. His pulses "leap for joy / Of the 
golden thought without alloy" (11. 448-449)— the Incar­
nation of Christ. Browning's dream takes him to St. Peter's 
in Rome and to a lecture room in Germany. He rejoices in 
the richness of the Roman Catholic Christmas service, but 
rejects bothit and the rationalism of the German professor 
in favor of the unaesthetic, but nevertheless humble and
sincere, worship of the Dissenters, who seem to him to
1 8encompass more fully the Joy of Christian love.
Easter-Pay is more directly and explicitly concerned 
with the idea of Joy. Browning voices the troubled opinions 
of an unnamed friend, an objectification of his own doubts 
about his Christian faith. This dialogue looks forward to 
a similar debate between Reason and Fancy in La Saisiaz.
Browning's visionary resolution of this religious 
conflict in favor of his own early religious training is 
anticipated by Wordsworth. R. D. Havens notes that in The 
Excursion, "the restoration of the Solitary was to have 
been accomplished not by reasoning but by the sight of 'a 
religious ceremony . . . which, by recalling to his mind the 
days of his early childhood. . . might have dissolved his 
heart into tenderness,'" p. 148.
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The friend wonders if he should reject the "joys of sense"
for "God's eternity of joy":
As sorrows and privations take
The place of joy— the thing that seems
Mere misery, under human schemes,
Becomes, regarded by the light
Of love, as very near, or quite
As good a gift as joy before. (11. 216-221)
Browning, however, replies that the renunciation of Joy is
not required for fullness of Christian life. Did Christ
take human form, he asks, "only to give our joys a zest /
And prove our sorrows for the best?" (11. 239-240). He
maintains that the power of Joy is intended for man's use
in the present. He recounts a visionary experience in which
Christ himself speaks and explains the nature of human Joy:
'Here the probation was for thee,
To show thy soul the earthly mixed 
With heavenly, it must choose betwixt.
The earthly joys lay palpable,—
A taint, in each, distinct as well;
The heavenly flitted, faint and rare,
Above them, but as truly were
Taintless, so, in their nature, best.' (11. 671-678)
This earthly Joy, Christ says, is an imperfect indication 
of the perfection of eternity. Browning, like his own 
Paracelsus, at first maintains that he will seize perfection 
now, in nature, in art, and in knowledge. He will break the 
chain that binds him to the imperfection of the human realm:
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Should the whirl slacken there, then verse,
Fining to music, shall asperse
Fresh and fresh fire-dew, till I strain
Intoxicate, half-break my chainI
Not joyless, though more favoured feet
Stand calm, where I want wings to beat
The floor. At least earth's bond is broke! (11. 883-
889)
This image of the chain that binds man to earth will also 
be employed in La Saisiaz, where Browning will again demon­
strate that man's attempt to escape his link to earth does 
not result in Joy. In Easter-Pay, the vision of Christ 
brings the poet to the perception of the most important 
aspect of his concept of Joy: human Joy is imperfect, but
it is a promise that man possesses a capability for infinite 
Joy which will be fulfilled in eternity.
Browning extends this idea in "Saul." David attempts 
to awaken Saul from his despair through a poetic catalogue 
of the Joy around him. Saul, however, like Coleridge in 
"Dejection," is experiencing a condition of spiritual 
exsiccation, and the naturalistic catalogue of the "wild 
joys of living" fails to inspirit him. David asserts the 
goodness of life:
How good is man's life, the mere living!
how fit to employ 
All the heart and the soul and the senses, 
for ever in joy! (11. 78-79)
This consideration has only a slight effect upon Saul, and
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Browning broke the poem off at this point in 1845. After 
the religious experiences embodied in Christmas-Eve and 
Easter-Pay in 1850, he had resolved the conflict of the 
reality of the imperfection of human Joy with man's desire 
for infinite Joy through the mystery of the Incarnation.
He then continued "Saul" to its culmination in David's 
prophetic vision of Christ's entry into human history.
The fact that God so dignified human nature by assuming 
its form indicates that the Joy of the tangible universe 
is not to be rejected, but that man lives in perfect Joy 
only through and with the Joy of Christ. Browning joins the 
"reflective wisdom" of the subjective poet with the "psy­
chological utterances" of the objective poet in his 
characterization of David. David is poet, priest, and 
prophet. Wordsworth had stressed these overlapping poetic 
roles in The Prelude, and he too associates these sacra­
mental poetic functions with the idea of Joy.
David, as Saul's human out-soul in this poem, brings 
the king to a recognition of the human Joy that leads to 
divine Joy. "Saul" is thus Browning's fullest early ex­
pression of the idea of kindred Joy, for the human out-soul 
reveals to Saul the Incarnation and Christ's role as the 
divine out-soul. The despairing lament of the speaker of 
Pauline, "I cannot be immortal, taste all joy," is, therefore,
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ultimately resolved by David, who assures Saul, suffering
from a comparable despair, that man is immortal, and that
he will taste all Joy through the power of the incarnation.
The two planes of kindred Joy, the struggle to achieve
communion with the human out-soul and the divine out-soul,
become one of Browning's major poetic concerns.
Browning demonstrates that the power of Joy is essenti
al to the artist, that it is possible to all men, amid he
indicates the manner in which it is to be experienced.
Browning's evaluation of man's "capability for joy" is not
unlike John Ruskin's. In an Oxford lecture of 1870, Ruskin
defines the idea of Joy as follows:
You must first have the right moral state 
or you cannot have art. . . . For instance, 
take the art of singing, and the simplest 
perfect master of it— the skylark. From
him you may learn what it is to sing for joy.
You must get the moral state first, the 
pure gladness, then give it finished ex­
pression, and it is perfected in itself 
and made communicable to others capable of
such joy.
The "pure gladness" of Joy is the "right moral state" if 
the poet is to overcome the stance of alienation and
communicate to others what Shelley calls the "news of
kindred joy." Like other poets of the Romantic tradition,
19John Ruskin, The Literary Criticism of John Ruskin, 
ed. Harold Bloom (New York, 1965), p. xvii.
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especially Wordsworth and Shelley, whose joyous skylarks 
Ruskin includes in this passage, Browning makes Joy the 
primary moral state for the poetic consciousness, and he 
defines and masters his own capability for Joy before 
writing his finest poetry.
CHAPTER IV
"CAPABILITY FOR JOY”:
MEN AND WOMEN AND DRAMATIS PERSONAE
The idea of kindred Joy which Browning evolved from 
1833 to 1850 emphasizes the Joy resulting from the strug­
gle of the human soul to achieve communion with other 
human beings and with God. Wordsworth, as has been seen, 
emphasizes union and communion as the source and result of 
Joy, the loss of a burdensome isolation achieved through 
the contemplation of the organic unity of the individual 
soul with the outer world. Browning, however, is more 
interested in the idea of union and communion between 
human beings as the source of the most intense Joy, and 
there is no more striking evidence of the vigor with which 
Browning contributed to the developing nineteenth-century 
concept of Joy than in the poems written between 1850 and 
1864, especially the poems that comprise Men and Women and 
Dramatis Personae.
The reason for Browning's overriding concern with all 
types of human personality lies both in his own poetic aims 
and in the changing concept of nature. Josephine Miles
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provides striking statistical evidence of this change. She 
notes that the most common metaphor for nature in the 
poetry of the eighteenth century is "face," while Wordsworth 
and the other poets of his generation employ the word 
"breath," indicating the living, moving spirit of the 
natural world. By mid-century, however, the dominating 
metaphor for nature is "pulse." This concept of nature's 
"pulse," Miss Miles points out, "is stronger [and] also sets 
nature more strongly apart as its own organism instrinsic 
to its own spirit." Miss Miles notes that through the 
1840's, the standard usage of what John Ruskin called 
pathetic fallacy, the communication between the creative 
energy of the human imagination and images of the outer 
world, is once in every fifty or sixty lines of English 
poetry. After the 18401s, perhaps because man became more 
and more estranged from the natural world, the use of 
pathetic fallacy is reduced to once in every hundred or 
more lines of poetry. In Browning's poetry, however, the 
reduction of pathetic fallacy as a source of poetic imagery 
is even more strikingly dramatic. Miss Miles, who uses the 
poems of Men and Women as the basis of her computation, 
writes that "Browning's frequency is once in two hundred 
and eighty lines, more than a halving again of a device
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already halved." She concludes that for Robert Browning, 
the "pattern of the world was an outward pattern. He 
described not scene plus emotion from it, but scene plus 
people in it. . . .nl This is a succinct summation of one 
of the basic poetic differences between Wordsworth and 
Browning. People are Browning's main interest, and it is 
in his men and women that he incorporates his idea of Joy.
However, inherent differences in personality and in
poetic aims, in addition to the changing concept of nature,
should not be ignored. Browning naturally enjoys the
diversity of human personality as Wordsworth instinctively
enjoys the diversity of the natural world. Wordsworth,
moreover, attempts to find the permanent and universal
truths that unite men, but the actuality of the hustle and
bustle of men in large numbers bemuses and agitates him.
In The Prelude, he describes the "huge fermenting mass of
human-kind" which pours through the streets of London:
How oft, amid those overflowing streets, %
Have I gone forward with the crowd and said
Unto myself, 'The face of every one
That passes by me is a mystery!' (VII, 626-629)
He then remembers having once seen a blind Beggar, who
carried a placard telling his name, his birthplace, and the
"^Josephine Miles, Pathetic Fallacy in the Nineteenth 
Century (Berkeley, 1942), pp. 224, 227, 228.
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cause of his blindness. Wordsworth concludes that the
Beggar's printed card signifies that these bare facts are
really all that man can know of man:
This label seemed of the utmost we can know,
Both of ourselves and of the universe?
And, on the shape of that unmoving man.
His steadfast face and sightless eyes, I gazed,
As if admonished from another world. (VII, 645-649)
Wordsworth thus emphasizes the "mystery" inherent in the
lives of other human beings, and he feels that divinity
itself admonishes him for his attempt to solve that mystery.
Browning, on the other hand, says that the poet is a
divinely appointed emissary, whose task is to delve into
the mysteries of human personality. In "How It Strikes a
Contemporary," he describes a poet whose business it is to
examine the variety of the human types found in the crowded
streets of Spain— the cobbler, the coffee-roaster, the
book-vendor:
He took such cognizance of men and things,
If any beat a horse, you felt he saw;
If any cursed a woman, he took note;
Yet stared at nobody,— you stared at him.
And found, less to your pleasure than surprise,
He seemed to know you and expect as much. (11. 30-35)
Browning's poet knows men and what to expect of them. He
is the "recording chief-inquisitor" of the town, reporting
his findings to God; he is the general-in-chief of the "whole
campaign of the world's life and death." The poet is an
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cause of his blindness. Wordsworth concludes that the
Beggar's printed card signifies that these bare facts are
really all that man can know of man:
This label seemed of the utmost we can know,
Both of ourselves and of the universe;
And, on the shape of that unmoving man.
His steadfast face and sightless eyes, I gazed,
As if admonished from another world. (VII, 645-649)
Wordsworth thus emphasizes the "mystery'1 inherent in the
lives of other human beings, and he feels that divinity
itself admonishes him for his attempt to solve that mystery.
Browning, on the other hand, says that the poet is a
divinely appointed emissary, whose task is to delve into
the mysteries of human personality. In "How It Strikes a
Contemporary," he describes a poet whose business it is to
examine the variety of the human types found in the crowded
streets of Spain— the cobbler, the coffee-roaster, the
book-vendor:
He took such cognizance of men and things,
If any beat a horse, you felt he saw;
If any cursed a woman, he took note;
Yet stared at nobody,— you stared at him.
And found, less to your pleasure than surprise,
He seemed to know you and expect as much. (11. 30-35)
Browning's poet knows men and what to expect of them. He
is the "recording chief-inquisitor" of the town, reporting
his findings to God; he is the general-in-chief of the "whole
campaign of the world's life and death." The poet is an
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active citizen of the world, recording the outward show of 
human life and indicating the inner springs of men's actions. 
This tangible world of men and women— rogues, saints, 
artists, poets, lovers— is the chief source of Joy in 
Browning's poetry, and, like the poet in "How It Strikes 
a Contemporary," he records their communion with each other 
and with God.
Browning is as precise as is Wordsworth in his use of 
the word "Joy." The poetry itself is the ultimate proof 
of that precision, but his letters also give ample evidence 
of his careful use of the term. In a letter written in 
1846, for example, he speaks of the "joy's essence" in 
contrast to "the mere vulgar happiness." In another letter, 
he writes of his feeling of "deep joy," adding, "I know 
and use to analyse my own feelings, and be sober in giving 
distinctive names to their varieties; this is deep joy." 
Furthermore, Browning writes in still another letter of 
the Joy that resists the flux of time, referring to Keats's 
idea of Joy in the "Ode on Melancholy": "Now Keats speaks
of 'Beauty, that must die— and Joy whose hand is ever at 
his lips bidding farewell' [sic]. . . . There is a Beauty 
that will not die, a Joy that bids no farewell. . . .
2The Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett 
Barrett, I, 460, 279, 388.
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A large number of the poems of Men and Women and Dramatis 
Personae are concerned with the exploration of the Joy 
that bids no farewell. This is the Joy that manifests 
itself in the discovery of the human out-soul as a first 
step to the discovery of the divine out-soul, the charac­
teristic progression of the experience of Joy in Browning's 
poetry, a progression which has already been seen in "Saul."
In "One Word More," the concluding poem of the Men 
and Women volume, Browning includes special mention of 
"Cleon" and In a Balcony. These two poems are among his 
own favorites, and they include some of his most important 
embodiments of his concept of Joy. In a Balcony was first 
published in the 1855 edition of Men and Women, but in 
1868 Browning had the poem placed between Men and Women 
and Dramatis Personae. This final placement of the poem 
serves to link the two volumes, for In a Balcony contains 
many of the themes which Browning explores in both volumes. 
In this poem. Browning differentiates love as it is experi­
enced by men and by women, the decay of love, the loss of 
the "good minute" because of failure to declare love, the 
man's Joy versus the artist's sorrow, and the power of Joy, 
that results when communion between out-souls is complete.
The Queen is the tragic figure of In a Balcony. She 
believes that the capacity for Joy is to be found only in
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youth. She watches Constance and Norbert and ponders her
own predicament:
My flower of youth, my woman's self that was,
My happiest woman's self that might have been!
These two shall have their joy and leave me here. (11. 
458-460)
When Norbert appears before the Queen, to ask her for the
hand of her cousin and a member of her court, Constance,
the Queen mistakenly believes that the devotion that he
declares for Constance is love for her. The power of love
manifests itself in Joy, and the experience of Joy has the
power to restore her wasted youth:
Am I so old? This hair was early grey;
But joy ere now has brought hair brown again.
And joy will bring the cheek's red back, I feel. (11. 
481-483)
Joy's power could rejuvenate the aged Queen, but her belief
in Norbert's love, the one moment of Joy in her life, is
the result of a grotesque misunderstanding.
Constance stands between the Queen and her prime
minister. She has attempted to convince Norbert that he
should defer the announcement of their love until the Queen
has permanently rewarded him for his statesmanship.
Norbert, however, is impetuous; he would attempt to win
Constance at any cost:
But just to obtain her! heap earth's woes in one 
And bear them— make a pile of all earth's joys
And spurn them, as they help or help not thisi 
Only obtain her! . . . (11. 158-161)
Constance is eventually won over to his position, but she
feels her own way to be the wiser course of action:
Meaning to give a treasure, I might dole 
Coin after coin out (each, as that were all,
With a new largess still at each despair)
And force you keep in sight the deed, preserve 
Exhaustless till the end my part and yours,
My giving and your taking; both our joys
Dying together. Is it the wiser way? (11. 611-617)
This is indeed the wiser way, but it results in the death
of Joy. Constance thus chooses Norbert*s simpler course
and gives all of her love at once.
The moment when love is declared should be a moment 
when "joy explodes," but for the Queen this moment is 
destroyed. She overhears Norbert's declaration of love for 
Constance, and the poem ends with the measured step of the 
palace guard advancing towards the lovers on the balcony. 
This ending is somewhat lame, and only Browning's state­
ments outside of the poem itself resolve the basic ambiguity 
does the guard advance to seize the prime minister or does 
it come to announce the Queen's suicide? Browning advances 
the latter interpretation, and the ambiguity turns on the 
intense Joy of the Queen. A friend, who heard Browning read 
the poem, thought that "the step of the guard should be 
heard coming to take Norbert to his doom, as, with a nature
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like the queen's, who had known only one hour of joy in
her sterile life, vengeance swift and terrible would follow
on the sudden destruction of her happiness.” Browning,
however, says that he means quite the opposite of this
interpretation. He says that "the queen had a large and
passionate temperament, which had only been touched and
brought into intense life. She would have died as by a
3knife in her heart." The Queen's intense awareness of 
life, which is the fruit of the experience of Joy, would 
not lead to the death and destruction of the agent of that 
Joy, but rather to the destruction of her own life, which, 
once having tasted Joy, is meaningless without the con­
tinuance of it. The promise of Joy which remains unful­
filled is destructive. Past Joy must lead to present Joy 
if the consciousness of the power of Joy is to retain via­
bility in human experience.
The conflict in many of Browning's lyrics centers 
on past Joy and present Joy. Joy is often associated, in 
a way analogous to the Joy that Wordsworth attaches to the 
"spots of time," with scenes from the past. Browning, 
however, more often utilizes the historical sense of the
Quoted in DeVane, A Browning Handbook, p. 253.
119
past, while Wordsworth uses the personal sense of the past. 
In "Love Among the Ruins," for example, the speaker of the 
poem reconstructs the scene before him as it might have 
existed in the past and contrasts that scene with its 
living counterpart in the present. He considers the "plenty 
and perfection" of the past, and thinks of the human 
passions associated with that glorious time:
And such plenty and perfection, see, of grass 
Never was I
Such a carpet as, this summer-time, o'erspreads 
And embeds
Every vestige of the city, guessed alone.
Stock or stone—
Where a multitude of men breathed joy and woe 
Long ago. (11. 26-32)
The speaker of the poem prefers the less grandiose Joy of
the present, the Joy resulting from the love of the girl
with the yellow hair who waits for him where kings once
stood. He concludes, therefore, unlike the earlier Romantic
poets, who cherish the Joy of the past associated with such
cities as Venice or Rome, that this present Joy is supreme:
"Love is best."
In "By the Fire-Side," Browning again contrasts the 
Joy of the past with the Joy of the present. The speaker 
of the poem considers the ruined chapel of the Alpine gorge 
which he and Leonor had visited in their youth:
And all day long a bird sings there,
And a stray sheep drinks at the pond at times;
The place is silent and aware;
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It has had its scenes, its joys and crimes,
But that is its own affair. (11. 96-100)
As they walk about this scene permeated with the sense of
the Joy of the past, present Joy comes, the "moment, one
and infinite" when content is quickened to bliss. In "Two
in the Campagna," an opposite result is described. Again,
as in the description of the Alpine gorge in "By the Fire-
Side," past Joy suffuses the scene:
The champaign with its endless fleece 
Of feathery grasses everywhere!
Silence and passion, joy and peace,
An everlasting wash of air—
Rome's ghost since her decease. (11. 21-25)
The sense of Joy attached to the past makes the speaker of
this poem desire a share of Joy in the present. But he is
unable to achieve the desired communion, the "good minute
goes," and he is left to ponder the paradox of "Infinite
passion, and the pain / Of finite hearts that yearn."
AFinally, in "Dis Aliter Visum; or, Le Byron de nos 
Jours," another poem which contrasts with the joyful moment 
of union described in "By the Fire-Side," the woman who is 
the speaker of the poem chides her would-be lover of ten 
years before. They did not seize the moment. The Joy of 
the old Norman ruin which they explored together led to no 
present Joy:
121
Was there nought better than to enjoy?
No feat which, done, would make time break,
And let us pent-up creatures through 
Into eternity, our due?
No forcing earth teach heaven's employ? (11. 116-120)
The speaker concludes that they failed to gain the present
Joy of love, "the sole spark from God's life," and their
lives are now inwardly sterile and empty, though outwardly
successful and prominent. The "good minute" of "Two in the
Campagna" is the moment when, as Constance says in In a
Balcony," "joy explodes." The experience of Joy, however,
cannot be maintained at such a level of intensity.
The Queen of In a Balcony declares that the Joy of
the soul transmits its power to the beauty of the body.
Browning incorporates this aspect of Joy into "Fra Lippo
Lippi" and "any Wife to Any Husband." Lippi says that art
should deal not just with outward form, but also with the
human soul:
Why can't a painter lift each foot in turn.
Left foot and right foot, go a double step,
Make his flesh liker and his soul more like,
Both in their order? . . . (11. 205-208)
The Prior's niece, Lippi says, has a beautiful face, but it
is not so beautiful that the artist should overlook the
source of the beauty:
You can't discover if it means hope, fear,
Sorrow or joy? won’t beauty go with these?
Suppose I've made her eyes all right and blue.
Can't I take breath and try to add life's flash,
And then add soul and heighten them threefold? (11. 210- 214)
Lippi says that the artist and the lover should be moved
not so much by beauty as by that soul-power which is the
creator of beauty. This is also the conclusion of the
aging wife, who, as the speaker of "Any Wife to Any Husband,
analyzes the cause of the death of love. The loss of
physical beauty is perhaps one reason for love's decay:
Oh, I should fade— 't is willed so! Might I save,
Gladly I would, whatever beauty gave
Joy to thy sense, for that was precious too.
It is not to be granted. But the soul
Whence the love comes, all ravage leaves that whole;
Vainly the flesh fades; soul makes all things new. (11 
13-18)
The Joy to which love gives birth could make "all things
new," but this love is now dead. Browning, as in "Dis
Aliter Visum," images human love as a spark from God's
"fire of fires," a spark which, in this poem, the married
couple has let die.
The highest Joy is not a static entity which the poet
contemplates or the lover seizes once and for all. It is
touched by the same imperfection which touches all human
things; in its imperfection is its life. The speaker of
"Old Pictures in Florence" says that "what's come to
perfection perishes." The Joy that is static is worthless:
Shall Man, such step within his endeavor,
Man's face, have no more play and action 
Than joy which is crystallized for ever,
Or grief, an eternal petrifaction? (11. 141-144)
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The Joy "crystallized for ever" is false to the facts of
human existence. The speaker of the poem praises the
early painters, who, scorning the artificial perfection
of Greek art, became the "self-acquainters" of mankind:
Make new hopes shine through the flesh they fray,
New fears aggrandize the rags and tatters:
To bring the invisible full into play!
Let the visible go to the dogs— what matters? (11. 149- 
152)
The speaker of "Old Pictures in Florence” rejoices in
change as does Fra Lippo Lippi.
The speaker of "James Lee's Wife" comes to a comparable
perception. She hears the moaning of the wind, which seems
to say to those who listen:
'Here is the change beginning, here the lines 
Circumscribe beauty, set to bliss 
The limit time assigns.' (11. 209-211)
Changeless beauty and changeless love are impossible; the
speaker realizes that change should be a cause of Joy:
Simple? Why this is the old woe o' the world;
Tune, to whose rise and fall we live and die.
Rise with it, then! Rejoice that man is hurled 
From change to change unceasingly,
His soul's wings never furled! (11. 217-221)
But the wind replies, "Nothing endures," and the fact that
God endures is a faint consolation at this point in the
development of James Lee's wife. The paradox of change is
explicit in this poem, for if James Lee, by some strange
reversal, were to declare his love and their union be made
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complete, the resulting Joy would overpower her hold on 
life:
You might turn myself!— should I know or care 
When I should be dead of joy, James Lee? (11. 371-372)
The speaker of "Childe Roland" expresses the same fear after
the old cripple points out to him the Dark Tower which he
had sought for so long:
What with my search drawn out thro* years, my hope
Dwindled into a ghost not fit to cope
With that obstreperous joy success would bring. (11. 20- 
22)
Joy deferred too long overwhelms the man's capacity for it.
These are inverse statements of the Queen's experience
in In a Balcony, for her death results from the Joy tasted
but once and then lost. On the other hand, too much Joy is
equally deadly. Karshish, in "An Epistle," notes the
effect of Lazarus' experience of eternity through the use
of the same paradox. Lazarus' restoration to life after
his death is compared to the experience of a middle-aged
beggar who is suddenly given a treasure:
With straitened habits and with tastes starved small,
And take at once to his impoverished brain 
The sudden element that changes things,
That sets the undreamed-of rapture at his hand
And puts the cheap old joy in the scorned dust? (11. 128-
132)
The imperfection of human Joy is, paradoxically, its very 
perfection, and "the cheap old joy" of life, nevertheless.
125
is the Joy designed for an imperfect creation.
Joy in human life, even the Joy of human love, is at 
best a fleeting and tenuous experience. Browning reinforces 
this quality of human Joy by associating the experience of 
Joy with the image of a thread. Wordsworth characteristical­
ly associates Joy with a ladder or with a scale, and he is 
confident that all men can mount this ladder, although the 
poet will climb highest. Browning, too, uses the ladder 
image in his discussion of Joy in his earlier poems, as we 
have seen in the last chapter. The sturdy image of the 
ladder, however, is replaced by the fragile image of the 
thread in several of the poems of Men and Women and Dramatis 
Personae, a change in imagery which indicates the difficulties 
that Browning sees human beings experiencing as they attempt 
to maintain the idea of Joy. Lazarus, for example, is 
described by Karshish in "An Epistle" as holding on "to some 
thread of life" which runs between the spiritual and the 
physical realms and which separates him from full enjoyment 
of either state.
In "Two in the Campagna," the speaker seems to seize 
the thread that will explain the paradox of love, but it 
eludes his grasp and winds through the champaign which is 
associated with the Joy of the past. The lovers do not 
achieve union, separated, as it were, by only a slight
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thread, a moment:
Just when I seemed about to learn!
Where is the thread now? Off again!
The old trick! Only I discern—
Infinite passion, and the pain 
Of finite hearts that yearn. (11. 56-60)
What the speaker discerns in this last stanza is not "only"
man's finite capacity for Joy as compared to an infinite
desire: it is actually an ironic understatement of the
highest truth of human life as Browning sees it.
Browning uses the image of the thread again in "Too
Late." The speaker of the poem did not declare his love,
and Edith, whom he once loved, married another man and is
now dead. The speaker says that, as a young man, he had
delayed taking any decisive action, waiting as if for some
special revelation to direct the course of his life. His
life was thus stopped, as if by a huge stone, at midcurrent,
and he rested apart from the sea of human struggle. He
considers the stone which symbolizes his own incapacity
for action, but does nothing to remove it:
But either I thought, 'They may churn and chide 
Awhile, my waves which came for their joy 
And found this horrible stone full-tide:
Yet I see just a thread escape, deploy 
Through the evening-country, silent and safe,
And it suffers no more till it finds the sea.' (11. 
25-30)
His capacity for Joy has dwindled until his life can be 
compared to a tiny thread of water which wanders through
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old age, the evening-country, to eventual death. He is 
secure and safe, but incapable of the Joy which rises from 
the struggle in the open sea of life.
Browning also employs the image of the thread to
symbolize the life-choking tyranny of one soul over another,
as it does in "Mesmerism." The speaker recognizes that
his power to conjure up and to invade the very soul of the
lady is like the "sudden thread" which the spider weaves
around his prey. His psychic power is similar to an "iron
nerve" which he has knitted for the purpose of trapping her
very soul's essence. He winds her spirit in the toils of his
leaden line and is drawn out into the night:
Swifter and still more swift,
As the crowding peace 
Doth to joy increase 
In the wide blind eyes uplift,
Thro' the darkness and the drift! (11. 91-95)
The fact that "peace" increases to "joy" as the speaker
winds his thread closer and closer indicates that this "joy"
of his dream is actually only frenzied emotion. The usual
progression of Joy in Browning's poetry, as it is in the
earlier Romantic tradition, is from Joy to peace. In "A
Grammarian's Funeral," for example, as the old scholar is
buried atop the mountain, his students ask that Joy, and
then peace, bless the dead Grammarian:
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Here— here's his place, where meteors shoot, clouds form, 
Lightnings are loosened,
Stars come and go! Let joy break with the storm,
Peace let the dew send! (11. 141-144)
Browning associates Joy with life and peace with death. The 
joy of the storm signals the Grammarian's triumphant strug­
gle and the peace of the dew his reward for that struggle.
The subtle inversion of this development in "Mesmerism" 
demonstrates Browning's distrust of the powers of the 
spiritualists.
It is in "Cleon" that Browning centers his most im­
portant discussion of the idea of Joy in Men and Women and 
Dramatis Personae. Cleon, a Greek poet, philosopher, and 
artist, now residing on an island off the mainland, writes 
in reply to a letter from the Greek king, Protus. He begins 
his letter by thanking the king for his generous gifts 
which indicate to all men that the wise king recognizes the 
artist as the chief Joy-giver to men, and that Joy is the 
"use of life":
Well-counselled, king, in hhy munificence!
For so shall men remark, in such an act 
Of love for him whose song gives life its joy.
Thy recognition of the use of life. (11. 19-22)
The king's work, in contrast to the poet's, is the wise rule
of the vulgar, Cleon says, but the king demonstrates his
spirit's power in the gifts bestowed upon the poet and in
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the tall burial tower which he is having built for his 
final resting place. The towerr significantly, faces East, 
symbolizing the king's desire for immortality and the chief 
questions which he has asked Cleon. After these initial 
compliments, Cleon next attempts to answer the king's 
questions.
The king has asked if Cleon is indeed the accomplished 
artist that men say that he is. Cleon replies that he is
the author of an epic poem, which the king has had engraved
on one hundred golden plates; that he is the composer of a 
popular chant, a favorite of Greek fishermen; that he 
carved the image of the sun-god on the lighthouse; that he 
designed and provided paintings for a magnificent portico 
in Athens; that he has written three philosophical tracts 
on the nature of the soul; and that he has made important 
contributions to music theory. "In brief," Cleon says, "all 
arts are mine." That one man can incorporate such achieve­
ment into a brief lifetime indicates, Cleon maintains, the 
progress of the race:
So, first the perfect separate forms were made,
The portions of mankind; and after, so.
Occurred the combination of the same.
For where had been a progress,-otherwise?
Mankind, made up of all the single men,—
In such a synthesis the labour ends. (11. 89-94)
But when one man, a man such as Cleon, reaches this great
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synthesis, the king might ask, what then is the purpose of 
life? Cleon replies that the purpose of life is growth, 
the struggle of the soul to create new and better syntheses 
of past achievements.
Cleon explains that he had long before considered the 
possibility of direct revelation from Zeus as to the use 
of life. He had even written out a story of the incarnation 
of Zeus, or some other god, who came into human history and 
showed once and for all, "the worth both absolute and re­
lative / Of all his children from the birth of time" (11. 
120-121). Now he goes on to imagine that this revelation 
might be extended to show the presence of Zeus latent in all 
things. However, Cleon says, this last is but an empty 
dream while man knows that progress occurs: the fields now
yield richer grapes, the grapes richer wine, and even the 
king's mistress is more beautiful than were the women of 
Cleon's time. The soul is not immortal, Cleon tells the 
king, but this is no cause for despair. Cleon himself, for 
example, is no Homer, nor Terpander, nor Phidias, but he 
has encompassed their separate arts of poetry, music, and 
sculpture into one lifetime; his life thus shows "a better 
flower if not so large."
The king wonders if Cleon, who, as an artist, will 
attain immortality through his work, fears death as he
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himself fears it. Cleon quotes from the king's letter at
this point in the poem:
'Thy life stays in the poems men shall sing,
The pictures men shall study? while my life,
Complete and whole now in its power and joy,
Dies altogether with my brain and arm,
Is lost indeed; since, what survives myself?1 (11. 
170-174)
The king thinks that his memory will be effaced when his 
progeny are eventually driven from the throne; the artist'£ 
works, however, will never be driven from men's hearts. 
Cleon answers this question of the king with the assurance 
that "imperfection means perfection hid." He asks the king
to imagine himself present in the distant past when Zeus
was preparing the world for man's appearance. If Zeus had 
asked him how he might improve upon his creation, the king 
would have replied to him that he should grant self-con­
sciousness to his creatures, for the Joy of the natural 
world is wasted on creatures who are "mere matter":
'And all this joy in natural life is put 
Like fire from off thy finger into each,
So exquisitely perfect is the same.
But 't is pure fire, and they mere matter are;
It has them, not they it: and so I choose
For man, thy last premeditated work 
(If I might add a glory to the scheme)
That a third thing should stand apart from both,
A quality arise within his soul.
Which, intro-active, made to supervise 
And feel the force it has, may view itself,
And so be happy'.. . . (11. 203-214)
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The "intro-active" power of the soul is man's self-conscious­
ness, a power which reflects upon the force of Joy and 
judges itself conscious of happiness. The more man experi­
ences the "intro-active" power, the more "joy-giving" is 
life:
The more joy-giving will his life become.
Thus man, who hath this quality, is best. (11. 219-220)
Cleon, however, next shows that self-consciousness is not
the blessing that it appears to be.
He tells Protus that in such a hypothetical situation
he would have more reasonably requested Zeus not to endow
man with reflective self-consciousness. Browning employs
the contrasting imagery of ladder and thread to support
this part of Cleon's argument. Self-consciousness is
imaged as the ladder of a tower which man climbs to greater
and greater awareness of the Joy of life:
The soul now climbs it just to perish there 1 
For thence we have discovered ('t is no dream—
We know this, which we had not else perceived)
That there's a world of capability
For joy, spread round about us, meant for us,
Inviting us; and still the soul craves all. (11. 236- 
241)
Man's capacity for Joy is not equal to the Joy which his 
soul can imagine. Cleon thus exclaims that an increasing 
measure of self-consciousness does not really increase life's 
"joy-giving" power after all:
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It skills not! Life's inadequate to joy
As the soul sees joy, tempting life to take. (11.
249-250)
Man's capacity for Joy is better imaged as a thread. A
fountain in his garden, Cleon says, could spout oceans of
water, but it is designed to be supplied by a thread of
water from the river. It would do the Naiad, who reigns
supreme over the thread of water in the fountain, no good
to know that vast oceans exist:
She cannot lift beyond her first thin thread:
And so a man can use but a man's joy
While he sees God's. . . . (11. 260-262)
Cleon thus reverses his former statement about the glory of
human progress and concludes that the discouraged King
Protus is right. Wider vision means deeper disappointment;
self-consciousness is man's curse— "Most progress is most
failure: thou sayest well."
Cleon now moves to answer the king's last question.
The king supposes that the Joy of the artist is the highest
Joy available to man, that the artist is an exception to
the disappointment which life holds in store for the general
run of mankind:
Holding joy not impossible to one
With artist-gifts— to such a man as I
Who leave behind me living works indeed. (11. 274-276)
Cleon replies that the king is mistaken in his assumption
that poems and paintings "live":
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What? dost thou verily trip upon a word.
Confound the accurate view of what joy is 
(Caught somewhat clearer by my eyes than thine)
With feeling joy? Confound the knowing how 
And showing how to live (my faculty)
With actual living?—  (11. 278-283)
The artist sees and feels Joy more ihtensely than other men,
but this does not mean that he "lives" its power more
deeply. To show men's actions in an epic poem does not
mean that the poet himself has performed great deeds, or
to paint a young god does not restore the artist's youth.
No, Cleon says, the artist's Joy is as inadequate as is any
other man's:
Indeed, to know is something, and to prove 
How all this beauty might be enjoyed, is more:
But, knowing nought, to enjoy is something too. (11. 
291-293)
Cleon concludes that though he knows "the joy of kingship," 
Protus, nevertheless, is king.
Protus, however, would insist that Sappho and Aeschylus 
live in their songs and plays. Cleon sarcastically replies 
that if they live they should come forward and enjoy life, 
drink his wine and speak his speech. He maintains that his 
fate, the fate of all artists, is actually far worse thap 
the fate of the king, for the artist is endowed with a 
greater sensibility and with greater self-awareness:
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Say rather that my fate is deadlier still,
In this, that every day my sense of joy
Grows more acute, my soul (intensified
By power and insight) more enlarged, more keen. (11.
309-312)
But physical weakness and advancing age dictate that Cleon
will; never be able to exploit this increased capability for
Joy. This is such a horrible fate, Cleon says, that he
sometimes imagines a life-after-death:
I dare at times imagine to my need 
Some future state revealed to us by Zeus,
Unlimited in capability
For joy, as this is in desire for joy,
— To seek which, the joy-hunger forces us. (11. 324-
328)
Such immortality of soul is not revealed, Cleon says, and 
were such a state possible to man, Zeus would have made 
it known to the Greek mind. Cleon thus closes his letter 
with a caution to Protus not to attempt to contact Paul, 
the leader of the Christians, for "their doctrine could be 
held by no sane man."
"Cleon" is accepted by most scholars as Browning's 
fullest reply to Matthew Arnold's Empedocles on Etna.
W. C. DeVane points out that "Browning thought of Empedocles' 
condition as illustrating the logical result of Greek 
paganism, and created Cleon as a later philosopher and poet 
who represented the final product of Greek culture, and who
in the blindness of his pride rejected the Christianity
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which fulfilled every one of the needs already recognized
by his own superb mind."4 Browning admired Arnold's poem,
and he persuaded Arnold to republish Empedocles in his New
Poems of 1867. Arnold's Empedocles, like Browning's Cleon,
is much concerned with the source and the power of Joy.
He too feels the inadequacy of human Joy:
The world hath fail'd to impart 
The joy our youth forebodes,
Fail'd to fill up the void which in our breasts we bear. 
(I. ii. 374-376)
Empedocles concludes that man should, therefore, "trust
the joys there are," and "nurse no extravagant hope." This
solution is not enough for his own desperate situation,
however. Empedocles determines that suicide is the only
possibility; he must return to the elements before his
power of Joy is completely dead. He must release his soul,
which is now the prisoner of his consciousness:
Before the soul lose all her solemn joys,
And awe be dead, and hope impossible,
And the soul's deep eternal night come on—
Receive me, hide me, quench me, take me homel (II, 
33-36)
Empedocles insists that man is isolated and that the artist 
is the victim of even greater alienation because his power
4Ibid., p. 274
137
of self-consciousness is greater. In his later essays, 
as has been seen, Arnold suggests that partial Joy is 
possible to man in the Christian spirit of purity, charity, 
and self-renouncement. Browning also explores the myth 
of the alienated artist in "Cleon," and rejects isolation 
by implicitly positing the divine out-soul as the basis and 
promise of man’s Joy. Browning maintains that man can 
achieve communion with the out-soul, if only for a moment, 
and if only a communion maintained by a tenuous thread.
Furthermore, Browning believes that the very imper­
fection of human Joy leads to the logical conclusion that 
perfect Joy must exist. He rejoices, for example, in the 
imperfection of his own age and insists that it is "worthy” 
of reproduction in art. In a letter written in 1846, 
Browning credits Carlyle with this aspect of his thought:
Carlyle has turned and forged, reforged on 
his anvil that fact "that no age ever ap­
peared heroic to itself” . . . and so, 
worthy of reproduction in art by itself. .
. . I thought after Carlyle's endeavors 
nobody could be ignorant of that,— nobody who 
was obliged to seek the proof of it out of 
his own experience. The cant is, that "an 
age of transition" is the melancholy thing 
to contemplate and delineate— whereas the 
worst thing of all to look back on are times 
of comparative standing still, rounded in their 
important completeness.̂
5,,The Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett 
Barrett, II, 159.
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Browning thus enjoys living in "an age of transition" and
rejects the ideal of perfection represented by Hellenic
culture. Arnold, however, in a letter written in 1849,
expresses longing for the perfection and calm of the Greek
world and damns the nineteenth century and Carlyle:
My dearest Clough these are damned times—  
everything is against one— the height to which 
knowledge is come, the spread of luxury, our 
physical enervation, the absence of great 
natures, the unavoidable contact with millions 
of small ones, newspapers, cities, light 
profligate friends, moral desperadoes like 
Carlyle, our own selves, and the sickening 
consciousness of our difficulties. . . .6
It is ironic, in the light of these two passages, that 
Arnold's final position on the idea of Joy, that in self­
renouncement there is "a fount of joy," is much closer to 
Carlyle's thought than is Browning's claim that Joy must 
be seized in time as in eternity.
Arnold laments the imperfection and change that 
debilitate Joy in many of his poems other than Empedocles, 
although it is the fullest embodiment of the idea. In 
"The Scholar-Gipsy," for example, he says that change wears 
out man's capacity for life:
For what wears out the life of mortal men?
'T is that from change to change their being rolls;
'T is that repeated shocks, again, again,
6Arnold, p. 520.
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Exhaust the energy of strongest souls 
And numb the elastic powers. (11. 142-146)
Browning, however, finds strength and power in change. The
following passage from "James Lee's Wife," quoted earlier
in this chapter, seems to be a point-for-point refutation
of these lines from Arnold's "Scholar-Gipsy"s
Simple? Why this is the old woe o' the world;
Tune, to whose rise and fall we live and die.
Rise with it, then! Rejoice that man is hurled 
From change to change unceasingly,
His soul's wings never furled! (11. 217-221)
To be rolled "from change to change" in Arnold's poem 
exhausts the soul's energy and numbs its elasticity; to be 
hurled "from change to change" in Browning's poem, however, 
is a source of strength and Joy, exercise for the soul's 
wings. Man should, Browning says, rejoice in change and 
imperfection.
There is concrete evidence that Browning means "Rabbi 
Ben Ezra" to serve not only as an answer to FitzGerald's 
Rubaiyat, but also as another reply to Arnold's Empedocles. 
Browning employs the same stanza which Arnold uses in his 
poem, but with a strident assertion of the immortality of 
the soul.^ The speaker of the poem declares that life would
'The crosscurrents of debate in Browning's poetry are 
one of its most interesting sidelights. DeVane believes 
that Arnold replies in turn to "Rabbi Ben Ezra" in "Growing 
Old,'1 in A Browning Handbook, p. 295.
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be no challenge if man were "but formed to feed / On joy,
to soley seek and find and feast" (11. 20-21). Man's
being is united to God's by a "spark" of love. Cleon had
imagined such a possibility, but the Rabbi, like Saul, is
certain of its truth:
Rejoice we are allied 
To That which doth provide 
And not partake, effect and not receive! (11. 25-27)
The soul's hunger for Joy is a manifestation of its immortal 
destiny. The Joy attained in human life, therefore, is 
necessarily "three-parts pain."
Browning develops this facet of the idea of Joy even 
further in "A Death in the Desert." Life, John declares, 
is a testing ground, and "all it yields of joy and woe" 
is just man's chance to learn the fact of immortal love.
It is the condition of man's "creatureship" that the com­
pletion of Joy be delayed beyond the present life. If man 
"renounces this pact of creatureship" with God, he will 
not taste the ultimate Joy:
'If ye demur, this judgment on your head.
Never to reach the ultimate, angels' law,
Indulging every instinct of the soul
There where law, life, joy, impulse are one thing!' (11. 
630-633)
In The Prelude, Wordsworth ascribes the greatest Joy experi­
enced in his life to his seventeenth year, when, from a kind
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of revelation, he had an intimation of the unity of life
and Joy that Browning's John describes here. Wordsworth
says that he saw one life "and felt that it was joy."
Browning, however, firmly attaches the unity of Joy and life
to the Incarnation in the gloss added to the account of
John's dying speech. The gloss says that if Christ is not
the son of God, then he is the most wretched of men:
'For see; Himself conceived of life as love.
Conceived of love as what must enter in.
Fill up, make one with His each soul He loved:
Thus much for man's joy, all men's joy for Himl' (11. 
670-673)
Browning thus employs again the paradox which he applies 
to the artist in "Cleon." Like the artist in that poem, 
Christ, if he is only a supreme man, has a greater capacity 
for Joy than do other men. He requires not just "man's 
joy," but "all men's joy." If he does not, indeed, share 
in the Godhead, all men are the slaves of Cleon's "horrible 
fate," but Christ, the highest man, suffers most because 
he possesses the greatest share of self-consciousness.
Browning both extends and modifies most of the aspects 
of the idea of Joy which have been seen in the Wordsworthian 
Romantic tradition. The Joy of the artist is the most 
intense Joy possible to man, it sets the artist apart, and 
it grows as his consciousness expands with greater
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universality and energy. The experience of Joy is most 
supreme, however, if the artist nurtures the essential 
purity that holds his reflective powers in check. Joy 
is the power which destroys the artist's alienation from 
the rest of men, for the experience of Joy is conclusive 
proof of a spiritual realm that includes all men. The 
artist must attempt to share his Joy, the "use of life," 
with those men, who, like Protus in "Cleon," are capable 
of such experience. Joy transforms the pleasures of sex 
so that love between human out-souls is a sacramental and 
redemptive relationship indicative of and leading to the 
love of the divine out-soul. The experience of Joy in­
evitably leads man to intimations of immortality. Browning,
however, makes explicit what the earlier Romantics imply.
The concept of Joy depends, in Browning's poetry, not upon
intimations of the immortality of the human soul, but upon
a faith in God's revelation of this immortality as a fact 
of human history. The Incarnation is the ultimate test of 
Joy.
In "Cleon," Browning describes three main sources of 
Joy— the Joy of art, the Joy of knowledge, and the Joy of 
experience. Cleon judges all three to be inadequate to man, 
whose imaginative faculties give him unlimited capability 
for Joy. If these three categories are applied to one of
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Browning's notoriously obscure poems, "Women and Roses,"
this poem can be seen as a symbolic statement of Cleon's
idea of Joy. The speaker of "Women and Roses " says that
he dreams of a red-rose tree around which three groups of
women dance. The circling figures of the women about the
rose tree call to mind the circling figures which Keats
sees in the "Ode on a Grecian Urn" and in the "Ode on
Indolence," and the longing for permanence in a world of
change which Browning describes in this poem is not unlike
that which Keats embodies in the "Ode on a Grecian Urn":
Round and round, like a dance of snow 
In a dazzling drift, as its guardians, go 
Floating the women, faded for ages,
Sculptured in stone, on the poet's pages. (11. 4-7)
These women symbolize the Joy of knowledge gleaned from
the study of the past. The next group belongs to the
present, to the Joy of experience:
Then follow women fresh and gay,
Living and loving and loved to-day. (11. B-9)
The third and final group is symbolic of the Joy of art, for
these women belong to the incipient future and are created
by the poetic imagination:
Last, in the rear, flee the multitude of maidens, 
Beauties yet unborn. And all, to one cadence.
They circle their rose on my rose tree. (11.10-12)
The circling groups of women embody the Joy that should
inhere in the continuity of human life from the past to the
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future, but their relentless circular movement only under­
scores the inevitability of the life-death cycle. The 
speaker of the poem now addresses each of the three groups 
in turn.
The women from the past are known, but their Joy eludes
him. He cannot "fix," "fire," or "freeze" them in the
present. The women of the present, who image the Joy of
experience, are living, and their "joy's undimmed," but
this present Joy also escapes his grasp:
Prison all my soul in eternities of pleasure,
Girdle me for once! But no— the old measure,
They circle their rose on my rose tree. (11. 34-36)
The speaker of the poem then thinks that the women yet un­
created can insure that his Joy shall live on in his art; 
the works of his imagination will embody Joy in the future:
Hoses will bloom nor want beholders,
Sprung from the dust where our flesh moulders.
What shall arrive with the cycle's change?
A novel grace and a beauty strange. (11. 42-45)
This beauty and grace of art will survive the life-death
cycle. He will create an image of Joy that surmounts
change:
I will make an Eve, be the artist that began her,
Shaped her to his mind!—  (11. 46-47)
But the Joy of creation is also doomed by the relentless
cycle of time: "— Alas! in like manner / They circle their
rose on my rose tree."
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The Joy of knowledge, the Joy of experience, and the 
Joy of art which Cleon defines are given symbolic projection 
in "Women and Roses" in the figures of the women from the 
past, the women of the present, and the women of the future* 
The moment of perfect union eludes the speaker of "Women and 
Roses," as it eludes the speakers of "James Lee's Wife,"
"Two in the Campagna," and "Too Late." His state is com­
parable to that of Lazarus, who is described by Karshish as 
being a man torn by the consciousness of two realms: "His
heart and brain move there, his feet stay here" (1. 185). 
This speaker's heart and brain long for the permanence of 
the rose tree, but his feet must move to the "one cadence" 
of time. He has the power to re-create the Joy of the past, 
to experience Joy in the present, and to project imagina­
tively the Joy of the future, but he, like all men, is 
bound by the conditions of "creatureship," and is thus 
subject to the flux of a temporal realm. The stationary 
rose tree around which the women circle indicates, however, 
that perfect Joy is a possibility outside the dimension of 
time.
The restrained lyrical intensity given the idea of 
Joy in "Women and Roses" is unique in Browning's poetry.
Joy characteristically "explodes," as it does in In a 
Balcony, or it appears, as in "The Worst of It," as "a
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blaze of joy and a crash of song." Joy comes with the 
recognition that man is "hurled from change to change," as 
in "James Lee's Wife," or Joy is manifested by the wild 
outbreak of a storm, as it is in "A Grammarian's Funeral."
In "The Last Ride Together," Browning again returns 
to the theme of the man's Joy versus the artist's sorrow, 
a theme which he first explores in Sordello. The speaker 
of the poem feels "joy and fear" as the woman he loves 
leans against him— Joy for the union that could be, and 
fear because he senses that this moment is the end of love. 
The speaker of the poem says that one moment of union with 
his companion is worth more than all the glory of states­
men, soldiers, poets, sculptors, or musicians. Like 
Cleon, he admits that the poet can tell the use of life, 
while other men can only mutely feel it, but, also like 
Cleon, he maintains that living is better:
'T is something, nay 't is much: but then,
Have you yourself what's best for men?
Are you— poor, sick, old ere your time—
Nearer one whit your sublime
Than we who have never turned a rhyme? (11. 72-76)
The poet's ability to imagine and to express the beauty of 
the world is a great gift, this speaker says, but his 
consciousness envisages a sublimity he himself is incapable 
of enjoying. The speaker of "The Last Ride Together" thus
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dismisses the poet. Sing, he says, but realize that the 
real Joy of life lies in action: "Sing, riding's a joy;
For me, I ride." The Joy of the ride is symbolic of the
guest for the eternal that also haunts Cleon and the speaker
of "Women and Roses," the quest for what Browning calls in
this poem, "the instant made eternity." It is an instant 
which contains a foretaste of man's eventual transition 
to a state beyond the temporal realm where his unlimited 
capacity for Joy will be infinitely fulfilled.
The man's Joy versus the artist's sorrow is also a
motif of the concluding poem of Men and Women. In "One
Word More," Browning dedicates the fifty poems of the
volume to his wife. He says that, like Dante and Raphael,
he would like to express his love, if only- once, in another
artistic medium:
What of Rafael's sonnets, Dante's pictures?
This: no artist lives and loves, that longs not
Once, and only once, and for one only,
(Ah, the prize!) to find his love a language 
Fit and fair and simple and sufficient—
Using nature that 's an art to others,
Not, this one time, art that 's turned his nature. (11. 
58-64)
When the painter makes a poem or the poet makes a painting,
he escapes the demands of his natural talents and abhieves
a pure expression of the love that is Joy:
So to be the man and leave the artist,
Gain the man's joy, miss the artist's sorrow. (11. 71- 
72)
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Browning, however, is no Cleon. He admits that painting,
sculpture, and music are all beyond his powers. His one
perfect gift, therefore, must be his fifty men and women:
Hardly shall I tell my joys and sorrows,
Hopes and fears, belief and disbelieving:
I am mine and yours— the rest be all men's,
Karshish, Cleon, Norbert and the fifty. (11. 133-136)
It is in this sense only that Browning maintains that the
Joy of both man and poet can be achieved simultaneously.
The Joys, sorrows, hopes, fears, beliefs, and disbeliefs
that his imaginative vision perceives in the life around
him are expressed in his poetic creations. The fifty men
and women enable him to achieve a universality that both
deepens and restrains his own Joy-hunger. In a very real
sense, Browning's characters are the poetic images that
implicitly assert the artist-man's "capability for joy."
CHAPTER V
JOY, ENERGY, AND THE GROTESQUE: 
THE RING AND THE BOOK
Robert Browning's acknowledged masterpiece is The 
Ring and the Book, and in this poem, first published in 
1868, Browning demonstrates his full artistic maturity and 
embodies his moral and aesthetic theories in their most 
complete expression. The Ring and the Book is his most 
searching analysis of human character and the nature of 
human truth. The twelve books of the poem re-create a 
seventeenth-century murder case from the varying points 
of view of both its protagonists and imaginary citizens 
of Rome. Henry James describes the complexity of the 
poem and indicates the difficulty inherent in any criti­
cal discussion of its characteristics:
"The Ring and the Book" is so vast and so 
essentially Gothic a structure, spreading 
and soaring and branching at such a rate, 
covering such groupd, putting forth such 
pinnacles and towers and brave excrescences, 
planting its transepts and chapels and 
porticoes, its clustered hugeness or in­
ordinate muchness, that with any first 
approach we but walk vaguely and slowly, 
rather bewilderedly, round and round it, 
wondering at what point we had best attempt
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such entrance as will save our steps and 
light our uncertainty. . .
One possible "entrance" to The Ring and the Book is from
the standpoint of the relationship between what James calls
the "Gothic" nature of the poem and the idea of Joy.
In the Romantic tradition, the power of Joy is said 
to enable a man to exist universally in the life around 
him. Coleridge says that "in joy individuality is lost," 
and that "to have genius is to live in the universal, to 
know no self but that which is reflected not only from 
the faces of all around us, our fellow creatures, but 
reflected from the flowers, the trees, the beasts. . . . 
Browning also maintains that the poetic consciousness must 
envelop the imperfection of the world with a universal 
and energetic response, a response that rises above both 
the formal demands of the traditional literary genres and 
the claims of conventional morality. Imperfection, energy, 
and universality are three keynotes of the idea of Joy? 
these three factors result in the grotesque or Gothic 
texture of Browning's mature poetry, for imperfection, 
energy, and universality are also the keynotes of the
^Henry James, "The Novel in 'The Ring and the Book,' 
The Quarterly Review, CCXVII (1912), 68.
2Coleridge, p. 179.
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nineteenth-century concept of the grotesque. The grotesque 
is manifest throughout Browning's poetry, but it is 
especially evident in The Ring and the Book. Before that 
poem is discussed, however, Browning's own view of the 
grotesque should be examined and the term itself defined.
Some of Browning's fullest expressions of his concept 
of the grotesque occur in Fifine at the Fair and Aristo­
phanes ' Apology. In the first place, the grotesque is the 
price that man pays for his imperfect humanity. It results 
from the working of spiritual energy outward to the physical 
form. The ability to perceive the grotesque as an integral 
part of human life is a result of the poet's joyous 
universality of vision. The speaker of Fifine at the Fair 
says:
I want, put down in black and
white,
What compensating joy, unknown and infinite,
Turns lawlessness to law, makes destitution—  
wealth,
Vice— virtue, and disease of soul and body—  
health? (11. 140-143)
Th& fact that Browning ultimately denies this "compensating 
joy" to the morally marginal character who speaks the poem 
reinforces the fact that the Joy that transmutes the 
illusion of vice into the reality of virtue, or the illusion 
of disease into health, is the universal Joy of the poetic 
imagination, that aspect of the idea of Joy that enables the
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poet to celebrate the imperfection of human existence in
all of its paradoxical reality.
Don Juan, the speaker of Fifine, describes his disgust
when he first observed the carnival-like atmosphere of the
Venice streets:
'T was easy to infer what meant my late disgust 
At the brute-pageant, each grotesque of greed and 
lust
And idle hate, and love as impotent for good. (11. 1861- 
1863)
This is, however, a hasty reaction; it results from a 
distorted perspective. Since "the proper goal for wisdom" 
is "the ground / And not the sky" (11. 1866-1867), Don Juan 
next describes his view of Venice from a different vantage 
point. He is now able to see that what was formerly con­
sidered ugly is actually beautiful:
Enough and not too much of hate, love, greed 
and lust,
Could one discerningly but hold the balance, shift 
The weight from scale to scale, do justice to the drift 
Of nature, and explain the glories by the shames 
Mixed up in man, one stuff miscalled by different 
names
According to what stage i 1 the process turned his 
rough
Even as I gazed, to smooth— only get close enough! (11. 
1871-1877)
If justice is done "to the drift of nature," incongruity 
and imperfection are seen to be the law of life:
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A love, a hate, a hope, a fear, each soul a-strain 
Some way through the flesh— the face, an evidence 
O' the soul at work inside; and, all the more 
intense,
So much the more grotesque. (11. 1718-1721)
The energy of human passion stamps every human soul with the 
intense evidence of the grotesque. The "compensating joy, 
unknown and infinite," which is the reward of the poetic 
consciousness, as well as the source of its power, enables 
the poet to see "the soul at work inside."
Furthermore, the experience of Joy enables the poet
to rise above the traditional claims of comedy and tragedy
to a new poetry which combines both, a poetry which Browning
calls "complex." He describes this ideal poetry in
Aristophanes1 Apology, and his description is an indication
of the effect which he attempted to achieve in The Ring and
the Book. First, he presents the claim of comedy:
Ay, the Good Genius I To the Comic Muse,
She who evolves superiority.
Triumph and joy from sorrow, unsuccess
And all that's incomplete in human life. (11. 1353-1356) 
Man's apparent physical and spiritual deformities are 
cured and made whole again by the power of the comic vision:
3C. N. Wenger, in The Aesthetics of Robert Browning 
(Ann Arbor, 1925), pp. 202-203, says that "it is safe to say? 
that the theory of the tragi-comic advanced by the speakers 
of this poem is Browning's own. The present discussion is 
based upon the assumption that this poem is indeed a reliable 
statement of Browning's own idea of "complex poetry."
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Since out of body uncouth, halt and maimed—
Since out of soul grotesque, corrupt or blank—
Fancy, uplifted by the Muse, can flit
To soul and body, re-instate them Man. (11. 1358-1361)
The comic grotesque emerges through the poet's use of both
exaggeration and contrast:
Hail who accept no deformity 
In man as normal and remediless,
But rather pushed it to such gross extreme
That, outraged, we protest by eye's recoil. (11. 1375-
1378)
Browning relegates the prime role of comedy to the worldly
pretensions of man, while the tragic vision concerns itself
with his spiritual aspirations and with his will:
She who instructs her poet, bids man's soul 
Play man's part merely nor attempt the gods'
Ill-guessed ofj Task humanity to height,
Put passion to prime use, urge will, unshamed
When will’s last effort breaks in impotence! (11. 1394-
1398)
The comic mode should not be separated from tragedy, however, 
any more than man's physical nature can be sundered from 
his spirit. Either mode of vision is incomplete without the 
other, but blended together into "complex poetry," the 
tragi-comic adequately reflects the complexities of the 
human personality.
Browning, therefore, advocates a poetry which combines 
both the comic and the tragic, the "complex poetry" that is 
his term for what is commonly called the tragi-comic. He 
describes this "complex poetry" as follows:
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Priest, do thou, president alike o'er each,
Tragic and Comic function of the god,
Help with libation to the blended twain!
Either of which who serving, only serves—
Proclaims himself disqualified to pour 
To that Good Genius— complex Poetry,
Uniting each god-grace, including both. (11. 1468-1474)
The tragic-comic vision enables the poet to see the whole man;
it unites man's disparate faculties through a resolution
which recognizes his necessary state of perfection-in-
imperfection:
For, when our folly ventures on the freak,
Would fain abolish joy and fruitfulness,
Mutilate nature— what avails the Head 
Left solitary predominant,—
Unbodied soul,— not Hermes, both in one? (11. 1487- 
1491)
Hermes, the winged god, symbolizes the coalescence of body 
and soul, each a "god-grace" of the whole man. It is only 
man's folly. Browning says, that judges any created thing 
as "freak"; the freak is an integral component in the joy 
and fruitfulness of nature which the universal vision of 
the poet embodies in "complex poetry."
This tragi-comic vision would remove not only the 
traditional barriers between comedy and tragedy, but also 
the artificial duality of body and soul, as well as the wall 
between past and present:
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And so, re-ordinating outworn rule,
Make Comedy and Tragedy combine,
Prove some new Both-yet-neither, all one bard,
Euripides with Aristophanes 
Cooperanti this, reproducing Now,
As that gave Then existence: Life today.
This, as that other— Life dead long ago! (11. 3439-3445)
The universal vision of the complex poet would destroy all
conventional classifications of the beautiful and the ugly.
This poet would glory in the total reality of life, what
Wordsworth calls life's "coarse nature and truth." Browning
sdys that any other view of human life cheapens its complex
tangibility:
No, this were unreality! the real
He wants, not falsehood,— truth alone he seeks,
Truth, for all beauty! Beauty, in all truth—
That 's certain somehow! Must the eagle lilt 
Lark-like, needs fir-tree blossom rose-like? No!
Strength and utility charm more than grace,
And what is most ugly proves most beautiful. (11. 2166- 
2172)
It is the "compensating joy, unknown and infinite," which is 
described in Fifine at the Fair, that enables the poet to 
strip away the illusion of ugliness which surrounds the 
actual beauty of the imperfect creation and to fathom Keats's 
mystery of Beauty-in-Truth and Truth-in-Beauty. The grotesque 
arises from the poet's ability to exist universally in the 
life around him, in the eagle as well as in the lark, in 
the fir tree as well as in the rose bush. This universal 
vision shatters the conventional molds of life, literature,
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and language. The tragi-comic is grotesque because it is 
an expression of a rebellion against an assumed perfection 
of aesthetic form.
John Ruskin was among the first to perceive the re­
lationship between the concept of Joy, energy, universality, 
imperfection, and the spirit of Gothic art, a relationship 
which he describes in The Stones of Venice and which he 
makes a cultural goal for the nineteenth century. Modern 
critics apply some of these same qualities of the Gothic 
spirit to the grotesque, and the latter is the term used 
most often to describe the peculiar quality of Browning's 
work, as the following survey of critical opinion will 
demonstrate.
Walter Bagehot, for example, identifies the grotesque 
as Robert Browning's distinguishing poetic characteristic.
He maintains that grotesque art "takes the type, so to say, 
in difficulties. It gives a representation of it in its 
minimum development, amid the circumstances least favorable 
to it, just while it is struggling with obstacles, just where 
it is encumbered with incongruities. It deals, to use the 
language of science, not with normal types but with abnormal 
specimens; to use the language of old philosophy, not with 
what Nature is striving to be, but with what by some lapse
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she has happened to become."^ We have just seen in Browning's 
own description of the grotesque his argument that the diffi­
culties and incongruities which Bagehot cites are endemic to 
the human condition, and that to overlook them in poetry is 
to "mutilate" the very "drift of nature." Bagehot further 
argues that Browning has not made his grotesquely medieval 
subject matter pleasant, and that the poet has chosen topics 
which he could not "charm." Browning, Bagehot concludes, 
estranges the reading public by his use of the grotesque.
It is obvious, then, that the term "grotesque" has a pejora­
tive connotation in Bagehot's critique of Browning's poetry. 
Most critics, however, see the grotesque as a necessary 
and quite legitimate aesthetic strategy.
Lily Bess Campbell's study, The Grotesque in the Poetry 
of Robert Browning, is more thorough and more sympathetic 
than is Bagehot's. She concludes that the grotesque can be
4Walter Bagehot, "Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning;
Or Pure, Ornate, and Grotesque Art in English Poetry," in 
Literary Studies (London, 1895), II, 366. John M. Hinter, 
in "Browning's Grotesque Period," VP, IV (Winter, 1966), 1-13, 
offers a convenient summary of Browning's use of the word 
"grotesque." Hinter, however, employs as the basis of his 
study a biographical argument that is somewhat questionable.
He traces Browning's use of the grotesque in the 1840's and 
the 1870's to the "bursts of bile" which the poet experienced 
when writing for the stage and again after his wife's death. 
"Grotesque" thus has an implicit pejorative connotation in 
Hinter's discussion, just as it does in Bagehot's.
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placed into three broad categories: the artificial
grotesque, the fanciful grotesque, and the great grotesque. 
Browning's work exemplifies all three of these classes, but 
he excells in the great grotesque, which Miss Campbell de­
fines as "the attempt of the mind through the imagination 
to remove its limitations. It is the result of activity and 
of strength." She argues, further, that the grotesque 
arises naturally from Browning's vision of life: "It was,
then, in this struggle between his idealism and his realism 
that he became the poet of the grotesque. An ever constant 
struggle thus to attain the absolute through the finite, to 
reconcile fact and truth, to comprehend the infinite ordering 
of things through the finite, this made Robert Browning the
5poet of the great grotesque." Miss Campbell thus posits 
for the grotesque in Browning's poetry an intellectual and 
philosophical basis that touches the very core of his most 
deeply held convictions.
G. K. Chesterton, however, reaches a somewhat different
conclusion:
They [Browning's admirers] believe that 
what is ordinarily called the grotesque 
style of Browning was a kind of necessity
5Lily Bess Campbell, The Grotesque in the Poetry of 
Robert Browning, Bulletin of the University of Texas, 
Humanistic Series No. 5 (April, 1907), pp. 15, 17.
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boldly adopted by a great genius in order 
to express novel and profound ideas. But 
this is an entire mistake. What is called 
ugliness was to Browning not in the least 
a necessary evil, but a quite unnecessary 
luxury, which he enjoyed for its own 
sake. . . . He had a love of the grotesque 
of the nature of art for art's sake.6
Chesterton stresses the link which exists between energy
and the grotesque; he says that "the element of the
grotesque in nature, means, in the main, energy, the
energy which takes its own forms and goes its own way."
Chesterton, furthermore, hints at the relationship between
the idea of Joy and the grotesque, the thesis of thb present
discussion, although he does not develop the idea. "Energy.
and joy," Chesterton writes, are "the father and the mother
7of the grotesque." Chesterton's view of the grotesque in 
Robert Browning's poetry presages the opinions of more 
recent critics.
W. O. Raymond, for example, notes that allied with 
the "love of energy in the physical world is Browning's keen 
perception of the grotesque. For the grotesque is the bold
Qand premptory shattering of conventional molds." J. Hillis
^G. K. Chesterton, Robert Browning (London, 1903), p.
139.
7Ibid., pp. 149, 148.
gW. O. Raymond, "The Infinite Moment," in The Infinite 
Moment (Toronto, 1965), p. 16.
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Miller, like Chesterton and Raymond, also stresses the role 
of energy in grotesque art. Miller contends that all men 
are grotesque in Browning's world, because each man is an 
imperfect expression of a Divine perfection. Miller explains 
that "grotesque visible forms and grotesque language are 
really the same, for both are the result of the pushing out 
of a novel internal energy, an energy which may express it­
self in appearance or in speech. . . . Inside, the intense 
energy, the eccentric seal of life— outside, the grotesque 
visible form. Each person, by doing what comes naturally, 
becomes just that self God intended him to be, and in that 
process becomes g r o t e s q u e . These last four critical 
opinions are consonant with Browning's own view of the 
grotesque as he expresses it in Fifine at the Fair and 
Aristophanes 1 Apology.
Wolfgang Kayser's provocative attempt to define the 
grotesque should be briefly mentioned, although it is de­
voted to continental art and literature and contains only a 
brief reference to Lily Bess Campbell's study of the grotes­
que in Browning. Kayser's conclusions, moreover, are of 
limited value to a study of Browning. Kayser finds that 
the grotesque is basically a structure; it is the estranged
9Miller, pp. 135-136.
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world; it instills a fear of life; it is a play with the 
absurd; and, finally, that the grotesque is "an attempt to 
invoke and subdue the demonic aspects of the world.
This definition has some validity for Browning's poetry, 
but is does not provide the necessary critical vocabulary 
which will concretely specify the uniquely grotesque quality 
of the poetry. These studies, however, are the chief aids 
that twentieth-century criticism offers for the exploration 
of Browning's use of the grotesque.
Chesterton says that the grotesque springs from joy 
and energy; Campbell, Raymond, and Miller echo this judgment 
with similar assertions. Victorian criticism is even more 
enlightening on this point. John Ruskin explains the re­
lationship between energy and the concept of Joy that emerges 
in the grotesque in The Stones of Venice, and his chapters on 
"The Nature of Gothic" and "Grotesque Renaissance” provide 
just the critical vocabulary needed for a discussion of the 
grotesque quality of The Ring and the Book.
The universality and energy that are central to the 
Romantic idea of Joy are equally crucial to Ruskin's defini­
tion of the nature of Gothic. The moral and imaginative
10Wolfgang Kayser, The Grotesque in Art and Literature, 
trans. Ulrich Weisstein (Bloomington, 1963), p. 188.
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qualities which Ruskin finds in the Gothic spirit are 
savageness, changefulness, naturalism, grotesqueness, 
rigidity, and redundance. Savageness, the most important 
of these six characteristics, manifests itself in the quality 
of imperfection. Ruskin says that "in all things that live 
there are certain irregularities and deficiences which are 
not only signs of life, but sources of beauty. . . . All 
admit irregularity as they imply change; and to banish im­
perfection is to destroy expression, to check exertion, to 
paralyze v i t a l i t y . T h i s  is Ruskin's statement of the 
"philosophy of the imperfect," which so appeals to Browning 
and which he also expresses in "Old Pictures in Florence," 
"Fra Lippo Lippi," "Andrea del Sarto," and in numerous other 
poems, including the passages from Fifine and Aristophanes1 
Apology cited above. Imperfection, according to Ruskin and 
Browning, is a source of beauty because it indicates that
John Ruskin, "The Nature of Gothic," in The Genius of 
John Ruskin, ed. John Rosenberg (Boston, 1963), p. 184. It 
seems impossible to determine if Browning is indebted to 
Ruskin for the "philosophy of the imperfect." DeVane, in A 
Browning Handbook, p. 271, points out that the Brownings read 
The Stones of Venice in 1854, but concludes that "the idea, 
of course, is as truly the expression of Browning's personality 
as it is of Ruskin's." Furthermore, Lawrence Poston has 
noted that any discussion of the theories of Ruskin and 
Browning must proceed from an analogical point of view, since 
"we can make no final decision as to where the indebtedness 
lies; it may be that both were proceeding quite independently," 
in "Ruskin and Browning's Artists," English Miscellany, XV, 
(1964), 196.
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incompletion is the fundamental law of life and that progress 
is a real possibility. All other qualities of the Gothic 
spirit rest upon the principle of imperfection.
The second characteristic of the Gothic spirit, as 
Ruskin defines it, is changefulness. Ruskin says that the 
love of variety manifests itself in "culminating energy," 
and he defines this "changefulness" as follows: "It is that
strange disquietude of the Gothic spirit that is its great­
ness; that restlessness of the dreaming mind, that wanders 
hither and thither among the niches, and flickers feverishly 
around the pinnacles, and frets and fades in labyrinthine 
knots and shadows along wall and roof, and yet is not satis­
fied, nor shall be s a t i s f i e d . T h i s  passage could be 
applied, without even altering the architectural metaphors, 
to the peculiar quality of Browning's verse in poems such as 
Fifine or "Caliban," which critics, for lack of suitable 
terminology, usually label "difficult" or "grotesque."^3 In
12Ibid., p. 190.
13Robert Preyer, for example, in "Two Styles in the 
Verse of Robert Browning," ELH, XXXII (March, 1965), 84, 
notes that in Byron, Dickens, and Browning, "sensibility 
operates at an abnormal speed and intensity. I have not 
found a way of formulating these similarities. One gets 
the impression that there is a literary form or intention 
that they share." The "changefulness" of the Gothic spirit, 
as Ruskin defines it in The Stones of Venice, is perhaps 
the formulation which Preyer seeks. Henry James, in the 
passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter, employs
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Pauline, Browning's narrator describes the dominating quality 
of his own mind as "restlessness." He says that he possesses 
a most "clear idea of consciousness," dominated by "a 
principle of restlessness / Which would be all, have, see, 
know, taste, feel, all— " (11. 277-278). This "restlessness" 
is analogous to the Gothic quality of changefulness, the 
disquietude of the mind in its search for the universality 
of vision which Ruskin describes.
Naturalism, the third quality of the Gothic mind,
Ruskin defines as the love of objects for their own sakes 
and the careful, factual description of those objects. This 
factor is analogous to Browning's poetic objectivity, that 
quality of his poetry which dwells on the perception of out­
ward forms without imputing human feelings to them as 
Wordsworth, for example, characteristically does. Further­
more, Ruskin says that the rigidity of the Gothic spirit 
manifests itself in "an elastic tension and communication of 
force from part to part," while the quality of redundance 
results from a "love of decorative accumulation: a magnifi­
cent enthusiasm, which feels as if it could never do enough to 
reach the fulness of its ideal."^ The twelve books of The
Gothic architectural metaphors similar to Ruskin's to des­
cribe The Ring and the Book.
14Ruskin, The Genius of John Ruskin, pp. 194, 195.
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Ring and the Book embody both Ruskin's idea of rigidity and 
redundance, essentially in Browning's choice of the multiple 
presentation of the same facts, a poetic dramatization that 
results in a tension between the monologues and an accumu­
lation of, specific detail which communicates the force of 
Browning's own judgments.
The sixth characteristic of the Gothic spirit is the
grotesque, which Ruskin describes in his chapter on the
"Grotesque Renaissance." He argues that the grotesque is
composed of two elements:
First, then, it seems to me that the grotesque 
is, in almost all cases, composed of two elements, 
one ludicrous, the other fearful; that, as one or 
the other of these elements prevails, the grotesque 
falls into two branches, sportive grotesque and 
terrible grotesque; but that we cannot legitimately 
consider it under these two aspects, because there 
are hardly any examples which do not in some degree 
combine both elements: there are few grotesques
so utterly playful as to be overcast with no shade 
of fearfulness, and few so fearful as absolutely to 
exclude all ideas of jest.-*-̂
Ruskin contends that the grotesque appears wherever and
whenever there exists in the cultural climate a "joyful
energy of the mind." In the Romantic tradition, Joy is
said to result when intellect and emotion exist in a state
of equipoise. The concept of Joy manifests itself in the
15Ibid., p. 207.
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universal poetic vision which enables the artist to exist 
imaginatively in an Ancient Mariner, a Betty Foy, or a 
Guido Franceschini, as well as in a Christabel, a Michael, 
or a Pompilia. Ruskin maintains that this cultural con­
dition, which the earlier Romantic tradition identifies as 
an aspect of the idea of Joy, provides the necessary basis 
for the grotesque. He explains that "wherever the human 
mind is healthy and vigorous in all its proportions, great 
in imagination and emotion no less than in intellect, and 
not overborne by an undue or hardened pre-eminence of the 
mere reasoning faculties, there the grotesque will exist 
in full energy.
Dante, Ruskin says, exhibits this balance more than 
any other artist, partly because "he was born both in the 
country and at the time which furnished the most stern 
opposition of Horror and Beauty.Nineteenth-century 
artists attempt to revive this stern opposition. Browning 
praises Dante in "One Word More," and he describes his 
genius in much the same way as does Ruskin:
Dante, who loved well because he hated.
Hated wickedness that hinders loving. (11. 42-43)
16Ibid., p. 214. 
17Ibid., p. 213.
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Wylie Sypher points out a passage from Victor Hugo, which 
is applicable to the grotesque in Browning, and which also 
contains the same elements of the grotesque that Ruskin 
employs in his definition. Sypher writes that many 
nineteenth-century artists "discovered the grotesque as 
Hugo understood it and as Browning, a retarded romantic, 
exploited it. Hugo insisted that romantic drama would 
present the 'abnormal and the horrible, the comic and the 
burlesque,' the beast as well as the beauty."^-8 The 
grotesque grows out of this opposition, an opposition which 
Browning encompasses in his characterization of Guido and 
Pompilia in The Ring and the Book.
John Ruskin, therefore, sees the grotesque as a dis­
tinguishing quality of the Gothic spirit. Modern critics, 
however, often use the term "grotesque" for the sum of the 
characteristics which Ruskin defines as Gothic. This dif­
ference in terminology makes little actual difference; 
whether one calls them grotesque or Gothic, the six charac­
teristics which Ruskin enumerates in The Stones of Venice 
provide the most meaningful set of criteria for the analysis 
of what modern critics usually term Browning's grotesque.
When The Ring and the Book is examined as a whole, the
18Wylie Sypher, Rococo to Cubism in Art and Literature 
(New York, 1960), p. 66.
elements which Ruskin describes— savageness, changefulness, 
naturalism, redundance, rigidity, and grotesgueness— are 
seen to develop chiefly from Browning's use of a classic, 
twelve-book epic structure to tell an obscure seventeenth- 
century murder story. This is a juxtaposition of form and 
content which shatters the conventional expectations of epic 
form and which emphasizes the grotesque texture of the poem. 
The structure of the poem, moreover, exhibits both the 
rigidity and the redundance that Ruskin describes. The 
quality of rigidity in the poem, "the tension and communi­
cation of force from part to part," appears as the facts of 
the Roman murder case gather greater and greater force and 
meaning as they are repeated and ramified by each speaker 
in turn. The tension of the poem arises not from one 
particular monologue, but from the cumulative force of the 
details of the case as they are variously interpreted by 
each of the speakers. Tension operates on a second level 
in Browning's poem in that the speakers actually reveal their 
own motivations and their own strengths and weaknesses as 
they ostensibly relate the story of Guido and Pompilia; this 
individual revelation is inextricably tied to Browning's own 
judgment of each of the speakers, which he has already 
presented in the first book of the poem.
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Furthermore, the structure of the poem indicates the 
Gothic quality of redundance. The virtuoso enthusiasm that 
Browning demonstrates, the "love of decorative accumulation," 
appears, for example, as Guido is given not one, but two 
separate opportunities to present his version of the case.
The naturalism of the Gothic spirit is evident in Browning's 
delight in "the pure crude fact" of the poem's sources, 
fact which he insists that each speaker presents as ob­
jectively as is consonant with his character. Ruskin's 
description of the Gothic quality of changefulness, or 
variety, is seen in Browning's presentation of ten different 
speakers, who present as many interpretations of the same 
essential facts. The murder of Pompilia and her parents, 
for example, is described twice by Browning himself in Book 
One, and each of the nine other speakers also renders a 
version of this central episode, as does Fra Celestino in 
the transcript of his sermon given in the final book of the 
poem.
The content of The Ring and the Book indicates its 
savageness, the most important of the six characteristics 
of the Gothic spirit which Ruskin describes in The Stones of 
Venice. The murder case appeals to Browning because its 
very savagery demonstrates not only man's imperfection, not 
only the imperfection of man's truth, but also their essential
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vitality and endurance. Thomas Carlyle, like Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning, felt that Browning had wasted his powers 
on an "Old Bailey" story, but Carlyle failed to see that the 
fact that an "Old Bailey" story can be transformed by the 
poetic imagination is precisely Browning's point. Further­
more, The Ring and the Book exhibits the grotesqueness which 
Ruskin describes in the sharp contrast between the horror 
of Guido's violence and the beauty of Pompilia's suffering. 
The poem is grotesque, finally, in that it represents an en­
deavor to fuse the conventional comic and tragic modes into 
the tragi-comedy that Browning calls "complex poetry."
In the final book of the poem. Fra Celestino warns 
the people of Rome against the too facile belief that per­
fect truth always triumphs. He recalls once again the facts 
of the case and reinforces its grotesque character in the 
following description:
'Be otherwise instructed, youl 
And preferably ponder, ere ye judge,
Each incident of this strange human play 
Privily acted on a theatre
That seemed secure from every gaze but God's—
Till, of a sudden, earthquake laid wall low 
And let the world perceive wild work inside 
And how, in petrifaction of surprise,
The actors stood, — raised arm and planted foot,—
Mouth as it made, eye as it evidenced,
Despairing shriek, triumphant hate, — transfixed,
Both he who takes and she who yields the life.' (XII, 
542-553)
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Savagery, surprise, rigidity, and redundance— these are the 
elements which are of central importance to the priest's 
description of the frozen moment of Guido's crime and to 
the poem as a whole. Consider, for example, that Browning 
has Bottini enclose the priest's sermon in a letter to an 
unnamed friend. The unprincipled Bottini is preparing to 
turn against Pompilia in order that he might seize her 
property; his judgment of the sermon is, therefore, a 
grotesque travesty of the priest's intention. This much 
is evident. But Browning provides still another accumu­
lation of tension, for the priest himself doubts his own 
ability to judge the case.
Significantly, since Fra Celestino is performing not
only a priestly role but also a poetic role as he interprets
the facts of the case in his sermon, his doubts about himself
turn on his experience of Joy:
'I answer, at the urgency of truth:
As this world seems, I dare not say I know 
— Apart from Christ's assurance which decides—
Whether I have not failed to taste much joy,
For many a doubt will fain perturb my choice— .' (XII, 
621-625)
Thus, we have Bottini, whom we know not to trust, harshly 
judging Fra Celestino*s judgment, and the priest in turn 
doubting himself. Browning certainly intends for us to 
accept Fra Celestino as a reliable interpreter— Christ's
173
assurance of his Joy is, after all, the ultimate endorse­
ment of its probity— but the twistings and the turnings of 
this one passage, the communication of tension and force 
from one speaker to the next, with the consciousness of 
Browning himself behind the sermon-within-the-letter-within- 
the-monologue and the Old Yellow Book behind all three, 
indicate Ruskin's description of the Gothic spirit as surely 
as if the poem were concluded with an image of a grinning 
gargoyle.
An attempt to trace these grotesque, or Gothic,
elements through each of the twelve books of the poem would
be an impossible task, and perhaps even a self-defeating one,
for these qualities are palpably present in the first book
and in Browning's presentation of the dramatic conflict.
Browning relishes the pure fact of the case as he considers
it in Book One, and he delights in the joyous creative
response that it elicits from him:
The Book! I turn its medicinable leaves 
In London now till, as in Florence erst,
A spirit laughs and leaps through every limb,
And lights my eye, and lifts me by the hair,
Letting me have my will with these. (I, 774-778)
In the naturalistic spirit of Ruskin's nature of Gothic, he
rejoices in the case in and for itself; it is said to be
"medicinable." He denies that having his "will" with the
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old murder case means that he "creates" the resulting poem:
Creates, no, but resuscitates, perhaps,
Inalienable, the arch-prerogative
Which turns thought, act— conceives, expresses too! (I, 
719-721)
The energy of the creative spirit "resuscitates" and re-
invigorates imperfect forms; the poet projects this energy
into the already created object:
Something with too much life or not enough,
Which, either way imperfect, ended once*
An end whereat man's impulse intervenes,
Makes new beginning,starts the dead alive,
Completes the incomplete and saves the thing. (I, 730- 
734)
The poet can bring the dead facts to life again:
The life in me abolished the death of things,
Deep calling unto deep: as then and there
Acted itself over again once more 
The tragic piece. (I, 520-523)
The "tragic piece," however, is made tragic, Browning insists,
only by virtue of the imaginative alloy of the poetic vision:
A book in shape but, really, pure crude fact 
Secreted from man's life when heart beat hard.
And brains, high-blooded, ticked two centuries since. (I, 
86-88)
The rudeness, the savagery, the imperfection of the "pure 
crude fact" is the domain of the poet, who, like a goldsmith, 
"repristinates," or restores, reality with the alloy of his 
creative energy.
The changefulness which marks the Gothic spirit as it 
is described by Ruskin, that culminating energy which manifests
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itself in the love of variety, is also given explicit ex­
pression in this first book of The Ring and the Book.
Browning prepares his readers for the monologues to follow 
by an analogy with the infinite variety of the seasons of 
the year. Any attempt to freeze any one aspect of the year 
into some perfect landscape would only abolish the life of 
that season:
The land dwarfed to one likeness of the land,
Life cramped corpse-fashion. Rather learn and love 
Each facet-flash of the revolving year!—
Red, green and blue that whirl into a white,
The variance now, the eventual unity,
Which makes the miracle. (I, 1359-1364)
Just as the seasons of the year admit life through change,
man demonstrates the same vital principle of changefulness:
See it for yourselves.
This man's act, changeable because alive!
Action now shrouds, nor shows the forming thought;
Man, like a glass ball with a spark a-top,
Out of the magic fire that lurks inside.
Shows one tint at a time to take the eye. (I, 1364- 
1369)
If the glass ball that is Guido, Browning says,is tilted only 
a little, he flashes forth an entirely different color and 
baffles man's absolutes. It is the poetic vision alone that 
can stay the merging of this changeable rainbow of human life.
Rigidity, or elastic tension and communication of force, 
as well as redundance, or love of decorative accumulation, 
grow out of the changefulness which marks the Gothic spirit
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of this first book. Without the energy of the poetic vision, 
which imparts tension and force to the facts of the case, the 
Old Yellow Book is worthless; it contains, Browning says, 
no "truth of force":
Was this truth of force?
Able to take its own part as truth should,
Sufficient, self-sustaining? Why, if so—
Yonder*s a fire, into it goes my book,
As who shall say me nay, and what the loss?
You know the tale already. (I, 372-377)
To know only the facts of the tale is not enough. In the
thirty-two verse paragraphs of this first book, Browning
repeats the essential facts of the case no fewer than five
times. This repetition reinforces his view of the essential
meaninglessness of fact without the alloy of imagination.
Furthermore, in his presentation of the nine speakers in
turn, Browning establishes a tension between the monologues
that each will deliver and the judgments that he would have
the reader make of each of the speakers.
The opposition between horror and beauty provides the 
polarities out of which the grotesque character of the poem 
emerges. Browning evokes this opposition through the use of 
imagery, especially the imagery of sheep and wolves, which 
he first introduces in the initial book of the poem and which 
accumulates greater and greater force with the variation and 
repetition of it in the subsequent monologues. Horror and
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beauty, Guido and Pompilia, sheep and wolves— the distinc­
tion between these should be as obvious to the human mind 
as if they were marked off from each other by a granite 
pillar:
The fact that, wolves or sheep, such creatures were,—  
Which hitherto, however men supposed,
Had somehow plain and pillar-like prevailed 
I' the midst of them, indisputably fact,
Granite, time's tooth should grate against, not graze.
(I, 662-666)
The granite of indisputable fact proves to be only sandstone, 
however, and the horror and the beauty merge with the passage 
of time. The poet who chances upon the square Old Yellow Book 
renews the tension of their opposition; the book itself is 
like an "abacus" which the poet uses to calculate the style 
of the granite pillar which formerly separated the sheep 
from the wolves, the beauty from the horror. The ensuing poem 
is to be a metaphorical granite pillar against which, now 
that the poetic repristination is complete, time's tooth can 
only grate, leaving the poet's judgments of Guido and Pompilia 
clearly and finally set off from each other.
The Ring and the Book is Browning's most extended at­
tempt to produce the "complex," or tragi-comic, poetry that 
he describes in Aristophanes' Apology. It is not Browning's 
mingling of the burlesque and comic machinations of Dominus 
Hyacinthus and Bottinius with the anguished, soul-searching
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utterances of the Pope or Pompilia that gives the poem its 
tragi-comic character. It is, rather, the dramatic conflict 
itself. Now the dramatic conflict in the poem arises osten­
sibly out of the opposition of Pompilia to Guido's tyranny, 
but in actuality it arises out of the struggle of the central 
characters to be true to their own imperfections. It is this 
interior conflict that takes the poem out of the realm of 
melodrama and into the realm of the tragi-comic. C. N. 
Wenger, who notes that Browning believes that comedy and 
tragedy must be combined to some extent in any great modern 
poem, suggests that the dramatic struggle in Browning "is 
always the struggle of the spirit to be true to a loyalty 
to some person, or cause, or ideal, always an aspiration 
within the individual soul in any case, and against the 
limitations imposed by the individual's own forms and by the 
outward forms in the way of circumstances and institutions. . 
. . The struggle merely becomes comic or tragic as one sees 
it from the standpoint of the freedom attained by spirit
over forms or from the standpoint of the limitations 
19suffered." If Wenger's observation is applied to Pompilia, 
Caponsacchi, and the Pope, the tragi-comic nature of their
■^Wenger, pp. 202-203.
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respective conflicts will emerge.
Pompilia, for example, struggles to be true to the 
glorious promise of her unborn child, and it is only the 
necessity of loyalty to the spirit of new life that prompts 
her flight from Guido. In turn, Caponsacchi's conflict is 
embedded in his struggle to maintain a human loyalty to 
Pompilia, a loyalty which has a prerogative over the loyalty 
which is due the church. Pope Innocent is caught up within 
a struggle to be loyal to not only the duties of his office, 
but also to the church and to Pompilia, as well as to Guido. 
Ruskin writes that "all things are literally better, 
lovelier, and more beloved for the imperfections which have
been divinely appointed, that the law of human life may be
2 0Effort, and the law of human judgment, Mercy." The Ring 
and the Book obliquely embodies the same truth. The tragic- 
comic vision which Browning employs demonstrates both the 
freedom and the limitation of each character, their individ­
ual efforts and the mercy due those efforts, Pompilia, 
Caponsacchi, and the Pope are as imperfect, and therefore as 
grotesque, as is Guido, but they struggle against their im­
perfection and grow in that struggle, while Guido remains a
20Ruskin, The Genius of John Ruskin, p. 184.
180
stunted animal, a frightened wolf.
Coleridge says that Joy is given "only to the pure 
and in their purest hour." Pompilia is the embodiment of 
this innocence that characterizes the idea of Joy. It is 
an innocence that does not assert the self or demand abso­
lutes. It is content to accept and to rejoice in the 
complexities of human life. Guido describes Pompilia's 
self-possession in his last speech:
This self-possession to the uttermost,
How does it differ in aught, save degree,
From the terrible patience of God. (XI, 1378-1380)
Coleridge describes the highest Joy as the perfect peace of
God, and Pompilia's self-possession, her "terrible patience,"
is analogous to this perfect peace that joyously embraces
whatever indignities the human condition may merit. Pompilia,
however, when the life of her unborn child is threatened,
demonstrates the energy that also characterizes the idea of
Joy, and her flight with Caponsacchi is the expression of
this creative energy. When Guido overtakes the fleeing pair
at the inn, his entrance blots out "all peace and joy and
light and life" (VI, 1526). Pompilia moves quickly to stop
him from inflicting injury to Caponsacchi, and the full
energy of her Joy is manifested:
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She sprang at the sword that hung beside him, seized,
Drew, brandished it, the sunrise burned for joy. (VI, 
1544-1545)
The Pope judges Pompilia's drawing the sword— surely her 
most uncharacteristic act— as the noblest expression of her 
character, precisely because it does require such an act of 
will.
Through Pompilia, furthermore. Browning gives expres­
sion to the idea of kindred Joy. When Guido claims her as 
his wife, his loveless lust burns the Joy from her life:
He laid a hand on me that burned all peace.
All joy, all hope, and last all fear away,
Dipping the bough of life, so pleasant once,
In fire which shrivelled leaf and bud alike. (VI,776-779)
The promise of her unborn child, however, restores her to
energy, and the planned flight from Guido is a flight to Joy.
She hears again the building-sparrows above her singing with
one voice, a voice of Joy, and the chance that Caponsacchi
will not aid her is a "doubt that first paled joy" (VII,
1365) . During one stage of the flight, the priest brings to
her a new-born child in the hope of distracting her troubled
thoughts for a moment:
A new-born babe?— and I saw faces beam 
Of the young mother proud to teach me joy,
And gossips round expecting my surprise
At the sudden hole through earth that lets in heaven.
(VII, 1556-1559)
This image of heaven flashing suddenly through to earth serves
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a double function in Pompilia's characterization. The 
supreme Joy experienced by Pompilia is the birth of her son, 
and Browning describes the home of the Comparini after the 
birth of Gaetano in images of Joy. He is the infant that 
"the great joy was for" (I, 404), and the Joy of Pompilia 
is explicitly compared to the Joy of Christ's mother.
Gaetano is born two weeks before Christmas, and 
heaven's Joy manifests itself both in his birth and in the 
celebration of the Incarnation that follows: Gaetano's
birth is thus an expression of kindred Joy, and Pompilia 
is able to judge her entire life on the basis of this ex­
perience :
All has been right; I have gained my gain, enjoyed 
As well as suffered,— nay, got foretaste too 
Of better life beginning where this ends— . (VII, 166 8- 
1670)
Kindred Joy in Browning's poetry is again manifested on two 
planes: the infant "the great joy was for" is both Gaetano,
a human out-soul who redeems Pompilia from Guido's tyranny, 
and Christ, the divine out-soul, whose incarnation she cele­
brates and towards whom she moves. The Joyful and Glorious 
mysteries of the Christian tradition are centered upon Maryfe 
divine motherhood, from the annunciation of God's choice of 
her to bear his son to Christ's assumption of her into 
heaven. Pompilia's life evidences the same implicit pattern.
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from her joy in the discovery of her pregnancy to the last 
words of both her monologue and of her life, "And I rise" 
(VII, 1845).
Furthermore, Pompilia is also an out-soul to
Caponsacchi. She compares herself to a flower whose growth
is stinted by the lack of the sun's warmth:
But if meanwhile some insect with a heart 
Worth floods of lazy music, spendthrift joy—
Some fire-fly renounced Spring for my dwarfed cup,
Crept close to me, brought lustre for the dark,
Comfort against the cold— what though excess
Of comfort should miscall the creature— sun? (VII,
1519-1524)
The "spendthrift joy" of Caponsacchi enables her to save her
unborn son, and she recognizes Caponsacchi in his role as the
"sun," her out-soul. Caponsacchi, in turn, reaches the same
conclusion: "I assuredly did bow, was blessed / By the
revelation of Pompilia" (VI, 1864-1865). He decides that his
agreement to aid her in her escape is obedience to God's
command through the agency of Pompilia:
Sirs, I obeyed. Obedience was too strange,—
This new thing that had been struck into me 
By the look o' the lady, —  to dare disobey 
The first authoritative word. 'T was God's 
I had been lifted to the level of her. (VI, 1010-1014)
The human out-soul is thus a channel of God's continuing
revelation in the world. The Pope reinforces the truth of
Caponsacchi's judgment. He says that Pompilia's life is
also a revelation to him:
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I see in the world the intellect of man,
That sword, the energy his subtle spear,
The knowledge which defends him like a shield—  
Everywhere; but they make not up, I think,
The marvel of a soul like thine, earth's flower
She holds up to the softened gaze of GodI (X, 1014-
1019)
Her life is "perfect in whiteness" (X, 1006), the Pope says, 
and she thus presages the condition to come when the whole 
world itself will blaze with Joy: "So should the frail be­
come the perfect, rapt / From glory of pain to the glory of 
joy" (X, 1801-1802).
Guido's hatred of Pompilia centers on the self-possess­
ion of her Joy. In this respect, Guido's character is 
similar to that of the Duke in Browning's 'My Last Duchess." 
The Duke, for example, hates the "spot of Joy" (11. 14-15) 
that shines through his wife's face, a Joy that his presence 
does not evoke. The Duchess, the Duke reiterates, is too 
liberal with her inner Joy. The slightest courtesy, he says, 
is "cause enough / For calling up that spot of joy" (11. 20- 
21). The pure and peaceful self-possession of Joy eludes the 
attempts of both the Duke and Guido to dominate their wives' 
very souls. Both men take drastic action to destroy the Joy 
they cannot possess, and both decide that violence is the 
only weapon effective against such Joy.
It is significant that the images of Joy associated
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with Pompilia's innocence, Caponsacchi's energy, and the
Pope's universal vision are not associated with Guido.
Guido speaks in images of pleasure, and he voices a
Utilitarian ethic:
For, pleasure being the sole good in the world 
Any one's pleasure turns to some one's pain,
So law must watch for everyone, — say we.
Who call things wicked that give too much joy,
And nickname mere reprisal, envy made,
Punishment: quite right! thus the world goes round.
(XI, 529-534)
Guido gives Joy the connotation of sensual pleasure. The 
Pope recognizes this aspect of Guido's mind in his descrip­
tion of him:
'I have my taste too, and tread no such step!
You choose the glorious life, and may, for me!
I like the lowest of life's appetites,—
So you judge, — but the very truth of joy
To my own apprehension which decides.' (X, 1932-1936)
The "very truth of joy" is, for Guido, simply the enjoyment
of "the lowest of life's appetites," and he scorns the Joy
that he does not understand and cannot possess.
The images of the Joy of nature, the Joy of new life,
the Joy of creative energy, and the Joy of Christ are denied
Guido. The Joy of Christmas, for example, only goads Guido
t© greater fury in his planned revenge upon Pompilia and her
parents. In Guido's mind,the image of Christ's face becomes
merged with Satan's, old and wrinkled, as the Joy "withers"
off:
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But, day by day, joy waned and withered off:
The Babe's face, premature with peak and pine,
Sank into wrinkled ruinous old age,
Suffering and death, then mist-like disappeared. (V, 
1602-1605)
Guido cannot move beyond the limitation of pleasure to the 
freedom of Joy. For Guido, therefore, Joy remains simply 
indulgence in "wicked" pleasures of sense which merits the 
reprisal of law. His conflict is thus more "tragic," as 
Browning uses the term, than are those of Pompilia, Capon­
sacchi, or the Pope, for their struggle partakes of the 
freedom of Joy, of a "divine" comedy.
Browning embodies in The Ring and the Book both the 
Gothic spirit and the idea of Joy in their greatest 
Victorian expression. John Ruskin's "The Nature of Gothic" 
is not so much an accurate historical description as it is 
the presentation of an ideal toward which he felt his own 
age should aspire. His desperate struggle to instill this 
spirit into all aspects of English life was eventually given 
up in despair of the architectural horrors that it spawned. 
Perhaps, however, the Gothic spirit is better conveyed in 
other media than architecture, for the idea of Joy, which is 
really the poetic manifestation of the Gothic spirit, 
flourishes in both Wordsworth and Browning and survives the 
nineteenth century. The grotesque quality of Browning's poe­
try, especially of The Ring and the Book, influenced the
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Pre-Raphaelites and paved the way to the idea of Joy in W.
B. Yeats. Wordsworth perceived the Gothic quality of his 
own work, and he describes the relationship of The Prelude 
to his other poems as that of an ante-chapel to a Gothic 
church. The Ring and the Book is the other great nineteenth- 
century poem that embodies the Gothic spirit, for although 
they are certainly vastly different kinds of poems, both 
Wordsworth and Browning attempt to encompass on an epic 
scale the energy, the universality, and the perfection-in- 
imperfection that marks Ruskin*s Gothic spirit.
The idea of Joy, like the spirit of Gothic, is an at­
tempt to tap a source of traditional cultural energy which 
could rejuvenate a mechanized society. Ruskin praises Gothic 
art because it indicates a culture that possesses a "joyful 
energy of the mind." The cultural conditions that produce 
Gothic art (whether they are historically justified is not 
the point) are the cultural conditions that produce Joy, 
and when these conditions are absent or unavailable to or­
dinary men, poets like Wordsworth and Browning must re-create 
the "compensating joy, unknown and infinite" in their poetry.
CHAPTER VI
JOY, STRUGGLE AND EQUIPOISE:
SELECTED POEMS OF THE 1870's AND 1880's
The Romantic tradition of Joy emphasizes the equipoise 
or equilibrium of the human intelligence and the human 
emotions within the individual consciousness as the source 
and the result of the highest Joy. This condition of equi­
poise, however, does not occupy a significant place in 
Browning's idea of Joy. In The Ring and the Book, the 
Other Half-Rome makes a statement which is a convenient 
summation of Browning's position. The speaker of the mono­
logue describes the life of Pietro and violante as a happy 
one:
All at the mean where joy's components mix.
So again, in the couple's very souls
You saw the adequate half with half to match,
Each having and each lacking somewhat, both
Making a whole that had all and lacked nought. (Ill, 126-
130)
But such a condition is not natural to human life as Browning
sees it; the Other Half-Rome explains that perfect equipoise
is as debilitating to the soul as it is to the body:
But, as 't is said a body, rightly mixed.
Each element in equipoise, would last
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Too long and live forever,— accordingly
Holds a germ— sand-grain weight too much i ' the scale—
Ordained to get predominance one day
And so bring all to ruin and release,— . (Ill, 137-142) 
Equipoise destroys an otherwise healthy imbalance in the 
human soul, and the moment when perfect union is attained, 
"the mean where joy's components mix," can be only a 
fleeting experience at best. Browning says in Sordello 
that "Joy comes when so much Soul is wreaked in Time / On 
Matter." His attempt to express the nature of the struggle 
for Joy occupies as prominent a position in several of the 
late poems of the 1870's and 1880's as it does in the 
earliest poems of the 1830's and 1840's.
The keynote of the idea of Joy in Browning's late
poems is struck in "St. Martin's Summer":
For, would we but avow the truth,
Sober is genuine joy. No jesting!
Ask else Penelope, Ulysses—
Old in youth! (11. 69-72)
The speaker of this poem recognizes the awe and fear that
Wordsworth also associates with the experience of Joy.
Genuine Joy is sober because it reminds man of an immortal
destiny whose attainment requires a tremendous effort of
the human will. Genuine Joy is sober because it is the
means by which the artist overcomes his alienation, but
it also imposes unique responsibilities. Genuine Joy is
sober because it brands the human soul with the innocent
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humility that enables it to embrace joyously the pact of 
creatureship with God. Genuine Joy is sober because it 
transforms and transcends the otherwise irreconcilable 
antinomies of the human condition. Finally, genuine Joy 
is sober because it is so tenuous, so fleeting an experi­
ence, as to almost persuade the man that it is actually 
only an illusion. Browning insists, indeed, that the 
experience of Joy is a kind of divine illusion that pre­
sages the reality of eternity.
The speaker of Browning's "Numpholeptos" embodies 
the vain search of the human soul to be completely ful­
filled in time by the Joy of eternity. Shelley says in 
"Adonais" that "Life, like a dome of many-colored glass, / 
Stains the white radiance of eternity"; Browning makes some­
what different use of a similar metaphor as the basis of 
"Numpholeptos." The speaker of the poem is nymph- 
enchanted. He would be, as the Pope says of Pompilia, 
"perfect in whiteness," for the nymph who holds him in 
thrall is moon-beam white and demands the same of him.
She requires that he experience all of the kaleidoscopic 
colors of the seven orbs without absorbing their stain and 
that he return to her as white as she herself is:
Your own permission— your command, indeed,
That who would worthily retain the love
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Must share the knowledge shrined those eyes 
above,
Go boldly on adventure, break through bonds 
O' the quintessential whiteness that surrounds 
Your feet, obtain experience of each tinge. (11. 95- 
100)
He returns to the nymph stained from his quest but neverthe­
less desirous of the reward of perfect Joy.
The speaker of the poem longs to find in the nymph's 
eyes some acknowledgment of a love that overcomes death:
My eyes, acquainted with the dust, dare probe 
Your eyes above for— what, if born, would blind 
Mine with redundant bliss, as flash may find 
The inert nerve, sting awake the palsied limb,
Bid with life's ectasy sense overbrim 
And suck back death in the resurging joy—
Love, the love whole and sole without alloy! (11. 28-34)
The "resurging joy" of perfect love is denied the man who
must traverse the stained and merging colors of human
experience. The "resurging joy" thus withers off, and the
speaker renews his vain quest:
You dwell there, hearted; from your midmost 
home
Rays forth— through that fantastic world I roam 
Ever— from centre to circumference,
Shaft upon coloured shaft: this crimsons thence
That purples out its precinct through the waste. (11. 
61-65)
He stands before her again, suffused "with crocus, saffron, 
orange." He receives, however, no hint of approval from 
his quest in the yellow orb:
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As before, you show 
Scarce recognition, no approval, some 
Mistrust, more wonder at a man become 
Monstrous in garb, nay— flesh disguised as well,
Through his adventure. (11. 85-89)
Life, this speaker implies, should be a guest which includes
all of the tints of the "quintessential whiteness"; man
should struggle to "obtain experience of each tinge." But
such experience will inevitably stain the man, who is,
after all, "flesh disguised."
The speaker of "Numpholeptos" rebels against the vain 
adventure which is imposed upon him, but finally submits 
and begins again, this time "the crimson-quest." He, 
like Andrea del Sarto, has gained the realization that he 
is wedded to an ideal of human conduct beyond the resources 
of his own humanity. The nymph resembles the silver-grey, 
placid perfection that Browning rejects in "Andrea del 
Sarto," and like Andrea, this speaker cannot break the bond 
with the achromatic, cold, but nevertheless enchanting 
ideal of perfection represented by the nymph. In Browning's 
world, it is good and necessary that life stain "the white 
radiance of eternity," and he embodies in this poem the 
actual beauty of the chromatic stains of experience and the 
futility of life on any other terms than the fully human. 
Like the speaker of "Women and Roses," the speaker of
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"Numpholeptos" finds himself ineffectually circling the 
whiteness of perfect Joy while vividly stained with the 
exigencies of his own humanity.
As far as it goes, this is a legitimate reading of 
"Numpholeptos," consonant with Browning’s statements in 
other poems, but this poem is a rich artistic achievement 
and embodies several levels of meaning. W. C. DeVane, 
for example, endorses Betty Miller's interpretation of the 
poem as a biographical allegory of Browning's bondage to 
the memory of his dead wife.^ However, if the poem is seen 
as another ramification of Browning's concept of the grotes­
que, still another level of meaning will emerge. The 
grotesque signals imperfection, universality, energy, and 
Joy. It determines the necessity of human struggle. Ruskin 
justifies the imperfection that marks the grotesque from 
both a human and a divine point of view: he says that im­
perfection is divinely appointed so that "the law of human 
life may be Effort, and the law of human judgment, Mercy."
In The Ring and the Book, the grotesque quality of human
^DeVane, A Browning Handbook, p. 405. W. O. Raymond 
sees "Numpholeptos" as a presentation of the contrast between 
the "abstract idealism" of the feminine nature and the 
"masculine realism" of Browning's own humanism, in"'The 
Jewelled Bow': A Study in Browning's Imagery and Humanism,"
The Infinite Moment, p. 209.
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life is viewed from a divine perspective and is judged a 
positive good. The poet, in other words, has a godlike, 
universal vantage point and an omnipotent control over the 
characters in the poem. Their imperfect struggles are said 
to partake of the freedom of Joy. But the human values of 
effort and mercy are equally important in the poem. From 
their internal points of view, Pompilia and Caponsacchi, for 
example, acknowledge their own imperfection, and their 
struggles against it become a source of Joy as soul is 
wreaked on matter in time. They are out-souls and their Joy 
is thus truly reciprocal and kindred, for it moves each of 
them closer to a knowledge of the divine out-soul. The 
perfection they struggle for is, therefore, initially a 
manifestly human ideal.
When seen from the vantage point of what Ruskin 
describes as the rationale of the imperfect, the grotesque 
is a source of Joy, but when seen from the point of view 
of the coldly perfect, it is an ugly and frightening 
quality of human life. The speaker of "Numpholeptos" is 
mesmerized by a false out-soul who represents an inhuman 
ideal of perfection. By her very nature, the nymph cannot 
reciprocate in the kindred Joy of humanity, but the colors 
of human experience are seen from her deadly perfect per­
spective. She possesses a "blank pure soul, alike the
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source / And tomb of that prismatic glow" (11... 73-74). The 
polychromatic colors' which stain him are vividly and grotes­
quely human, but from an inhuman point of view, the strong 
and Vibrant hues of the crimson, purple, topaz, saffron, 
orange, and scarlet merit only "forebearance, then re­
pulsion, then disdain" (1. 40).
The speaker of this poem is bound by what Ruskin 
calls the condition of effort, for he must achieve the 
experience of each color, but he is not judged with the 
correlative mercy due his humanity. He thus comes to 
see his own condition from the nymph's perspective and 
judges it "absurd":
Who trusts your word 
Tries the adventure: and returns— absurd 
As frightful— in that sulphur-steeped disguise. (11. 
124-126)
His very soul is mesmerized by the nymph, however, and he 
relapses and acquiesces in the vain struggle which yields 
no Joy. His recidivism is comparable to that of Paracelsus, 
but Paracelsus achieves a final freedom that is denied this 
speaker. By viewing the human struggle from the point of 
view of the equipoise of the nymph, Browning effects a quite 
different expression of his concept of the grotesque, ex­
tending and enriching its meaning beyond his statements in 
Fifine at the Fair.
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In La Saisiaz. Browning, speaking in his own person, 
again returns to the Joy theme which he dramatized in 
"Cleon." "Does the soul survive the body?"— this is the 
blunt and insidious question that the sudden death of a 
friend brings forth again from the depths of his conscious­
ness, clamoring for an answer. Without a firm belief in the 
immortality of the soul, man's experience of human Joy is 
an inadequate and wholly futile process:
Life thus owned unhappy, is there supplemental 
happiness
Possible and probable in life to come? or must 
we count
Life a curse and not a blessing, summed-up in its 
whole amount,
Help and hindrance, joy and sorrow? (11. 204-207)
If the experience of Joy has to be computed as one would add 
a column of figures, it would be found to be totally lacking 
in spiritual import. Such computations of man's Joy without 
the consideration of eternity, Browning says, make human life 
"brutish." It is the desire for immortality which makes 
human life worthy of man's own reflective self-consciousness:
This life has its hopes for this life, hopes that 
promise joy: life done—
Out of all the hopes, how many had complete 
fulfilment? none. (11. 245-246)
Browning argues that human Joy is necessarily incomplete, and
if this incompletion does not signal potential completion,
life becomes futile and joyless. As in "Saul," Browning
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demands that the present life be seen as only a "prelude" 
to the full and complete harmony of eternity.
Browning says that if he would set aside all human 
desires and examine his life solely on the terms of his own 
human experience, he still finds the same inadequacy in his 
experience of Joy, an inadequacy which Cleon also finds. 
Browning maintains that the sorrow of life far outweighs 
its Joy:
Still— with no more Nature, no more Man as 
riddle to be read,
Only my own joys and sorrows now to reckon 
real instead,—
I must say— or choke in silence— 'Howsoever 
came my fate,
Sorrow did and joy did nowise,— life well weighed,
— preponderate.1 (11. 330-333)
In this poem, as in "Numpholeptos," man's life is envisioned
as being stained by the vivid and variegated colors of his
"flesh disguise," and if death is to result in the perfect
whiteness that man is capable of imagining, there must be a
promise of future life in which to attain that condition of
perfection.
In an attempt to resolve the problem of his belief in 
immortality, Browning introduces into the poem a debate be­
tween the Reason and the Fancy. F. E. L. Priestley, who 
provides the most incisive reading of La Saisiaz, points 
out that Browning, by placing the debate between these two
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human faculties at this point in the poem, returns to the 
ring metaphor of The Ring and the Book. In that poem, 
Browning images the imagination as the repristinating alloy 
which cooperates with the "pure crude fact" to arrive at 
truth. Priestley writes that, as in The Ring and the Book, 
Browning selects "the vulgar (and empiricist) opposition 
of Reason and Fancy (vulgarly concerned with 'truth' and 
'fiction', 'fact' and 'surmise'). . . . Reason and Fancy 
in actuality cooperate in the search for truth, as the dia-
logue that follows suggests." Browning maintains that
Fancy conducts Reason to the ultimate knowledge that man 
can grasp. An important part of the recognition which the 
cooperating human faculties achieve lies in the realization 
of the nature of Joy.
The Reason accepts the Fancy’s assertion of three
"facts" of human existence: God is, the soul is, and the
soul survives death. The Reason then proceeds to build upon
these propositions a superstructure of belief:
Life to come will be improvement on the life 
that's now; destroy 
Body's thwartings, there's no longer screen be­
twixt soul and soul's joy. (11. 411-412)
2F. E. L. Priestley, "A Reading of 'La Saisiaz,'" UTQ, 
XXV (October, 1955), 53.
The "screen" that separates the soul from its Joy is man's 
finite, physical nature. Browning consistently utilizes the 
screen image for this concept. In "By the Fire-Side," for 
example, he images the human body as the "fine flesh-stuff"
t
and as the "mortal screen" that impedes more than a momentary 
achievement of the perfect union of out-souls, while in 
"The Last Ride Together," the body is imaged as a "fleshly 
screen" which the speaker of the poem cannot transcend. The 
perfect transcendence of the "fine flesh-stuff" comes only 
in eternity, where all barriers between "soul and soul's 
joy" are removed. The Reason thus concludes that man can do 
little more than "wait" for the translation to eternity; 
the soul must "take the joys and bear the sorrows— neither 
with extreme concern!" (1. 467). The Fancy, however, leads 
the Reason to comprehend the fact that man must do more than 
simply "bear" the Joys and sorrows of life:
Life has worth incalculable, every moment that 
he spends
So much gain or loss for that next life which on 
this life depends. (11. 477-478)
The Fancy employs the concrete imagery of commerce in order
to appeal to the Reason which insists upon "fact." Browning
confronts the Gradgrinds of the nineteenth-century Coketowns
with the imagery that appeals to them, and in its very use
demonstrates its inadequacies. The experience of Joy, as
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Browning has already shown, cannot be computed on the basis 
of losses and gains.
In La Saisiaz, Browning insists upon the Joy of human
life, no matter how imperfect that Joy appears to be; with
a tenacity like that of his own Fra Lippo Lippi, he asserts 
that "life means intensely and means good." The poet's 
business is to find and to convey that meaning, but in this 
markedly personal utterance. Browning still maintains that 
the poet's meaning is not to be identified with the individu­
al's belief. Each man, he says, must build his own faith 
upon the substructural propositions of knowledge, and his
faith must find its ultimate truth and meaning in the facts
of his individual experience.
F. E. L. Priestley notes that in the short envoi which 
concludes La Saisiaz, Browning describes the poem as a 
chain of thoughts, and Priestley discusses the "obliqueness" 
of this conclusion and the questions that it raises in 
relation to the poem as a whole.3 However, the envoi can 
be clarified somewhat if it is realized that Browning uses 
in his conclusion imagery similar to the ladder and thread 
images that are found in several of the poems of Men and
3Ibid., 59.
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Women and Dramatis Personae. In "Cleon," for example, the 
climb up the ladder of the tower represents man's increasing 
power of Joy-consciousness, but Cleon rejects the ladder 
imagery in favor of the image of the thread of water, which 
signifies man's finite capability for Joy in contrast to 
the infinite oceans which his soul can envisage from its 
vantage point at the top of the ladder of consciousness.
In La Saisiaz, Browning similarly employs the imagery of 
mountain climbing as a contrast to the image of the "fleshly 
chain" that binds man to earth. The struggle up the mountain 
is analogous to the climb up the ladder of Joy-consciousness, 
while the chain image is analogous to the thread that signi­
fies at once man's finitude and the tenuity of his separation 
from infinitude.
The poem begins with a description of the climb that
the poet makes in memory of his dead friend. As he stands
at the top of Mt. Saleve, he is face to face with the
mightiest possible symbol of infinity in Romantic poetry:
(As I climbed or paused from climbing, now 
o'erbranched by shrub and tree,
Now built round by rock and boulder, now at 
just a turn set free.
Stationed face to face with— Nature? rather with 
Infinitude). (11. 9-11)
The mountain signals to his consciousness not only an aware­
ness of infinitude, but also an awareness of the profound
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vastness of the separation between life and death. The
poet and his friend had climbed together prior to her death
only five short days before this one, and the climb had
seemed to be a joyous experience:
Up and up we went, how careless— nay, how 
joyous! All was new.
All was strange. 'Call progress toilsome? that 
were just insulting you!' (11. 41-42)
As in "Cleon," however, this joyous progress is interrupted, 
this time by the chilling reality of sudden death, and 
again in this poem. Browning sees increasing progress in 
Joy-consciousness issuing in despair. Browning now intro­
duces the contrasting image of the chain just as he had 
introduced the thread image in "Cleon" after a similar 
perception.
He wonders if perhaps immortality means only that man 
is linked to succeeding generations by the power of the 
human memory. His friend survives death as long as he keeps 
her memory alive, and they both are linked beyond his own 
life in the memories of his friends. This is, however, 
an unsatisfactory supposition, Browning concludes, for in 
actuality it means that "both memories dwindle, youxs and 
mine together linked" (1. 185) . They are linked more firmly 
by the "fleshly chain" of their own humanity, and the 
mountain climb only reinforces their bondage:
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Stalwart body idly yoked to stunted spirit, powers, 
that fain
Else would soar, condemned to grovel, ground­
lings through the fleshly chain,— . (11. 199-200)
The profundity of their separation no longer seems so vast
as it did from the perspective of the mountain top; even
after death, he is yet bound to her by the fleshly chain,
and he must attempt to judge the chances of the eventual
transcendence of the fleshly chain while still remaining
a finite link. When Browning comes to the envoi of the poem,
he includes the imagery of the mountain climb and the fleshly
chain as symbolic indications of the experiences which they
shared. If these aspects of the contracting imagery of
mountain climb and fleshly chain are kept in mind, the envoi
seems less oblique and can be understood as a meaningful and
organic part of the poem.
In the envoi, Browning first describes his exaltation 
as he descended the mountain. From the vantage point of 
infinity, all things had taken on the illusion of solidity 
and purpose:
Not so loosely 
thoughts were linked,
Six weeks since as I, descending in the sunset 
from Saleve,
Found the chain, I seemed to forge there, flawless 
till it reached your grave,— . (11. 606-608)
This is the chain of their humanity which seems "flawless" 
from the mountain top. The realization of the vulnerability
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of the fleshly chain, however, coming so soon after the 
mountain climb which indicates his capacity for infinitude, 
only hurls him into a recognition of the terrible "flaws" 
that death rends in any comfortable metaphysical system:
Not so filmy was the texture, but I bore it in my 
breast
Safe thus far. And since I found a something in 
me would not rest
Till I, link by link, unravelled any tangle of the 
chain. (11. 609-611)
The deeper consciousness of infinitude is the "something" 
in him, and his mastery of the mountain is indissolubly 
linked to the fact of human mortality. The poem is a "chain 
of thoughts," as Priestley points out, but it is also the 
poet's recognition that he is bound to all humanity by the 
fleshly chain. The poem is a tribute to, and an acknowledg­
ment of, the link that exists between the poet, his friend, 
and, by extension, all humanity. La Saisiaz is at once a 
"memory evoked from slumber" and the poet's realization that 
both the memory and the slumber have meaning. However loose 
and vulnerable the links may seem as they wind down the 
mountain to the grave, the soul has gained a memory of Joy- 
consciousness that lies beyond the dimension of time, a 
dimension which the poet now sees to be as fragile as the 
life-breath of the human links.
Browning maintains that although the fleshly chain
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must be broken and eventually transcended, it must not be 
rejected. When stated as baldly as this, this belief would 
appear to make Browning another drab Victorian prophet of 
the possible, but his idea of Joy runs far deeper than the 
simple exploitation of the prosaic possibilities of the Joy 
that resides in sensory pleasures. James Benziger, who 
observes that beauty and joy are really what Romantic poetry 
is all about, has noted this aspect of Browning's poetry. 
Benziger writes that it is indeed a "religious truism that 
the thought of heavenly joy means little to one who has no 
vivid experience of its earthly counterpart. Truisms like 
this are what original poets infuse with new life and vigor. 
The experiences of beauty and joy are what the Romantic 
poets most seriously explore, and they explore them precisely 
as they intimate some truth of great significance."^ 
Browning's idea of Joy imbues the life of man in the tangible 
universe with a Vigorous raison d'etre and dignifies flesh 
as well as spirit.
An example of the originality of Browning's approach 
to the truism which Benziger notes is found in one of his 
most striking metaphors for the human body, the "fine 
flesh-stuff" of "By the Fire-Side." Browning's diction is
4Benziger, p. 271
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not without its Empsonian ambiguities, and the connotations 
of the word "fine" in this metaphor yield a rich and com­
plex texture of meanings to this aspect of Browning's idea 
of Joy. Through the use of the word "fine" in this image, 
Browning indicates that although the human body is only a 
thin barrier between the perfect union of out-souls, it is 
also the subtle, sensitive, and refined medium of man's 
earthly life. The word "fine" indicates that the human body 
is, indeed, superior in quality to any other created thing 
in the evolutionary scale, and that human love both purifies 
and clarifies the body's use, a use which is diminished as 
the spiritual union between out-souls grows and develops. 
This image, moreover, partakes of still further connotations 
of the word "fine," for Browning sees the limitations of the 
flesh as a kind of probationary penalty imposed upon man's 
life on earth, but he also maintains that while the "fine 
flesh-stuff" will have an end in death, the soul will sur­
vive into eternity. The image of the "fine flesh-stuff" 
thus opens out, as it were, into a viable and striking 
summation of Browning's belief in the probity of human Joy 
together with his equally firm belief that man is capable 
of infinite Joy.
Browning continues to explore the idea of Joy in 
several of the poems of Ferishtah's Fancies, a volume
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published in 1884. Ferishtah is a "soul-starved" Persian,
hungry for a philosophical and psychological framework
which will renew his present moral inertia. He chances
upon a melon-seller, whom he recognizes to be the Shah's
former prime minister. He is shocked by the transformation
in the man and wonders if the melon-seller curses God for
the twelve years of Joy which he has tasted, since they
would seem to make his present status all the more bitter.
The melon-seller incredulously listens and then mordantly
replies to Ferishtah's question:
'Fool, does thy folly think my foolishness 
Dwells rather on the fact that God appoints 
A day of woe to the unworthy one,
Than that the unworthy one, by God's award,
Tasted joy twelve years long?' (11. 27-31)
No man is "worthy" of Joy, the once prominent melon-seller
tells Ferishtah, and he advises the youth to return to school
to remedy his ignorance of the basic foundations of human
life. Ferishtah does so, but the melon-seller's speech on
Joy remains the basis of his wisdom, his "stock-in-trade"
whose paradoxical and deceptive simplicity makes "great wits
jump."
In "Two Camels," Browning recalls the problems of 
asceticism which he first explored in Paracelsus and Sordello. 
The poet's ability to embody concretely the Joy that his 
consciousness can imagine would seem to dictate that the
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poet mortify his human desires in an attempt to save his 
"peculiar joy," as Browning calls it in Paracelsus, from 
a possibly debilitating contact with the mundane life of 
ordinary men. Browning rejects this idea in his earlier 
poems, and his rejection of it is even more explicit in 
"Two Camels." Ferishtah tells his disciple that the sage 
must experience all facets of Joy:
'Put case I never have myself enjoyed,
Known by experience what enjoyment means,
How shall I— share enjoyment? — no, indeed!—
Supply it to my fellows, — ignorant.
As so I should be of the thing they crave.' (11. 66-70) 
Like Fra Celestino in The Ring and the Book, like Cleon, and 
like Paracelsus, Ferishtah questions the ability of any man 
to know Joy unless he himself has experienced it. He insists 
that the alienated sage is actually dwelling in an anachro­
nistic world of illusion. His stress upon the absolute 
necessity of experience in the world of men bears out more 
incisively than perhaps any other passage in Browning's 
poetry Robert Langbaum's contention that the poetry of the 
nineteenth century is a "poetry of experience." In The 
Poetry of Experience, Langbaum correlates the rise of the 
dramatic monologue through the Victorians to its prominence 
in modem poetry with the rise of the experimental spirit. 
Langbaum contends that the most essential idea of Romanticism
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is the doctrine of experience, which he defines as "the 
doctrine that the imaginative apprehension gained through 
immediate experience is primary and certain, whereas the 
analytic reflection that follows is secondary and prob-
5lematical." Ferishtah's insistence that Joy be "known by
experience" is a capsule statement of Langbaum's thesis.
Ferishtah further maintains that the sage must know
Joy as he knows his own mind:
'Just as I cannot, till myself convinced,
Impart conviction, so, to deal forth joy
Adroitly, needs must I know joy myself.' (11. 77-79)
The sage may suppose that a legitimate reason for the re­
jection of human Joy lies in his desire to improve the Joy- 
consciousness of his fellow-men:
'Renounce joy for my fellows' sake? That's joy 
Beyond joy; but renounced for mine, not theirs?' (11. 
80-81)
For the sage to renounce Joy in order to increase its power,
Ferishtah says, were analogous to the physician's rejection
of health in order to heal disease. Asceticism is not a
condition for Joy; it is actually a hindrance to creative
productivity:
No, Son: the richness hearted in such Joy
Is in the knowing what are gifts we give,
5Robert Langbaum, The Poetry of Experience (London, 
1957), p. 35.
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Not in a vain endeavor not to know!
Therefore, desire joy and thank God for it! (11. 84-87) 
Joy is a part of man's "creatureship," Ferishtah concludes, 
for just as Job learned the necessity of independent human 
effort and work, all men must, recalling the words of 
Paracelsus again, "painfully attain to joy."
In "A Pillar at Sebzevar," Ferishtah reiterates the 
necessity of what John in "A Death in the Desert" calls 
man's "pact of creatureship" with God, as well as the reality 
of human Joy despite its illusory appearance that Browning 
embodies in La Saisiaz. Human love is again made the test 
of Joy. Ferishtah employs a parable to drive hone his point. 
Suppose, he says, that a child grasps an orange, mistakenly 
thinking it to be the sum. This pitiable mistake does not 
dim his Joy in the reality of the orange:
'What if soon he finds 
The foolish fruit unworthy grasping? Joy 
In shape and color,— that was joy as true—
Worthy in its degree of love— as grasp
Of sun were, which had singed his hand beside.' (11. 32-
36)
Ferishtah maintains that man must "enjoy the present gift," 
trusting to a beneficent and providential ordering of the 
future. Man cannot achieve the pure trust of the child, 
Ferishtah argues, because he would attempt to "circumscribe 
omnipotence." Man's power of love, an analogue of his power
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of Joy, is imaged as a tether line linking God and man, a
line which gains at "first leap" an understanding of God's
providence that the human mind alone can never achieve:
'Frankly accept the creatureship: ask good
To love for: press bold to the tether's end
Allotted to this life's intelligence!' (11. 136-138)
In "A Bean-Stripe: Also, Apple-Eating," Ferishtah
voices the insight of "St. Martin's Summer" that genuine
Joy is indeed a sober and inextricable mixture of both
pleasure and sorrow:
'Choose a joy!
Bettered it was by sorrow gone before.
And sobered somewhat by the shadowy sense 
Of sorrow which came after or might come.
Joy, sorrow, — by precedence, subsequence—
Either on each, make fusion, mix in life.' (11. 66-71)
Mem can see only man's world, Ferishtah says, and that world
seems to be swallowed up in pain and sorrow, but God's
larger purpose must be trusted:
'God's care be God's! 'T is mine— to boast no joy 
Unsobered by such sorrows of ray kind
As sully with their shade my life that shines.' (11. 187- 
189)
God permits such "black" shades to sully the "whiteness" of 
human experience, Ferishtah explains, in order to prepare 
man for the tremors of doubt that inevitably must intrude. 
Some men would be jealous of Ferishtah's power of Joy; they 
would judge it an unfair and excessive gift:
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'Who is Ferishtah, hitherto exempt
From black experience? Why, if God be just.
Were sundry fellow-mortals singled out 
To undergo experience for his sake,
Just that the gift of pain, bestowed on them,
In him might temper to the due degree 
Joy's else-excessive largess?' (11. 208-214)
Ferishtah admits that he does not know why he is granted
Joy's largess. He can only maintain that such insolvable
questions point again to "man's impotency, God's omnipotence"
(1. 216) .
Browning obviously delights in the exotic Persian 
holiday that is mirrored in the colorful imagery of 
Ferishtah's Fancies, but readers object to the strident 
optimism voiced by Ferishtah but not made meaningful in the 
poetic experience itself. Thomas Hardy, for example, com­
plains that Browning evidences a Christian optimism "worthy 
of a dissenting grocer." Maisie Ward implicitly replies 
to Hardy's charge in her explanation of Browning's purpose 
in Christmas-Eve and Easter-Pay, an explanation that also 
applies to these poems from Ferishtah's Fancies:
Psychology is a modern science. Had it been 
developed earlier mapy of the worst evils of 
the more-or-less Christian centuries would 
have been avoided. Browning was ahead of his 
age when he recognized what his contemporary, 
the scientist Pasteur, also saw when he claimed 
to have the faith of a Breton peasant— and 
hoped one day to have that of a Breton pea­
sant's wife. This does not mean (any more 
than does Newman's saying that all men have
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a reason, though not all men can give a 
reason) that he despised the mind's pro­
cesses. Still less does it mean what 
Browning in his later years sometimes 
appeared to say— that love can be a 
substitute for mind.6
Mrs. Ward contends that Browning sees what his age generally
did not see, that the Godhead must be perceived by the
response of the total human person, not by "mind" or
"emotion" in isolation. This total human response manifests
itself in Joy, and Browning's poetic embodiment of the idea
of Joy needs no elaborate defense.
Furthermore, the "Epilogue" to Ferishtah1s Fancies 
also dispels any suspicion that Browning achieves his idea 
of Joy as smoothly and easily as Ferishtah's glib and con­
fident rhetoric would seem to imply. Morse Peckham has 
pointed out in an introduction to The Ring and the Book 
that "Browning is far from being the witless optimist most 
people imagine him. He is an objectist, as deeply engaged 
with penetrating illusion as were Baudelaire and Flaubert, 
but with a tougher mind. He was one of the most subtle and 
complex of nineteenth-century writers. The meaning of his
6Maisie Ward, Robert Browning and His World: The Private 
Face, 1812-1861 (New York, 1967), p. 188.
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dramatic monologues is so structured that every position—
7even his own . . .  is ironically destroyed." The irony
that Peckham finds at the heart of Browning's poetic method
is abundantly present in the "Epilogue" to this volume,
where the experience of Joy itself is again imaged as a
kini of illusion:
Only, at heart's utmost joy and triumph, terror 
Sudden turns the blood to ice: a chill wind
disencharms
All the lateenchantment! What if all be error—
If the halo irised round my head were. Love, 
thine arms? (11. 25-28)
This final stanza of the "Epilogue," which follows upon a 
vivid description of the good, beauty, and wonder of the 
universe, ironically undercuts both the "utmost joy" of 
that description and the idea of Joy which is a motif of 
the entire volume. Browning, indeed,, most painfully at­
tains to Joy.
In the "Parleying With Christopher Smart," Browning 
admits that his late poetry is often "mere grey argument"
(1. 200). In several of these later poems, however, there 
is a reconciliation of youth and old age that relates to 
Browning's idea of Joy and thus merits some attention. In
7Morse Peckham, ed.. Romanticism: The Culture of the
Nineteenth Century (New York, 1965), p. 218.
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"Christopher Smart," Browning delineates one aspect of his 
poetic theory. As in "Cleon," the poet's first responsibil­
ity is said to be the Joy that encompasses the "use of life":
Nature was made to be by Man enjoyed 
First; followed duly by enjoyment's fruit,
Instruction— haply leaving joy behind:
And you, the instructor, would you slack pursuit
Of the main prize, as poet help mankind
Just to enjoy, there leave them? Play the fool,
Abjuring a superior privilege? (11. 225-231)
In its contemporary setting, this passage is Browning's ad­
verse comment on the "art for art's sake" movement of the 
1880's, but in its more universal application, it is as 
succinct and searching an examination of the place of Joy 
in his own poetic theory and of the poetic vocation itself 
as are Paracelsus and Sordello. Browning again sees Joy 
as the primary poetic value, and he again denies that the 
artist's idea of Joy can be made an end in itself, with no 
thought of the communication of that Joy's meaning to other 
men.
Browning recalls the ladder image, pervasive in his
early poetry, to indicate the necessity of the poet's firm
foundation in the reality of the human situation:
The other method's favored in our day!
The end ere the beginning: as you may.
Master the heavens before you study earth,
Make you familiar with the meteor's birth 
Ere you descend to scrutinize the rose!
I say, o'erstep no least one of the rows
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That lead man from the bottom where he plants
Foot first of all, to life's last ladder-top. (11. 240-
247)
The poet should, Browning says, "learn earth" as the first 
step up the metaphorical ladder of poetry that leads eventu­
ally to the heavens themselves. This ladder imagery of 
"Christopher Smart" is strikingly similar to that employed 
by W. B. Yeats for an analogous purpose in "The Circus 
Animals' Desertion." Yeats concludes this poem, which is a 
survey of his poetic career, with the following passage:
Those masterful images because complete 
Grew in pure mind, but out of what began?
A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street,
Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can,
Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut 
Who keeps the till. Now that my ladder's gone,
I must lie down where all the ladders start.
In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart. (11. 33-40)
The ascent of any spiritual-aesthetic ladder, both Yeats 
and Browning say, starts in the earth and in man's own 
complex and contradictory emotional and psychological strate­
gies. J. Hillis Miller sums up Browning's poetic achievement 
with a reference to the final line of this stanza of Yeats's 
poem. Miller writes that, of the five writers discussed in 
The Disappearance of God, "Browning alone seems to have 
glimpsed the fact that the sad alternations of nihilism and 
escape beyond the world could be evaded if man would only 
reject twenty-five hundred years of belief in the dualism of
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heaven and earth. If man could do this he might come to see 
that being and value lie in this world, in what is immediate, 
tangible, present to man, in earth, sun, sea, in the stars 
in their courses, and in what Yeats was to call 'the foul
Qrag-and-bone shop of the heart; " Browning advises young 
poets to “study earth," "learn earth," and "scrutinize the 
rose," as he himself has studied, learned, and scrutinized 
the innermost conflicts of men and women; only this know­
ledge enables poetry to encompass Joy, to "master the 
heavens."
Browning, as Wordsworth does before him and Yeats
after him, points out the antithetical aspects of human life
and demonstrates that the idea of Joy is an important aspect
of the power that overcomes these antinomies. In "Pisgah-
Sights, I," written when Browning was sixty-three, the
speaker of the poem notes the apparently discordant elements
of human life:
Over the ball of it,
Peering and prying,





One reconcilement. (11. 1-8)
8Miller, p. 359.
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This "one reconcilement" is the only aspect of the Romantic
ideal of equipoise that Browning holds tenable. The wisdom
of old age and approaching death can see the reconcilement
that lies in the wedding of opposites:
All's lend-and-borrow;
Good, see, wants evil,
Joy demands sorrow,
Angel weds devilI (11. 13-16)
The speaker of the poem rejoices in the "rough-smooth"
texture of man's "mixed" existence, and his Joy is also
mixed, for this earthly Joy, so briefly tasted, must be left
behind for the unknown Joy of eternity:
Honey yet gall of it!
There's the life lying,
And I see all of it 
Only, I'm dying. (11. 29-32)
As in the "Epilogue" to Ferishtah's Fancies, the poetic 
pattern of "Pisgaiv-Sights,.I" is a reconciliation of op­
posites followed by an ironic conclusion which undercuts 
that reconciliation.
This pattern also appears in a similar poem of 
reconciliation written by Yeats in his sixty-seventh year. 
Yeats begins "Vacillation" with this stanza:
Between extremities 
Man runs his course;
A brand, or flaming breath.
Comes to destroy 
All those antinomies 
Of day and night;
The body calls it death,
The heart remorse.
But if these be right 
What is joy? (11. 1-10)
With Yeats's question, this exploration of the idea of Joy
is brought full circle. Almost one hundred years before
Yeats asks "What is joy?" in this poem, Browning had asked
the same question in Sordello, and he spent a large part of
his poetic career delineating the answer:
For what is joy? — to heave 
Up one obstruction more, and common leave 
What was peculiar, by such act destroy 
Itself; a partial death is every joy. (VI, 261-264)
The struggle for Joy in the poetry of Robert Browning ulti­
mately encompasses this "one reconcilement," but since his 
best poetry is dramatic rather than contemplative or 
reflective, the concept receives its most intense expression 
in the inner conflicts of speakers such as Cleon, Pompilia, 
and Paracelsus as they embody the interplay of the complex 
components of the idea of Joy. The experience of these 
speakers demonstrates that central to Robert Browning's 
concept of Joy is William Blake's proverb, "Excess of joy 
weeps."
"What is joy?”— the answer to this question is a con­
cern of the major poets of the nineteenth century. 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Arnold, and Browning each contributes 
to the developing notion of the idea of Joy as a unifying
force within a pluralistic culture. The particular mark of 
Browning's concept of Joy lies in his presentment of kindred 
Joy, in the inexorable movement of the human out-souls to­
wards the divine out-soul in the "infinite moment" of union. 
Another important facet of his idea of Joy is manifested in 
his use of the grotesque as an integral part of his poetic 
method. Finally, Browning's ability to embody man's "cap­
ability for joy" in his poetic characters enables him to 
extend the metaphysical and psychological abstractions that 
are associated with the concept of Joy through concrete 
dramatizations. F. A. Pottle's cautionary remarks quoted 
earlier should be recalled in this conclusion; Pottle says 
that it is essential to remember in Wordsworth's poetry that 
it is the poetic imagery that conveys the emotion of Joy.
The same caution is applicable to the idea of Joy in the 
poetry of Robert Browning. In his best poems, it is the 
poetic character who conveys the idea of Joy and who impli­
citly asserts man's capability for Joy.
The idea of Joy touches some of the most important 
aspects of nineteenth-century English literature. I have 
attempted to show that it is not, however, a portmanteau 
emotion, but that the concept of Joy is a serious attempt . 
to provide both an intellectual and spiritual embodiment of
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crucial cultural aspirations. Browning's struggle to main­
tain the idea of Joy is an attempt to merge the "innocence" 
of the poet's idea of Joy with the inevitably conflicting 
"experience" of his position in society. Wordsworth and 
Browning continued to explore this paradoxical union in 
their poetry, while Coleridge and Arnold attempted to es­
tablish a new concept of culture as a dynamic force in 
English life. Since the idea of Joy is so intimately re­
lated to the desire for totality, wholeness, and unity which 
characterizes nineteenth-century English literature, perhaps 
Browning's concept of Joy should be viewed with these stan­
dards in mind. Robert Langbaum's recent comments on this 
aspect of Browning's poetry are sane and judicious.
Langbaum notes that "his best dramatic monologues entitle 
Browning to his rank among the two or three best Victorian 
poets. But is he also— as he certainly aimed to be— one of 
the great poets of English literature?" Langbaum contends 
that even Browning's best dramatic monologues "do not add up 
to what Browning called 'the pure white light,' the total 
vision of life that the greatest poets give us, and that 
Browning from the start— from the time of Sordello— intended 
to give us." Langbaum thus concludes that Browning "is a 
poet of enduring interest— partly because his very faults 
show that he was turning analytic thought against itself,
222
gthat he understood what had to be done." Whatever the 
final verdict may be of his total poetic achievement, the 
idea of Joy is certainly one of Browning's most effective 
attempts to turn "analytic thought against itself."
Henry Adams charged the nineteenth century with an 
unceasing dynamism that found expression in no adequate 
human symbol, and he reluctantly accepts the image of the 
dynamo as the modern equivalent of the twelfth-century 
symbol of the virgin of Chartres. From the time of Matthew 
Arnold's judgment of "confused multitudinousness," the 
same charge of struggling, undirected energy has often been 
leveled against the poetry of Robert Browning. Browning, 
however, is a part of the nineteenth century, and unifying 
symbols of experience had given way to the diversity of ex­
perience itself. It was impossible for the nineteenth- 
century consciousness to acquiesce in a single image of 
cultural experience as powerful as the Virgin; the age was 
too complex in its development for that. But with the idea 
of Joy, Browning continues a Romantic tradition that im­
plicitly denies the symbolic import of the dynamo. The idea
9Robert Langbaum, "Browning and the Question of Myth," 
PMLA, LXXXI (December, 1966), 577, 582.
of Joy in Robert Browning, as it is in Wordsworth and in 
Yeats, is not so much a poetic symbol as it is the embodi­
ment of the most powerful experience that the poetic vision 
can discern and the struggle to channel human energy into 
and through the unifying experience of Joy.
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